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ABSTRACT
In this project are advanced two ways of seeing the ordinary human being with the aim of
understanding who he is: namely, from the perspective of his personal identity and from the point
of view of his self-conception. The chapters included in the first part are meant to treat the issue
of personal identity from a practical perspective, whereas the ones included in the second part
intend to assess the utility of self-conception from a phenomenological standpoint. Ultimately, I
bring together these two perspectives into a unitary understanding of the human being in the
context of his everyday life.
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INTRODUCTION
It might be thought at first glance that if there is a question we would be able to address from our
own experience, which gets to our core and from which we should be able to draw a definite
answer, it could be following: Who am I? Because even if we are not prepared to say anything
about the world and the lives of others, presumably we would at least be tempted to think that we
have enough resources for determining what makes us who we are. But formulating a satisfactory
answer to this question has since ancient times eluded the most inquisitive and insightful minds.
Indeed, it is no accident that the motto inscribed above the entrance to the oracle at Delphi was
“Know thyself,” puzzling figures of the stature of Socrates. It can be gathered, from the vast
literature that this question has given rise to, that no small inquiry would settle it.
A further concern growing as an implication of addressing this matter can be posed in the
follow-up question – How do I conceive of myself? Assuming that we have figured out who we
are, the way we see ourselves would have important consequences for the characterization of selfconception. This would be an interrelated problem, as it would seem that we should be able to
explain what is our self-conception and how have we acquired it if we have in effect grasped who
we are. For if we can explain who we are, we should in principle be capable of justifying the way
we have achieved this grasp, making it thus available for the assessment of others.
Contemporarily, these matters have been framed on the one hand in terms of the
philosophical problems of personal identity and the nature of the self, and on the other as the issue
of the nature of self-conception. We can see how these problems would become tractable by
distributing them in three levels or categories of inquiry.
We can begin discerning the human being at a ground level, belonging to the ontological
class of inquiry, upon which we can secondly identify a practical level and thirdly a
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phenomenological level of its existence. Now, instead of following the tradition in treating
personal identity in the context of the first level as an ontological matter, we follow Marya
Schechtman (2014) and situate this problem at the second level, thinking of personal identity as
something that is practically achieved through our daily interactions and activities. Still, the
ontological status of the human being is indirectly referenced based on how we approach personal
identity from the standpoint of our practical considerations and concerns. Meanwhile, although
the issue of the nature of the self is also traditionally classified as an ontological problem, we do
not address this problem in this way. We only concern ourselves with the phenomenological
problem of the self, thereby setting it up in the context of the third level of inquiry. Thus, while
avoiding the reference to the ontological status of the self, we focus on self-conception since we
are more interested in knowing how we see ourselves than pondering the nature the self. This
phenomenological account is shown to have important implications on the practical level of the
human being’s ordinary life, as it revolves primarily around the utility of self-conception.
The three levels just noted correspond to different types of inquiry about the human being,
which is the main subject of our investigation. The point of separating our approximations to the
human being this way is to avoid conflating types of issues that can be raised about personal
identity and selfhood, so as to not further misunderstandings that have made these issues hard to
treat. It must be said, though, that we sort the problems we treat here into the mentioned levels in
function of the needs and objectives of our investigation with the intention of dividing the labor,
such that these problems could have been organized differently had our goals been others.
Assuming this distinction of levels, we advance two different approaches, contexts, or
modes of presentation of the same content, i.e., an ordinary human being, whether seen with
respect to his personal identity or else from the perspective of his self-conception. Accordingly,
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we divide our proposal in two parts. Part One deals with the issue of personal identity from a
practical standpoint. Clearly, despite the fact that a human being has a notion of himself (i.e., a
self-conception), the relationship of this individual with such an aspect of his identity will not be
assessed in this part. This aspect is rather examined in Part Two, which is concerned with the
general issue of the self viewed from a phenomenological angle. The intention of examining the
topic of self-conception as a further layer of the human being is to see him from a perspective
from which his personal identity can be reconceived as an existential issue, making it thereby
tractable from an ulterior stance. Therefore, by separating the topics of personal identity and selfconception this way, we can advance alternative ways of understanding the same structure or
reference, which is that of a human being.
The practical approximation or mode of presentation of the human being’s personal
identity is thus proposed in the first part, which consists of chapters I, II and III, though Chapter I
is mainly included as a background discussion on the notion of a ‘human being’, a concept we
adopt throughout the extent of this investigation. In the second part, we move on to the
phenomenological discussion of the concept of ‘self’, particularly attending to the issue of the use
of self-conception. Such a phenomenological account is elaborated in chapters IV and V,
assuming indeed the notion of a ‘human being’ that we have elucidated in Chapter I. The point
there is to specify, in the third level of inquiry, the role that the phenomenon of ‘oneself’ plays in
the life of this individual by emphasizing its existential value.
Moreover, the separation of the subjects of personal identity and self-conception in these
two parts is viable given that personal identity does not entail a determined self-conception,
whereas the latter does not presuppose the former. Particularly, we can make sense of personal
identity without having yet accounted for the utility of self-conception, while we are able to
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explain the second without presupposing an account of the first. This is due to the fact that, even
though a human being has a personal identity, he might still conceive of himself otherwise,
attributing a rather different identity to himself; this is, he might have a self-conception that is
incompatible with the character of his identity. As will be seen, the previous corresponds to a case
of ‘alienation’ or ‘dissociation’ that constitutes part of the target of our treatments in this project.
As we classify the problem of personal identity as practical whereas that of self-conception as
phenomenological, our overall approach is going to serve us in discerning several factors that
contribute to this sort of alienation and further help us determine how it can be surmounted.
Conversely, it will be noticed that even as a human being might conceive of himself in a given
way, this conception does not require that the individual is able to track the literal persistence of a
substance in virtue of which his personal identity is grounded, as if his self-conception had to
match this substance.
Nonetheless, it is true that we tend to think of personal identity and self-conception as
interrelated subjects insofar as we suppose that how we conceive of ourselves depends on what
our person identity is, so that our self-conception arises from an understanding of what this
identity is. In effect, it is arguably the case that by explaining who we are we account for our
personal identity and offer at the same time insight into how we see ourselves. After all, we have
noticed that personal identity and self-conception can be regarded as two aspects of the same
individual, so they would naturally be related to one another. Having said that, in the interest of
clarity we will deal with these subjects separately in order to provide a fuller view of the
connection of the personal identity of a human being and his self-conception.
To achieve these goals, in Chapter I we start by elucidating the term ‘human being’ with
the intention of specifying the concept associated to it that is employed in this dissertation. This is
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Wittgenstein’s concept of an ordinary human being as it is used in the Philosophical
Investigations (2009). Furthermore, as a way of positing this concept at the center of our
investigation, it is argued that this notion is logically primitive, that is to say, a basic element in
our conceptual repertoire that will further serve us in specifying diverse aspects of this individual.
The idea is to lay there most of the conceptual framework of this proposal, as in the end it is the
same subject –namely, the ordinary human being– which will be seen from one or another
perspective in all of the chapters of this investigation.
Then, in Chapter II it is offered the remaining part of this dissertation’s framework. The
issue of personal identity is advanced there from a practical stance by presenting Schechtman’s
view of a ‘person life’. This way, we are going to expand Wittgenstein’s picture of the ordinary
person to further capture in it relevant aspects of his everyday life, such as the activities and
interactions of this individual with other human beings within the context of a ‘sociocultural
infrastructure’. The chief aim is thus to forward Schechtman’s approach in a Wittgensteinian vein,
given that she employs a notion of a ‘person’ that is based on Wittgenstein’s concept of a ‘human
being’. In this chapter are also offered elements that play a key role in the next one, as we observe
similarities between Schechtman’s practical account of a ‘person life’ and Wittgenstein’s
conception of ‘forms of life’, such that we can integrate the proposals of these authors in the
context of the human being’s everyday life.
Next, in Chapter III a treatment of the problem of personal identity is presented by appeal
to Wittgenstein’s understanding of the end-goal of his philosophy, this is, the transformation of
life. Since the issue of personal identity is posed as a practical one, it is only natural that its
‘solution’ be practical as well. Roughly speaking, this problem is conceived as a type of
‘alienation’ in which a human being has lost a large degree of ordinariness. It will be clear,
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however, that with “solution” it is meant the sort of ‘treatments’ or ‘therapies’ Wittgenstein
recommends in his latter philosophy. Therefore, in this chapter the picture of a ‘person life’
offered by Schechtman plays a crucial role, because it is in terms of the relationship between a
person’s life and the forms of life of a community that the type of ‘solution’ we propose to this
practical issue can be accomplished.
In Part Two, the notion that an ordinary human person has of himself is brought to the
forefront, such that a phenomenological account of self-conception can be elaborated. In Chapter
IV, the issue of the utility of self-conception is posed by first addressing the question of the origin
of self-conception. Nevertheless, the previous question leads to the puzzle of self-conception,
which basically challenges ways in which we have supposedly come up with a notion of
ourselves. This is why we must address the puzzle of self-conception in the second part of this
project, since, without a basic grasp as to the origins of self-conception, its utility would hardly be
explained. We advance and criticize there traditional approaches to this puzzle that are framed in
a static vein, and then argue that we need to change our approach by embracing a dynamic
standpoint in order to make the puzzle of self-conception tractable.
Lastly, Chapter IV proposes a dynamic approximation to the puzzle of self-conception
and, thereby, to the problem of self-conception’s utility. After advancing some relevant dynamic
approaches, I introduce the Two-Moment View as a way of accounting for the role of selfconception from a dynamic standpoint. With these resources in hand, and with the aid of Mead’s
notion of the self understood as a social construct, it is then possible to address the puzzle of selfconception. Additionally, this final chapter provides several elements needed in our treatment of
alienation that are not made explicit in Part One, so that by outlining there the importance of selfconception we can point out other requirements that must be satisfied to overcome alienation.
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This much is stressed in the Conclusions, where the richness of our twofold approach to the
human being in terms of his personal identity and his self-conception is shown in the combination
or synthesis of these heterogeneous aspects.
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Part One
Personal Identity
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I.

AN ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN BEINGS

What does it mean to say that an individual is human? It is generally thought that we place others
in the ‘human being’ category insofar as we ascribe them a wide range of properties such as
corporeal states like size, weight, and a physical location – and, more importantly, psychological
states such as intentions, beliefs, desires, and feelings. Usually we do not have any trouble
recognizing that others possess mental states or classifying other people as human. However, once
we begin to view this matter from a philosophical perspective, we can question the nature of our
knowledge of others as human beings. For how is it that we know for a fact that the individuals
we see on the streets, with whom we interact on a daily basis, are actually people? Ultimately, the
only mental states that are transparent are my own, whereas those of others lie beyond my realm
of experience. If I am aware at all of the existence of these states, it is because I perceive my own
but I can only perceive the behavior of others and not the concrete beliefs, desires, and feelings
motivating it, so the problem of whether it is an expression of mental states appears to be
unsolvable. Thereby, if the only way I can decide whether others are human beings is by verifying
that they have psychological states, it seems that I can never determine if I am surrounded by
humans.
It could be argued in response that our ability to judge others as human beings rests solely on
the capacity of recognizing that they must be attributed the sort of properties mentioned above.
Still, this answer does not prove satisfactory as it presupposes that viewing others as human
necessarily means recognizing them as worthy of the application of a large set of human-like
properties. On the other hand, it could be said that we recognize the existence of psychological
states in others based on the analogy with our own case, as this analogy provides us with
sufficient knowledge about humanity in individuals. Yet, for one thing, the way in which my

9

verbal behavior relates to my own mental states could hardly constitute an adequate basis for
inferring that the behavior of others correlate, in sufficiently similar ways, to their own mental
states. The evidence I have so far gathered about my own case is notably limited, so it could not
serve in accounting for an indefinite number of cases; it would merely allow hasty generalizations
about what occurs in a far greater number of cases where others are involved. Furthermore, the
way I verify psychological self-ascriptions significantly differs from the method through which
mental properties are usually attributed to others. In contrast to other-ascription of mental
predicates, I do not rely on the observation of my own behavior in order to self-ascribe these
predicates (see Strawson 394). Given, then, that I cannot know solely on the basis of the analogy
with my own case whether others have mental states like my own and which these might turn out
to be, it appears that I cannot know, either, whether others are human, that is, if I can only know
about the humanity of others after I have determined that they undergo such states.
Even so, it is not clear that we judge others as human beings only after we have reached the
conclusion that they (must) have psychological states. An alternative approach to be explored in
this chapter is that we naturally or instinctively treat others as human beings and attend to the
psychological states they experience without previously questioning whether or not they possess
such states. For if we are ever to know that others are people, it would rather be due to the
characteristic reactions and responses they elicit from us.
Now, given the multiplicity of meanings of ‘human being’ such as the genetic and moral
acceptations of the term, we should distinguish in the course of this inquiry which notion we have
in mind to demarcate the traits of the being we are referring to. This way, we will be able to
clarify what we mean when saying that a certain individual is human. I shall thus analyze several
notions typically associated to the term ‘human’. This analysis will primarily revolve around
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Wittgenstein’s notion of a human being (1953). Other conceptions will be examined as well,
particularly, Paul Snowdon’s genetic notion (2014). Additionally, I will advance and defend the
claim that Wittgenstein’s notion can be interpreted as logically primitive. To substantiate this
claim, I will argue that there exists a parity of cases with Strawson’s approach to the concept of
person.

I.1. Human Beings
In the context of addressing a large set of philosophical assumptions, Wittgenstein appeals in his
Philosophical Investigations to a common sense of ‘human being’ that applies to an individual
who “has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (§ 281). He
regards this individual as someone towards whom we possess a natural or instinctual attitude that
consists of an extensive range of characteristic reactions, responses and dispositions. This is a
creature that we automatically treat as someone in possession of mental states, which partly
constitute what he is. This attitude goes hand in hand with the treatment of this creature as a
human being, which crucially differs from a belief or opinion we form in order to include him in
the human being category. As Wittgenstein states, “[m]y attitude towards him [i.e., a human
being] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (II, IV, § 22). The
notion that human beings have mental states, then, is not just a conclusion we reach based on the
observation of their verbal behavior. On the contrary, we have a practical concern towards these
beings that results from several interactions with them, a concern particularly shown in reactions
that contrast those we have towards other objects of our attention.
David Cockburn accounts for this ‘practical orientation’ as instinctually given “in part in
the fact that certain emotions and actions would come naturally to me in response to certain
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behavior” on the part of a human being (6). Furthermore, he stresses how important this practical
orientation is to Wittgenstein’s approach by arguing that he places it in the center of his picture of
the human being. What this picture offers is an ordinary context wherein numerous engagements
with people already include a characteristic treatment that reveals the fact that we already
conceive them as having mental states. Wittgenstein’s framework circumscribes an ordinary
understanding of the human being meant to oppose a rationalist portrayal, where one would be in
the position to treat others as humans only if one knew for a fact that they have experiences. In
principle, this ordinary understanding would assist us in resisting the rationalistic view that leads
us to be puzzled about whether others are actually human. Thus, from the ordinary standpoint, we
feel compelled to react to someone’s manifestation of pain, e.g., treating him in consequence as a
human being, whether we take pity on him, respond irascibly, or else feel apathy. Indifference
would not amount to the absence of a reaction but, rather, to one reaction more amongst others.
The main discrepancy with the rationalist picture resides then in the natural fact that we do not
usually infer the existence of a psychological state of pain residing somehow ‘under the surface’
of the human being grimacing in front of us. The target of our reactions is not a putative
homunculus expressing his pain through the human being’s features. Rather, the target is only the
flesh-and-bone human being we are confronted with.
Moreover, conceiving myself as a human being involves in the same sense having a
certain attitude towards myself, which is to say, a practically driven concern about me (20). This
attitude, again, is instinctual in that it is not the end result of a thought process through which I
confirm that I am actually human given that I happen to find ‘in myself’ psychological states like
those of other humans. That I am a proper object of the sort of reactions and responses
Wittgenstein has in mind is shown in the several ways I treat myself, while these in turn incite
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reactions and responses from other human beings. Ultimately, the attitudes I possess towards
myself come about instinctually.

Resisting Behaviorism
Although Wittgenstein opposes the rationalist picture of human beings, this does not imply that he
advocates for a class of physicalism such as behaviorism (Philosophical Investigations § 307).
According to him, the object of our natural reactions and responses is not just a human body, for
what sort of distinction are we making when we say that it is the body that feels pain and not the
man? In effect, he asks, “How does it become clear that it is not the body [that feels pain]?” (§
286) After all, there is some absurdity in saying that it is merely a body or a part of it that feels
pain: “if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it)” (§
286.). In the end, when it comes to tracking our own reactions and responses to someone’s pain, it
is the whole human being and not only his body who we sympathize with: “one does not comfort
the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his eyes” (§ 286.). It is true that human behavior is a
constitutive aspect of Wittgenstein’s picture, but to limit the picture to this aspect would exclude
several dimensions of the human being that are purposely meant to be encompassed in his
depiction.
In this regard, John Cook advises against reading Wittgenstein as embracing behaviorism.
When one interprets human beings in terms of their types of actions, one’s ordinary judgments are
not grounded in “protocol statements,” which are propositions merely about humans conduct
amounting to “colorless bodily movements” (118). Such an analysis would depart from our
ordinary interpretation of the actions of humans, for it is not based upon such statements. Indeed,
Cook maintains that the assumption whereby “we are forced to recognize descriptions (or
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observations) of bodily movements as being epistemologically basic in our knowledge of other
persons” is unwarranted (118). Our ordinary perception of human beings does not rest on their
description of them as bodies in movement. On the contrary, it is only after we have ordinarily
judged the actions of humans that we can move on to a more abstract level of comprehension,
thus perceiving them solely as physical objects moving through space. But this level would be
derived from the ordinary perception of them and, ultimately, would depend on it.

The Holism of Living Human Beings
It is worth noting that Wittgenstein restricts the logical type of an individual deserving
psychological attributions to a living human being and what resembles or behaves like it
(Philosophical Investigations § 281). As discussed previously, recognizing others as human
beings involves possessing a wide range of reactions with which to reciprocate them, insofar as
they initially act in ways that provoke such reactions. Now, all of this is possible because of our
responses to these individuals as particular forms of life. “Only surrounded by certain normal
manifestations of life,” Wittgenstein writes in Zettel, “is there such a thing as an expression of
pain. Only surrounded by an even more far-reaching particular manifestation of life, such a thing
as the expression of sorrow or affection” (§ 534). This suggests, broadly speaking, that the
presence of human life is a precondition for our ascriptions of mental states. In the absence of
human life, the aforementioned reactions and responses to humans could not be provoked and,
consequently, people’s psychological states would not be a matter of our concern. Actually, we do
not include dead human beings in the category of individuals towards whom we react in the ways
described by Wittgenstein because we do not regard them as having experience: “a corpse seems
to us quite inaccessible to pain. — Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead is not the
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same. All our reactions are different” (Philosophical Investigations § 284). As Wittgenstein
observes, this difference does not yet imply that we do not respond to human corpses in a specific
manner, which is evidently different from, say, our responses to dead animals and inanimate
objects. To be precise, the typical responses we exhibit towards human forms of life compose a
distinguished set, the specificity of which delimits the attitudes we would consider to be oriented
towards living humans and what resemble them. For example, we do not fear inanimate objects in
the same sense that we fear the aggression of human beings. As Cockburn suggests, “[f]or most of
us another’s intense anger can be disturbing in a way which is quite different from that in which a
landslide is generally thought of disturbing” (4).
Then again, we are not usually disturbed only because we have determined that someone
must hate us on the basis of observing his demeanor, as if such hatred would potentially bring
about harm to us by using his body in a specific way so as to inflict pain on us. Quite the
opposite: we feel one way or another about a human being as a whole. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s
illustration:
Imagine that I am in the presence of someone who, for one reason or another, is
extremely annoyed with me. My interlocutor gets angry and I notice that he is
expressing his anger by speaking aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But
where is this anger? People will say that it is in the mind of my interlocutor. What this
means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I
discern in my opponent’s looks separated from his gestures, speech and body. None of
this takes place in some otherworldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of
the angry man. It really is here, in this room and in this part of the room, that the anger
breaks forth. It is in the space between him and me that it unfolds … anger inhabits him
and it blossoms on the surface of his pale or purple cheeks, his blood-shot eyes and
wheezing voice. (85)
It is thus that Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that psychological states inhabit something other
than an entire human being. “Other human beings,” he argues, “are never pure spirit for me: I
only know them through their glances, their gestures, their speech – in other words, through their
bodies” (82). By the same token, he continues, “another human being is certainly more than
15

simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin
of numerous actions and words” (82). Similarly, we can interpret Wittgenstein as thinking of the
human being in a holistic way: namely, as a creature who we ordinarily perceive as undivided,
capable of receiving psychological and corporeal ascriptions since he is uniformly the natural
bearer of both.
The point, then, seems not to be so much that we are human because we have human bodies
and human psychology. Instinctively, we respond to these creatures as having mental states and
processes with the same degree of confidence that we ascribe corporeal traits to them. To the
same degree that we may trivially consider others as being of a certain weight and height –
although we do not know exactly what those might turn out to be - we can rightly expect others to
have intentions, beliefs, desires and dispositions. Therefore, whichever is the way we end up
perceiving someone as a human being, we nonetheless treat him as one regardless.

Countering Skepticism of Other Minds
A notable implication of Wittgenstein’s approach is that it presents a way out of the Cartesian
problem of other minds. His line of argumentation serves as a precedent for contesting radical
skepticism about the humanity of others. Insofar as our treatment of others is in accordance with
our natural reactions and dispositions towards humans, such treatment demands no justification.
The burden of the proof rather lies on the skeptic, who must provide sufficient evidence for
questioning humanity in others by doubting the validity of our natural reactions and dispositions
towards them. In fact, at times one may have reasonable doubt about the authenticity of the
expressions of sorrow or pain of other humans; but in what contexts would one deny the humanity
of individuals even though one manifests natural reactions toward them? Without the possibility
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of error, as Wittgenstein would say, we cannot possibly be right, so the skeptic would have to find
plausible reasons to undermine the authenticity of our reactions. In this regard, Cook asks the
following:
If the question is whether they are people or not, we must ask: ‘People as opposed to
what?’ And here the answer is not at all clear. If I look at my son playing near by
and ask, ‘What else might he be?’, no answer suggests itself. He is clearly not a
statue, nor is he an animated doll of the sort we sometimes see looking very lifelike.
He is my own child, my own flesh and blood. (121)
Cook thus interprets Wittgenstein as claiming that, when pushed to the extreme, the skeptic’s
doubt becomes unsatisfactory. As a consequence of adopting the philosophical ideas of ‘body’
and ‘bodily movement’, he thinks that we create a metaphysical fissure between an ordinary
human being and his body that cannot exist (128). However, once we take an ordinary human
being to be central to our reactions, this fissure cannot exist. Thereby, in the absence of such a
gap, the skeptic will have to find other ways to question the humanity of others. The burden of the
proof lies with the skeptic, who must provide reasons for doubting our normal understanding of
humans. In other words, the burden lies on those who want to deny humanity in the individuals
towards whom the skeptics have already displayed natural reactions as if they were human beings.
These reactions and responses are ‘basic’ in the sense that we do not need reasons for having
them.
A skeptic, though, could try to shift the burden of the proof back and demand evidence
from Wittgenstein which would substantiate his ordinary characterization of human beings. Still,
at this stage Wittgenstein would claim that we have reached the rock bottom of our beliefs
(Philosophical Investigations § 248). That we feel inclined to treat others as human beings is
already part of what is involved in belonging to a human form of life. The only valid way to err in
ascribing humanity to these forms of life would require seeing those individuals from outside a
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historical, social, and physical context. But, as we are already situated in a given context and we
are in constant contact with other humans (Taylor 76), we cannot make sense of such radical
doubt. The starting point of our inquiries is precisely a ‘rough ground’ (Cf. Philosophical
Investigations § 107) where we ascribe mental properties to people. This ground does not have or
need a foundation, inasmuch as one does not ordinarily need proof of the humanity of others to
treat them as such.
In this respect, Wittgenstein observes a type of immediateness in the way that we become
aware of the fact that others undergo mental states, particularly, as we naturally feel compelled to
respond to the feelings, beliefs, and desires of others. Such immediacy takes place in the context
of a ‘rough ground’ (§ 107) where everyday human beings interact with each other in several
ways. Notice, though, that Wittgenstein is not simply pointing out that there is a connection
between having instinctive attitudes towards others and recognizing them as human beings.
Instead, he provides a picture of this connection where the rationalist assumption that there is
something more basic or fundamental than these attitudes – such as recognizing others as humans
– is excluded. “The attitude,” Cockburn explains, “is what is basic in our relations with each
other; it does not have, or need, any underpinning in the form of a ‘belief’ about the character of
what we are confronted with” (23). The reason is that we immediately and spontaneously come
up with such a belief: “To ‘recognize these as people’, we might say, just is to have the attitude”
(Ibid.). This explains why Wittgenstein does not see the need to justify our reactions and
responses to individuals, since forming a belief about the character of others is one more attitude
amongst others. Therefore, insofar as ascribing mental states to others occurs instinctively – i.e.,
as effortlessly as treating others like human beings –, forming an opinion about their
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psychological states is not in and of itself a ‘basic’ process on which our reactions and responses
to others could be grounded.
Let us now turn to Strawson’s conception of a person in order to establish the basis for
arguing later on that Wittgenstein’s human being concept can be shown to connote similar
attributes.

I.2. Persons
In Individuals (1959), Strawson refers to a concept of a person that denotes a logical type of entity
that can be ascribed different types of predicates, regardless of their class. This is, “the concept of
a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates
ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc. are applicable to a single individual of
that single type” (388). These predicates apply to such an individual in virtue of the fact that
person is a logically primitive notion, meaning that it has a central place in our conceptual scheme
and in our linguistic practices. The fact that it is an elementary tool in our linguistic repertoire
explains how it shapes our attributions of states of consciousness. The concept of a person, he
stresses, is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness or body (389), so that ascriptions
of psychological and bodily properties are logically secondary, derived from the notion of a
person (389). By implication, a person cannot be analyzed in terms of those psychological or
corporeal concepts, i.e., either as “an animated body or … an embodied anima.” (389). On the
contrary, “states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to
persons” (389) in that the existence of persons is a requisite for mental ascriptions. In other
words, the primitive character of this notion is “a necessary condition of states of consciousness
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being ascribed at all,” because they are ascribed “to the very same things as certain corporeal
characteristic, a certain physical situation, etc.” (389).
It follows that the idea of a ‘pure individual consciousness’ understood as a logical ingredient
of persons could not exist, or, at least, he thinks that it could not exist as a primitive concept by
appeal to which the concept of person could be explained. Rather, if such a notion exists at all, it
must be “a secondary, nonprimitive concept, which is itself explained, analyzed, in terms of the
concept of person.” (389). A person is thus conceived as a “two-sided thing,” and not as the
combination of “two one-sided things” (389) — i.e., as a mind or pure consciousness, on the one
hand, and a discrete body, on the other. Therefore, affirming that an individual is a person would
not involve conceiving it as an entity made out of a mind and a body (see Descartes 1997 48).
From one perspective, a person is said to have a body, not to be one (Hacker “Strawson’s Concept
of a Person” 39). From another, mental states like beliefs and desires apply not merely to a body
but to a person undergoing those states. According to Strawson, then, ‘I’ does not refer to an
‘inner’ subject of experience or else to someone’s body. Instead, it refers to the person employing
the pronoun, which is the genuine bearer of both psychological and material ascriptions. The
genuine bearer of mental predicates – a person – is naturally suitable for ‘I’ “because I am a
person among others. And the [mental] predicates which would, per impossibile, belong to the
pure subject [of experience] if it could be referred to, belong properly to the person to which “I”
does refer” (390).

On the First Person/Third Person Asymmetry
When it comes to ascribing mental states, though, Strawson notices an asymmetry between firstand third-person methods of correction. It can be verified by contrasting how a subclass of
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psychological predicates is applied to oneself and how it applies to others. According to him, one
attributes these predicates to oneself without the help of any behavioral criterion, but judges the
correctness of their ascription to others solely on the basis of their behavior (394). Otherascription of this set of predicates entails an intention or a state of consciousness which is shown
in an action, that is, a pattern of bodily movements (398): “I mean such things as ‘going for a
walk,’ ‘furling a rope,’ ‘playing ball,’ ‘writing a letter’” (398). For instance, ‘going for a walk’ is
a psychological predicate that we can ascribe to others based on the observation of their actions.
The asymmetry, though, resides in the natural fact that I can self-ascribe this property without
external basis of observation. To be sure, I can predict my actions without interpreting my own
behavior. Strawson claims that that the basis for self-ascriptions of mental properties is “entirely
adequate,” and yet, “this basis is quite distinct from those on which one ascribes the predicate to
another” (394), as this subset is other-ascribable only on the basis of behavioral criterion.
At the same time, Strawson considers that first- and third-person methods of correction of
mental ascriptions are interdependent. Such interdependence lies in the fact that we can interpret
others as suitable objects of mental predicates only if we are disposed to self-ascribe them. The
reverse is also true: namely, we can predicate these psychological properties to ourselves without
any observational criterion because we are disposed to ascribe them to others. Moreover, in order
to interpret the bodily movements of others as actions, one conceives oneself in function of the
concept of a person: “It is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as
persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on, each other, and act in accord with a
common human nature” (399). As Hacker points out, the methods through which self-ascribable
and other-ascribable psychological predicates are applied are not processes with absolutely
nothing in common. They rather represent “two sides of a single coin” (“Strawson’s Concept of a
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Person” 27). Indeed, he finds that “we interpret … the movements of the bodies of others only by
seeing them as elements of plans of action akin to our own, of which we know the present course
and future developments without observation of the present movements of our own body” (27).
Strawson’s idea, then, is that we ascribe intentions to the persons whose bodily movements we
can observe because of a displayed pattern of action only to the extent that we are also disposed to
ascribe such actions to ourselves. If one is to make sense of one’s own intentions, one must have a
sense of what it means to be a person with intentions or dispositions to actions, which can be
developed only by conceiving others as relating to one another on the basis of what they intend to
do. Therefore, the asymmetry existing between first- and third-person methods of verification
does not make any one of these methods more indispensable over the other, for they complement
each another in the process of learning how to apply psychological predicates pertaining to the
subclass mentioned above.
Now that we have examined Wittgenstein’s notion of a human being and Strawson’s concept
of a person, let us see in what ways there is a parity of cases between these approaches.

I.3. On the Logical Status of the Human Being Concept
“Human being” is an ambiguous expression that connotes at least four notions. First, there is the
genetic sense of the term referring to a member of the Homo sapiens species (Cf. Snowdon 2014).
Secondly, there is the moral sense that applies to a member of the moral community (Cf. Warren
1973). Furthermore, Aristotle defines a human being essentially as a rational animal, offering thus
a third notion that focuses on the cognitive capacities of this creature. Lastly, there is the ordinary
notion instantiated in Wittgenstein’s usage of the expression. During this dissertation, I will
employ “human being” in the fourth sense by appealing to the notion with which Wittgenstein
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denotes an individual towards whom we possess natural reactions, responses, and dispositions. I
will now elaborate on the status of this concept by considering whether it can be interpreted as
primitive in our conceptual scheme. Then, I will describe the ways it relates to the genetic notion
to further explain the central place it has in our conceptual scheme.

The Human Being in a Primitive Conception
As previously discussed, Strawson speaks of the primitiveness of ‘person’ in relation to the
secondary status of notions like ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, and ‘body’. He argues that the notion of
a person cannot be analyzed as that of an individual consciousness or body (389), while
maintaining that ascriptions of states of consciousness, together with corporeal ascriptions, can be
explained relative to a holistic understanding of a person. Even more, he conceives of the
presence of a person as a necessary condition for the ascription of mental and physical states.
Similarly, we can characterize Wittgenstein’s concept of a human being as primitive if it
cannot be explained or analyzed either into the genetic, moral, or Aristotelian conception of a
human being. Inasmuch as Strawson considers the concept of body to be derived from ‘person’,
the ordinary concept of a human being is primitive or basic in relation to the (secondary) status of
the genetic notion of a human being. If this is the case, the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian
notions of a human being are not logical ingredients of the ordinary concept. Conversely, the
ordinary notion must be a logical ingredient of the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian conceptions.
Moreover, Wittgenstein considers the human being holistically, which can be interpreted –
like Strawson’s conception of a person – as a unified object of our concern. To the same extent,
then, it can be inferred that the common concept we possess of individuals must be present in our
conceptual repertoire in a primitive form. For, in the end, through this concept we ultimately
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attend to the common man. Practically speaking, from Wittgenstein’s perspective we react to the
ordinary human being and not just to some of its attributes, that is, regardless of what is our
attitude towards the individual in its entirety. For instance, we are instinctively prone to attend to
the person’s suffering; his pain is part of our concern, but only insofar as it is a concern for his
individual wellbeing. The ordinary human being, then, is not something we find in the world
already categorized either according to a biological, moral, or psychological set of properties. On
the contrary, it is after we grasp the common notion that we are able to develop other notions of a
human being, depending on the interests and necessities of our endeavor.
Thus, since the ordinary concept occupies a central position in our conceptual network, it
serves as a starting point on which the questions driving our inquiries about human beings are
based. It would thus be possible to explain our ascriptions of biological, moral, and cognitive
properties relative to humans based on our primitive understanding and employment of the human
being notion, since these properties can all be traced to the common human. Either a biological,
moral, or psychological examination has its own advantages and disadvantages. For although it
serves to explain a series of aspects of the ordinary human, since it is interested in one sense of
‘human being’ over the rest, either investigation cannot do justice to all of the dimensions of the
human being. Either way, as each secondary notion of the human being emerges by emphasizing
aspects or characteristics of the ordinary individual, each can be said to derive from our ordinary
understanding of this being, which is not yet categorized from either perspective.
Now, another way in which Wittgenstein’s approach resembles Strawson’s is that the
presence of an ordinary human being can be interpreted as a necessary condition for the
ascriptions of biological, moral, and cognitive characteristics. Let us examine as a case study how
the genetic characterization of a human being presupposes the existence of the ordinary human
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being, to which we attribute biological properties that fix the latter within the category of a
species. What we need to find out, then, is whether the set of properties ascribable to the ordinary
human can be exhausted in a complete and accurate biological description of this creature.
Specifically, we need to determine if our applications of the ordinary sense of ‘human being’ can
be satisfactorily explained in function of a biological account of this individual. With this
intention, let us see how the genetic notion of a human being is employed in an animalist
approach.

A Vantage Perspective on the Ordinary Human Being
According to Paul Snowdon, what persists over the course of a person’s life is the bodily
continuity of an animal. This view is supported on an identity thesis whereby “[e]ach of us is
identical with, is one and the same as, an animal” (7). The person one is would amount to no more
or less than a human animal situated in a discernible space, so that ultimately “[t]he person is the
animal (where the person is)” (4). From his perspective, then, the person does not differ in any
relevant way from the Homo sapiens. He suggests that many traits we would assign to the
ordinary person or human being are explained by evolutionary theory, so that psychology, for
example, is irrelevant to animal persistence over time. Its cognitive and linguistic capacities have
thus arisen in the course of evolution, just as any other device from which this animal has
benefited from (4). The development of these capacities is explained in terms of the ways this
organism has thought about its environment.
Yet, Snowdon seems to expand the notion of ‘animal’ so as to capture diverse types of
properties we generally attribute to the ordinary human. In his appeal to natural selection, he
privileges the biological dimension of the ordinary human being by selecting the genetic category
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as the most ‘basic’ perspective to be taken on the human being. This way, the genetic concept is
appealed to in order to argue that bodily continuity is what really matters when it comes to
deciding what persists during the course of a human life. But it is not clear how this expansion of
meaning would be justified. First, in its common sense, “human being” is not meant to apply
exclusively to the body of a human being. We rather denote with it a single entity, an individual
of a primitive logical class. Actually, our instinct is to respond to the other as a human being with
physical characteristics, and not particularly as a homo sapiens. Secondly, this use of ‘animal’
would at least not be completely justified by evolutionary theory, since, for all we know, the
cognitive and linguistic faculties of this animal make it a special case in evolutionary biology.
Indeed, we only attribute some traits to human beings – such as using language and having
culture, which entails passing on knowledge to future generations. Thus, it is not clear how this
broad conception of ‘animal’ would be supported through the appeal to natural selection.
Then again, the theoretical advantages of evolutionary theory are not in question. The
expansion of the meaning of ‘animal’ could in turn be justified as offering one vantage
perspective on the human being based on the background of evolutionary biology. That is, a
standpoint on the ordinary human being from which we can predict and explain much of his
behavior. Nonetheless, the point is rather that we do not ordinarily conceive of the human being
as a homo sapiens: our understanding of a human being as pertaining to a species comes after the
fact, when we classify what type of animal we are from the vantage point offered by evolutionary
theory. Our primitive comprehension of the human being would thereby not presuppose or require
the biological grounds afforded by evolutionary theory, as we can explain the actions and
reactions of common human beings without its help. The issue then with how Snowdon expands
the genetic notion of animal is that it sets stringent boundaries on the ordinary notion of a human
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being, whilst actually the ordinary concept lacks such limitations. Our primitive understanding of
a human being does not involve a distinction between a genetic, moral, or psychological category.
From Wittgenstein’s perspective, the ordinary expression “human being” has no fixed or definite
rules of application (see Philosophical Investigations § 81), just as any other ordinary expression.
In consequence, we cannot strictly define what an ordinary human being is based on necessary
and sufficient conditions, given that this ordinary notion has no such sharp boundaries. Setting,
then, those strict limitations would not actually solve the natural imprecision of the ordinary sense
of “human being.”

A Sense in which the Ordinary Human is Favored
But is not the ordinary sense of “human being” just another sense of the expression, so that in the
end it is not logically primitive? For why should the ordinary concept be privileged over the other
notions of a human being? At this stage, it is important to notice that, if the ordinary concept of a
human being were primitive, it would only acquire this status in virtue of its relationship with
other notions such as the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian. As the latter derive from it, the ordinary
concept would be primitive in a relative way. There would not be, so to speak, a real sense of
“human being” to be favored, for it is clear that this expression is ordinarily ambiguous
favoring such real sense would thus be artificial. The common sense, though, is preferred for its
practical advantages, to the extent that it plays a central role in our conceptual practices,
particularly, in relation to the use of notions derived from it. The ordinary notion is a precondition
in our understanding of the different possible senses of “human being,” so that without it we
could not benefit from the theoretical advantages offered by adopting any particular notion
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connoted by it. Thereby, we only favor the ordinary concept insofar as it is the logical beginning
of our biological, moral, and psychological inquiries.
On a final note, it is not clear though that metaphysical questions about the nature of
human beings can be answered by favoring any secondary sense of “human being” over the rest.
All one can do is point out the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the biologist’s
viewpoint, who might be interested in the genetic sense; the psychologist’s stance, who might be
concerned with the cognitive-capacity sense; or, finally, the philosopher’s (or someone else’s)
stance, who might be interested in the moral sense. In our day-to-day life, however, we seem
rather prone to viewing others as ordinary human beings in virtue of our practical concerns. The
ordinary sense is thus favored insofar as we naturally fall back on it when it comes to
characterizing others as human beings.
Let us now turn to the main issue of the first part of this investigation, namely, the
relationship of an ordinary human being and his everyday life so as to understand what his
personal identity consists of.
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II.

A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL IDENTITY

The main goal of this chapter is to address the philosophical issue of personal identity by
expanding Wittgenstein’s picture of the human being in a way that further encapsulates aspects of
his ordinary life such as his activities and exchanges with other human beings. This will be
achieved by elaborating on Schechtman’s Person Life View, since her understanding of the
concept of a ‘person’ is in tune with Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘human being’. Accordingly, I will
be laying out her position while being in agreement with it, as it is also part of the conceptual
framework of this project. The reason is that her position will complement Wittgenstein’s image
of the human being by explicitly including in it his everyday life. In this context, Schechtman’s
practical approach to the problem of personal identity will be explained by taking over especially
her dependence model, the general structure of a person life, and her Person Life View, which are
the aspects of her account that will be important when we propose in Chapter III a ‘solution’ to
the issue of personal identity. As will be seen in the last section of this chapter, what is mostly
relevant in these places of agreement is her ‘external’ approximation to a person’s identity as
opposed to an ‘internal’, ‘essentialist’ view of it. It is in this sense that her practical
approximation to personal identity will be made clear.
The issue we seek to get acquaintance with in this chapter is this: How can one remain the
same individual over time? Given the alterations of state and condition that any human being
must undergo, in what way can anyone be said to persist continuously, unaltered, during a
lifetime? If someone is, strictly speaking, going to remain, the issue is then whether a person’s
hypothetical avoidance of substantive change could somehow have an impact on the constitution
of his personal identity. To put it differently: How could anyone in any way bypass all of the
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changes implied in fully living? And why would such changes undermine the identity of a
person?
In general, we tend to think of a person as having some constituting feature or element
“which is there and remains the same” as he grows up, rendering the person ‘the same’ despite the
diverse stages of life (Hunter 33). We believe that we have identified such a constituent element
after completing the process of identifying a person, or at least assume its presence regardless of
whether we can explicitly point out such a constituent (33). Our conception of the identity of a
person thereby entails the continuity of a single element during the life of a person, since, upon its
presence, a criterion for deciding whether an individual is the same person at different times
would help settle the matter. In its absence we would have to decide upon such a criterion that
someone is no longer the same but a different person —we would have to insist that the person
has changed. That is, the individual has not merely changed radically in personality, physical
traits, or in some other ‘basic’ way his life has undergone a radical transformation. The person has
rather lost his identity:
If Caesar becomes an alcoholic, it is Caesar who is now addicted; but if Caesar
becomes Cleopatra, it is not Caesar but Cleopatra who is now Cleopatra. (33)
It makes no sense to talk about two distinct individuals as being the same by saying that one has
become the other, the first thereby losing completely his identity: if Caesar is an alcoholic and
becomes Cleopatra, then it is Cleopatra who is an alcoholic. If we accept a change of identity, it
follows that “we cannot attribute the new identity to the old person” (33). When we refer to a
person’s substantial change, we are not merely speaking of a change in personality or physical
appearance: as the psychological and physical functions of human beings unavoidably decay, by
default none of these can constitute the one element capable of continuing ‘the same’ through
time and guaranteeing a person’s identity.
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However, do we require a grasp of what this alleged constitutive element might be before
we can identify people as the individuals they are? From the standpoint of our regular experience,
it is clear that identifying human beings is an effortless process, at least to the extent that it does
not presuppose theoretical knowledge of the persistence of such an element in a person for the
latter to be individuated. But then, if identifying persons is an ordinary activity that does not entail
knowledge of the literal preservation during the span of a lifetime of a quality defining who we
‘really’ are, why do we even think of the identity of a person in terms of the continuity of an
unaltered element? If our ordinary conception of personal identity does not presuppose an
ontological commitment to the continuation or preservation of such a feature, our problem must
not be primarily ontological. Since the question of what makes a person the same over time does
not require establishing the nature of such an essential element or property constitutive of
persons’ identities, we can then focus on the significance of personal identity as it concerns a
large range of interactions through which human beings are normally individuated. We can
restrict our analysis to the diverse ways that someone’s identity is ordinarily fixed, thus putting
aside the philosophical problem of which is the property that gives rise to one’s identity.
Still, an appeal to the specificity of each human being in the context of his exchanges with
others would not suffice when it comes to determining how his identity is constituted. We could
trivially say that a person’s identity consists of the specific attributes and capacities he possesses,
but this would hardly be of help. If we are looking to move on from a basic understanding of what
a person is, we need to establish which sort of traits determine whether persons are to be
considered as being ‘the same over time’. The defining elements we are seeking must particularly
serve in individuating persons if they are going to constitute their identity. Subsequently,
whatever might be the elements giving rise to a person’s identity, they must have individuating
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characteristics since “otherwise … [their] presence would not show who a person is (but at most
that he is a human being)” (36). As a matter of fact, we do not merely see people as exhibiting
features pertaining to a common ‘human nature’ when we track characteristics of individuals with
the intention of determining whether they are the same people we used to know. Instead, we
distinguish each one as a unique individual depending on the qualities that are particular to their
humanity, like those “having to do with place of birth, parents, sex, race, social status, job,
personality, wishes and dreams” (Canfield 21).
Now, we ordinarily think that such personal traits are central to our understanding of
others and ourselves (21), and in this way we feel entitled to the belief that each human being is
endowed with ‘selfhood’. Yet, whichever traits might give rise to who a person is, we are not
going to be able to discern the latter in virtue of noticing constant traits in him, “since it is agreed
that all such characteristics can change without our being bound to say that we have on our hands
a different person” (Hunter 36). In effect, everything that matters for deciding whether a person
has changed or not happens not to be, as it were, presently displayed for us to appreciate. Perhaps
the first-person singular pronoun does not simply denote a particular person or human being
uttering it. For if we have at our disposal a criterion of identity for deciding whether someone
remains the same through time, we must presumably possess a degree of insight into something
more than whatever a detailed and comprehensive examination of a specific person at any given
moment can show.
All the same, in a vague, general sense we do not hesitate in identifying ourselves with a
particular human being with a given set of psychological and physical properties. However, when
it comes to defining who this human being is, we cannot make the definition of who we are
precise enough to put the matter to rest. We seek to narrow down the extension of ‘I’ trying to

32

pick out whatever we assume makes up for the person we are. But are we going to posit the
existence of a ‘self’ as opposed to a specific, ordinary person we recognize ourselves to be, so that
we will say that ‘I’ in a narrow sense selects a ‘self’? Suppose, then, that whatever it is to be a I in
the narrow sense is not exhausted in being a specific person. Accordingly, whatever it is to be a
person would not be equivalent to being a self. For if being a person presupposes being a self, and
if this in turn presupposes being a unity (this is, given his numeric identity), we cannot make use
of the concept of a ‘person’ to select the concept of ‘I’. The reason is that ‘I’ is already assumed
in the concept of a person. Thereby, personal identity would have little to do with the identity of
the ‘self’. As a consequence, it would not be necessary to conceive of ‘I’ as a concept denoting a
self in the narrow sense in order to understand the multiple ways that persons are individuated.
Indeed, inasmuch as a single element or property in persons need not be selected for us to be
thought of as being ‘the same’ over time, we do not require ‘selves’ for particular human beings
to be identified.
Still, if it is the case that the concept of ‘I’ is not exhausted when defined in terms of the
ordinary notion of a human being, why should we define the former by appealing to the latter? At
any rate, cannot we define ourselves exclusively as moral, biological, or psychological individuals
when it comes to selecting an element capable of meeting the persistence conditions for a human
being to continue in life as the same individual? When seen from a metaphysical standpoint,
animalism (e.g., Snowden 2014) could provide an appealing theoretical assessment, such that our
personal identity would be accounted for through our physical continuity. Nevertheless, as in the
case of defining personal identity either in terms of a moral or rational agent, the animalistic
alternative would offer an incomplete –although probably accurate– picture of the matter. It
would basically fail to speak to the different types of properties and capacities that can be ascribed
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in general to ordinary human beings (see I.3). It is by virtue of the many sorts of characteristics
that are ascribable to ordinary persons that we end up deciding whether we are confronted with
the same person we knew. Thus, even though it is true that in a way each individual is a Homo
sapiens, this would not get us any closer to fulfilling our task. Even if this account helps us
determine what we are, it would not serve to individualize who we are (see Olson 66).
Meanwhile, one could argue that under a psychological conception of a ‘person’, personal identity
is successfully defined as the continuity of character and memory (see Locke Book Two, ch.
xxvii). Nonetheless, this would not help draw a complete picture of the persistence of an ordinary
human being over time: while the character of a person might drastically change, there is no loss
of identity (see Cockburn 137). Though again, it is not as if the distinction made by Locke
between a human animal (which is understood as a living organism) and a person (which is seen
as the continuity of psychological capacities and attributes) could not prove useful. This would
depend on the type of properties we are looking to underscore so as to explain a given aspect of
the ordinary human person. The general point is rather that his distinction between human animal
and person makes no real difference in the ordinary human being.
So far we would only have a trivially correct view of personal identity framed within the
limits of the types of properties and faculties that can be attributed to ordinary human beings. An
alternative meant to overcome this difficulty consists in reconceiving personal identity as a
practical issue. Thus understood, our view of the problem would be such that many unwarranted
assumptions about the continuity of a single, essential element in a human being could be
dropped. As the difficulties concerning the literal identity of persons are pushed to the
background, we would focus instead on understanding the conditions under which the identity of
a person is practically established. Indeed, as we rethink our general objectives in practical terms,
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it looks like we are not searching anymore for a substance concept to explain the meaning of ‘I’,
say, as a rational agent, a moral agent, or a Homo sapiens. We are thus not searching for a simple,
continuous element, property, or principle constituting our personal identity. This would also
demand a change in our methodological expectations, as we are not trying to construct a theory
about what satisfies the persistence conditions of a human being. If personal identity is to be
treated as practical problem, it naturally requires a practical ‘solution’. The latter will be proposed
and evaluated in Chapter III.
In this chapter, we are trying to explain what it means to approach the problem of personal
identity from a practical perspective. I want to focus here on the issue of personal identity
assuming a primitive, elementary conception of ordinary human beings (Cf. I.3). I follow
Schechtman in the idea that we should examine the relevant characteristics of our ordinary lives
in order to properly articulate a practical account of personal identity. Thus, the basic connection
between Schechtman and Wittgenstein’s considerations about ordinary persons will be presented
here.
II.1. Personal Identity from a Practical Standpoint
In order to justify a turn from a metaphysical to a practical approach to the identity of human
persons, I adopt the strong dependence model of the relation between practical considerations and
the literal identity of these individuals that is offered by Schechtman.
She advances an account of personal identity that takes a person to be an appropriate
target of all of our practical concerns, which is to say, of “the different interests, judgments, and
practices involved in our interactions with other people” (68). When speaking of a ‘person’, she
thinks of the locus of the multiple conceptual activities through which we get to individuate an
ordinary human being. According to a strong dependence model of the relationship between
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personal identity and practical concerns, the reality of persons is a necessary condition for the
application of a wide set of practical considerations about them. Although our main endeavor is
restricted to practical concerns about a human person, that does not mean that there is nothing to
be said about the literal identity of this individual. On the contrary, from the standpoint of the
strong dependence model there is an ontological commitment to the existence and reality of a
person conceived as “an appropriate target of practical questions and concerns” (41). An account
of personal identity is thus meant to individuate the target of our considerations for these to be
intelligible (41), so that, ultimately, our practical concerns presuppose such a target. Schechtman
sees this model as one in which there is a logical dependence between personal identity and
practical concerns. The relationship between these two is conceptual: “an account of personal
identity … [is] conceptually dependent upon practical considerations because the relation which
constitutes identity must by necessity be one which makes a person an intrinsically appropriate
unit about which to raise particular practical questions” (41). A practical approach to personal
identity would then shed light onto the metaphysical status of persons, since practical questions
and considerations end up fixing the reference of these individuals in order to evaluate them as
objects of our concerns: “[p]ractical concerns are dependent on facts about personal identity in the
sense that identity must be in place before particular practical judgments can be appropriately
made—identity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for these judgments” (41). Therefore,
Schechtman relies on such a model to indirectly provide an account of the literal identity of
persons.
Given our objectives in this chapter, we can think of Wittgenstein’s understanding of
human beings as supporting this strong dependence model. From this perspective, his picture of
the human being presupposes the existence of an individual with whom to enter in contact and
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towards whom to develop instinctive attitudes. From another point of view, it is worth mentioning
that Strawson underscores the primitive character of the notion of a ‘person’ to suggest that this
notion constitutes a necessary condition for the attribution of states of consciousness and physical
characteristics (389). One might thus say that most of our conceptual practices are intrinsically
tied to the ontological commitment to human persons.
In the following sections, we will see how to expand the picture of the ordinary human
being provided by Wittgenstein so as to include in it elements that are pertinent to the discussion
of his personal identity.

The Expanded Set of Practical Considerations
On the basis of an expanded conception of a ‘person’, Schechtman tackles the issue of which
practical considerations are inherently linked to a person’s identity. She proposes an explanation
of the full range of person-related practices that constitute a practical unity relative to a person
and his life. In effect, she is looking for a type of complex unity to be associated with the concept
of a ‘person’ that includes a full range of practical considerations and interests.
Schechtman argues for opening up our understanding of the notion of a ‘person’ so as to
capture not only with it individuals that fall in the forensic category –those that can be rightly
praised or blamed for their actions– but, moreover, the full range of behaviors encompassed in
‘treating others’ as ordinary persons. In harmony with Wittgenstein’s holistic picture of a human
being, she conceives of the notion of a ‘person’ as connoting “the full range of everyday
behaviors that make up the lives of human persons” (72). Such comprehension of a ‘person’ is
thereby not restricted to the range of behaviors generally associated with those of either a moral or
rational agent. Being a person would not only entail a range of forensic capacities and moral
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attributes but, even more, the large set of behaviors of ordinary human beings in the context of
their daily lives.
This way, Schechtman enlarges the forensic notion of a ‘person’ used by Locke so as to
capture ordinary aspects of our interactions with one another. Recognizing someone as a person
would not be limited to judging him as such in virtue of the moral or rational properties he
exhibits. While adopting Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’, she argues on the contrary that
conceiving “someone as a person is not to make a particular kind of judgment about her, but
rather to treat her in the myriad ways that this form of life entails” (72). Seeing and treating
someone ‘as a person’ would not then presuppose “sophisticated assessments of moral
responsibility or prudential rationality,” as it rather involves basic practices that help constitute
someone’s personal identity (75). Being a person, therefore, is not just about bearing rights, being
the object of duties, or being a proper object of praise and blame (75) as it entails a wider range of
behaviors, including the instinctive responses by means of which we regularly interact with other
human beings. She thus widens the concept of personhood as applying to individuals that might
not be regarded as such according to a psychological description of personhood that excludes
infants, those who have lost their mental capacities, and the mentally challenged: “[e]ven those
who lack these capacities (e.g., very young children, the demented, and those with significant
deficits) can be treated as, and so constituted as, persons with personal identities” (74). For
instance, treating someone with dementia as a person involves more than judging him as a person
because it meets a minimum rational threshold. Schechtman thinks of ‘person’, instead, as a
concept designating the individuals connoted by the forensic notion and the ones excluded by it,
like the patient with dementia, who is still treated as a person although he might actually be acting
like an animal. Likewise, it can be argued that “those who lack sentience can be (and are)
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included, albeit minimally, in person-effective activities,” as in the case of an individual in a
persistent vegetative stage: “[it] is typically dressed in clothes, lies in a bed with sheets, and is
referred to by a name” (74). It is thus that, while these individuals might not actually possess and
exhibit the cognitive properties normally ascribed to human beings, “[t]hey are the recipients of
person-specific attentions even if they cannot actively reciprocate” (74).
Schechtman stresses that she is not diminishing the significance of the forensic notion of
personhood. Her point is rather that an account of personhood and personal identity focused
solely on this notion would not be complete: “it is not enough to define identity in a way that
makes persons exclusively forensic units” (76). An adequate account, she suggests, has to
comprehend also the multiple practices constituting a person’s identity, “such that on it persons
are appropriate units of forensic concern as well as of other kinds of concerns and practices
associated with personal identity” (76).

II.2. The Unity of a Person Life
While addressing the issue of personal identity, Schechtman simultaneously tackles what she
refers to as the ‘problem of multiplicity’, i.e., the difficulties encountered when trying to provide
an account for the single relationship in virtue of which a person has an identity (81). By
insulating such a relationship, a response to the issue is in principle attempted as such a relation
would account for the continuity of an individual by meeting its persistence conditions. As these
problems are interconnected, she addresses them simultaneously by selecting a unit as an
appropriate target of a wide net of practical concerns.
The problem of multiplicity specifically involves accounting for how “an individual
person, defined as the appropriate target of the range of person-related practices and concerns,”
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can be constituted by “a single entity” (87). The difficulty lies in the fact that, if we think of
‘human being’ or ‘person’ as terms denoting different types of individuals, we would not have a
unified locus for our multiple practical considerations and questions. With the use of a moral
conception of a ‘human being’, for instance, we would refer to a moral agent bearing rights and
respect; with a genetic sense of the expression, we would denote a Homo sapiens; and by means
of defining a human being as a rational and speaking animal, we would target a rational agent.
Similarly, when we employ ‘person’ in a forensic sense, we signify an individual accountable for
his actions; but while we use it in a moral sense, we refer to an individual that is a member of the
moral community. How, then, can the variety of considerations we can have about human beings
and persons, respectively, be explained in terms of a single, continuous entity? With regard to a
‘human being’, such an entity would have to be at once a Homo sapiens, a moral and a rational
agent, while in the case of a ‘person’ it would have to be both a rational and moral agent. Yet, if
we are looking for a single relationship explaining the continuity or persistence of an individual, it
appears as if we are confronted with an impossible choice.
Admittedly, it is not clear how embracing one or another notion of either ‘human being’ or
‘person’ can help since, for example, when using ‘person’ in a forensic sense infants and those
with severe cognitive deficits would fall out of the category. But if we follow Schechtman in the
idea that several types of practical considerations relative to persons in ordinary contexts help
constituting their identities, then the forensic notion will not do. For if we operate solely with the
forensic notion, we readily dismiss any dimension of a human life that is not an object of duties
and responsibilities as external or accidental to what constitutes his identity. But as there many
different types of practical concerns that apply to an ordinary person, Schechtman argues, “it is by
no means obvious that we will be able to encounter a single relation that defines an appropriate
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target for them all” (81). This means that there is no single practical relation that makes up for a
person identity, so that “the project of finding a single relation that defines the appropriate locus
for our practical concerns appears … hopeless” (81). Given the complex unity of the life of a
person or human being in which there is no single relation underlying all of the different types of
practical concerns and questions that can be raised about him, there is nothing to select as
uniquely responsible for his personal identity. As there is no one thread, as it were, based on
which we could say what the identity of a person resides in, a potential solution to problem of
multiplicity seems incoherent: “[i]f the aim is to define a locus which is the appropriate target of
all of our person-related practices (including forensic judgments) and to define personhood in
such a way that those who are not appropriate targets of forensic judgments are persons,” such an
aim “is going to be pretty hard to meet” (81).
Now, Schechtman does not quite abandon the problem of multiplicity as if it were illfounded. On the contrary, according to her we encounter in the ordinary world “unified (albeit
ridiculously complex and multi-faceted) individuals” (83). This much is clear in the context of our
daily interchanges with others:
[t]he son I feed and clothe and comfort is the same person I chastise for behaving
badly to her sister and the same person to whom I try to teach the value of hard
work and explain the benefit of making small sacrifices now for larger benefits
later. He is also the same person whose straight As bring me pride and whose
disappointments are a cause for my sadness, and the person whose health I am
concerned to safeguard. I do not have a moral son and an animal son and a
psychological son—I have a single son who has all of these aspects and is important
to me in all of these ways. (83)
She suggests there is something odd in the presuppositions that give rise to the problem of
multiplicity. Particularly, this issue is at odds not only with how our practical exchanges come
about but with how our practical concerns demand the existence of a unified individual as their
target, however complex this might actually be. The point, then, is not that the individual cannot

41

be treated solely according to one of his given dimensions; one could be concerned only with a
person as a psychologically endowed animal insofar as the task of a psychiatrist, for instance, is to
enhance someone’s mental wellbeing. But, one way or the other, we presuppose the existence of
other facets of a person without compromising the integrity of his identity when focusing only on
his psychological aspects. Therefore, “[h]owever much complexity there is to our practical lives
each of us is, in the end, a single thing” (84), meaning, one multifaceted entity. This is why we
might after all “have a further question about what it is that possesses self-consciousness,
rationality, and the ability to act as a moral agent” (84). Ultimately, our practical considerations
are about a single individual: they are “concerns … directed at someone, and in the end we want
an answer to the question of what constitutes the integrity of that someone” (85).
The again, Schechtman’s issue is not to address the question of a person’s identity by
singling out a unique, intrinsic type of relationship in virtue of which an individual can literally be
said to be the same over time. For “[i]f we must have a single unified entity that is the target of
the full range of person-related practices,” then there does is not available a single relation that
can be taken as the target of all of our practical concerns (84). But if, on the other hand, the
multiplicity of relationships constituting an individual’s life do not compromise our experience of
person as a multifaceted being that, still, is identical to himself, then, according to Schechtman,
maybe we should “give up on the idea that the target of our practical interactions and judgments
must be intrinsically suited for being so” (84). If our business is instead to point out, from an
external perspective, how diverse types of practical considerations and concerns are linked to
form a complex unity, it follows that what matters when individuating persons is not a single
relationship:
[p]erhaps all we need is an entity that we are able to individuate and track over
time, and which can be designated as the individual about which we ask practical
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questions, make practical judgments, and otherwise engage in person-related
interactions. Of course we have such an entity ready to hand in the form of the
human organism. (84)
The challenge of an individual unity involved in problem of multiplicity is thus met by
understanding the identity of a person in terms of different relations making him an appropriate
locus of the full range of person-related concerns even though these concerns can come apart, so
that a person is understood, at any given time, as a unified target of a variety of distinct practical
concerns.
In order to explain how Schechtman describes the way these diverse relationships
constitute personal identity, let us now examine her understanding of the different aspects of a
person’s ordinary life.

The Paradigmatic Structure of a Person Life
Remember that Schechtman uses ‘human being’ and ‘person’ in their ordinary sense which
follows from her adoption of Wittgenstein’s phraseology (see 114). Particularly, she employs the
notion of a ‘person’ in an ordinary sense in her discussion of paradigmatic forms of human life.
She refers to “beings like us—you who are reading a book and I who am writing it” when
articulating a model of a paradigmatic or standard person life (114). In turn, she avoids the
challenge to individual unity by defining personal identity in terms of the unity of the life of a
person, referring thus to a single yet multi-faceted ‘entity’ (109). In general, she conceives of a
‘person life’ as something “held together by the form of its unfolding” structure and not, say, by
the existence of a definite human animal (109). That here is such a thing as the form of a person
life is clear from a holistic perspective, this is, understanding a human life as a structured,
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ongoing whole. Diachronically, a person is constituted by an entire life, and not just by the
attributes that can be ascribed to him at any given stage of it:
[i]t is a structural whole that has, by its very nature, attributes that apply to it as a
whole which do not necessarily apply to each individual portion. We can thus say
that the mature person is the same person as the infant or (in unlucky cases)
dementia patient because there is a single life course that starts (roughly) with
infancy, develops into maturity, and devolves (possibly) into dementia. The person
is defined by the unfolding of the pattern in which these stages all play their part.
(108)
The form of the complete diachronically structured unity described by the unfolding life of a
person accounts for the singularity of his life (108).
Then again, how does she exactly conceive of the structure of a person life? Schechtman
advances the Person Life View whereby we generally define persons in terms of the
“characteristic lives they lead” (110). Being a person amounts to having or living a ‘person life’:
“persons are individuated by individuating person lives; and the duration of a single person is
determined by the duration of a single person life” (110). She explains what it is to be a person by
accounting for the basic structure of a typical person life, implying that peoples’ lives share a
distinctive and standard structure, although not a stringent one —in the end, what counts as a
‘standard person life’ varies from culture to culture. She appeals to paradigmatic cases of persons’
lives by pointing to “typical enculturated humans” (111), so that paradigmatic exemplars of
human beings exhibit the standard structure of a person life. It is, then, an appeal to a
typical/atypical distinction between forms of person life that brings forward practical
considerations meant to provide the elements required for a proper definition of personal identity.
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II. 3. A Property Cluster Model of a Person Life
Now that we have seen what the paradigmatic structure of an ordinary human life consists of, we
will explain in what way Schechtman’s account of personal identity is practical in character. This
can be seen in the fact that she assumes an externalist approach, which ends up being more
persuasive than competing positions such as animalism because she does not rely on an intrinsic
attribute of human beings like the biological property of being an animal to define his identity.
This way, she avoids formulating an essentialist account of personal identity that would not in the
end satisfy us. This biological property together with the psychological and social aspects of
human beings are rather subsumed under her view of persons, as she gives them a place in her
practical approach. Therefore, her account is ‘practical’ as she thinks of the human being in the
context of his everyday life, where all of these aspects contribute to his personal identity.
Particularly, her approach to the ‘person life’ of this individual is practical as it involves his
regular activities and interactions of with other human beings.
There is, of course, a way in which it is trivially true that there is a human being out there
with a life of his own. With the intention of rendering her conception of a person life informative,
Schechtman maintains that the characteristic developmental trajectory which we recognize as a
standard person life is constituted by “three interconnected levels: the level of [individual]
capabilities and attributes, the level of activities and interaction, and the level of social
infrastructure” (138). First, we find a typical encultured human being with biological and
psychological capacities and attributes serving as a paradigmatic example. This is the dominion of
properties normally attributed to an ordinary person. Secondly, we find the particular interactions
in a daily life of a person with other human beings and the activities he engages in. Finally, there
is a cultural and social set of “institutions and practices that grow out of social organization of
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beings who … set the norms that govern interactions among persons” (138). She thinks of the
previous level as forming a “person-space” (138) wherein the daily life on a person occurs. In this
third level –which comprises the other two– we find practices, customs, and institutions that offer
the background within which we judge the daily activities and interactions of particular persons
(112).
In this way, Schechtman advances a picture of a typical mature person in terms of the three
interconnected levels. Hierocles similarly thought that “each one of us is, as it were, entirely
encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger” (qtd. in Martin and Barresi 26). The
individual human being
has drawn as though around a center, his own mind … the body and anything taken
for the sake of the body; for it is a circle of virtually minimal radius, and almost
touches the center itself … further removed from the center, but enclosing the first
circle [are] parents, siblings, wife, and children … [and in the] outermost and
largest circle [is] the whole human race. (26)
Schechtman notices how social, psychological, and biological properties and functions belong to
different levels in a person life, and they reciprocate one another in a way that a distinct life of a
human being emerges. Because of such reciprocity, an individual can develop a personal identity:
[w]e have already seen the way in which [the sociocultural] infrastructure shapes
the kinds of daily activities, relationships, and interactions a person engages in by
setting the parameters within which these take place and providing the background
institutions and practices they require. But the infrastructure is also constrained by
the physical and psychological attributes of the individuals who reside in the
person-space it defines. (115)
What is more, the property of ‘being alive’ is attributed holistically to the human individual, and
not ascribed to any of his parts. What is true of the whole person in the context of his life and
within the parameters of a sociocultural infrastructure is not true of any of his dimensions.
Likewise, being ‘one and the same’ is not a property that applies to any given dimension of the
person (whether it is the psychological, moral, or biological) but to the person itself relative to his
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life. Being someone, thereby, would not be reduced to being a moral agent, a rational animal, or a
Homo sapiens. It would further involve engaging with others and performing activities that
constitute a person life in the wider context of a given sociocultural infrastructure. Since we apply
holistically a host of biological, psychological, and social attributes to ordinary persons, such
distinctions among categories of functions and properties can mislead us into thinking that an
individual human being is made up of “a biological or psychological or social life” (115). Yet,
when we speak of the life of a person we rather refer to particular sorts of activities “within a
person life” involving interactions with other human beings (115). Then, the particular way in
which a life unfolds would explain how a person persists over time as the same individual, as we
ascribe to the human being physical and psychological properties and capacities but, moreover,
social qualities and functions.
It is important to further notice that Schechtman has only offered a picture of a human
being to whom a cluster of properties applies in a given context. But the division shown between
the levels mentioned might be somewhat artificial (115), given that the typical psychological and
biological attributes of the individual, his daily life, and the sociocultural infrastructure wherein
such a life takes place complement, reinforce, and support one another. Such differentiation of
levels, however, is still helpful insofar as it provides guidance in grasping the ways in which the
elements pertaining to the different categories relate to one other:
The development on the one hand of cognitive and agential capacities and on the
other increasingly complex and self-directed interpersonal relationships and
interactions should not be seen as distinct processes, but rather as two sides of a
single coin. In order to develop psychologically and physically as human persons
typically do, it is necessary to mature in an environment that provides the proper
scaffolding and social support for such development. By the same token, there are
particular psychological capacities that are required if one is to engage in the more
sophisticated kinds of interpersonal interactions found in a standard in a standard
person life … Without the ability to develop these internal resources active
participation in a person life would be severely limited. (112)
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A given sociocultural infrastructure is necessary for there to be a person life, and this
infrastructure presupposes, in turn, an individual with psychological and physical properties to
ever live a person life, as “the infrastructure could not exist … unless those who are part of
person-space have the necessary capacities and attributes to create and maintain it” (112).
Thereby, such individual capacities and properties constitute a necessary condition both for a
person life to exist and for there to be a person-space wherein the activities of such a life can take
place, since the institutions and customs constituting a sociocultural infrastructure depend on the
existence of individual capacities and properties of persons. Indeed, according to this picture,
“[t]he development of institutions and norms of the sort that define person lives (e.g., prisons, or
systems of punishment, economies, theologies, art) requires beings who have certain kinds of
memory systems, reflective self-consciousness, rationality, and related cognitive and affective
abilities” (116).
Meanwhile, the individual capacities of persons depend both on sociocultural institutions
and on the activities and interactions constituting persons’ lives (116). Without the framework
offered by a sociocultural infrastructure, there would be no place for a person’s life to acquire a
form of its own, in the absence of which it would not make sense in turn to speak of a person’s
identity. In effect, our psychological and physical capacities “depend upon the existence of a
social infrastructure and engagement in characteristic lives” (116). In the absence of these two
levels, individual capacitates would not develop, at least not to the extent and manner we would
associate with the qualities of a typical mature person. When we search for the traits of a standard
mature person in a human life form within the context of a given community, it is clear that the
“sophisticated and agential capacities of human persons depend upon social scaffold to develop,”
so that, for example, if they are not exposed to language or the appropriate kinds of
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developmental stimuli, infants will “not develop the kind of cognitive, social, and affective
capabilities that are found in mature persons” (116).
Hence, Schechtman’s Person Life View is a practically-based account of a standard person
life (118). This is clear from the fact that “a person life is made up of the kinds of practical
interactions peculiar to persons, and occupying a place in person-space just is to be a locus of the
practical interests and concerns that apply to beings like us” (118). An implication of this view is
that having a personal identity presupposes leading a particular form of life comparable in some
way to the paradigmatic structure of a person life. This aspect of Schechtman’s view is further
elaborated on the next chapter.

The Sociocultural Infrastructure as a Form of Life of Personhood
In this section, we will provide elements that are relevant for the articulation of a ‘solution’ to the
personal identity issue in the next chapter. We lay here the groundwork for then pointing to
similarities between Schechtman’s Person Life View and Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’.
According to Schechtman, a particular form of life of a human individual amounts to an
exemplar of the general form of life of a community. For living a person life entails more than
being a suitable object of ascription of a cluster of physical, psychological, and social properties
in the context of the activities and interactions making up one’s daily life. If it is going to count as
such, a person life should aim to be a model of the general standard of a typical human life. But,
in order to be a model, there must be a fixed background of assumptions against which the
accordance or deviation of a given life can be judged. This background, Schechtman argues, sets
the parameters within which our person life unfolds, informing us of the type of person that we
are (113). Moreover, the social roles we engage in when interacting with others are validated
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externally, i.e., by the standard of a community: “[i]n the case of human persons, for instance,
other humans play a particular prescribed role that is set by social and cultural institutions and not
accorded on an individual basis” (113). Therefore, what counts as being a particular person with a
typical life sets the bar for what a community of speakers would accept as such.
One could object to the Person Life View that it leads to conventionalism. A ‘typical’
developmental trajectory of human exemplars is presumably going to be whatever a given
community of speakers takes as ‘typical’. Schechtman replies by pointing out the fact that we
have not explicitly agreed to adopt the sociocultural infrastructure wherein our lives develop. This
‘person-space’ afforded by living in a sociocultural infrastructure “is not simply something we
choose or make up, but rather something that evolves with us and is responsive to and constrained
by facts about us and about the world” (119). This does not yet imply that there is something like
a sociocultural macrostructure composed of the general forms of life of existing communities:
“[o]f course,” she claims, “not every culture must contain all of … [the same] elements, and the
details of such institutions will vary over time and place” (119). The sociocultural infrastructure,
though, is “absolutely central” inasmuch as it is required for the existence of personhood:
[t]here would be no persons without person-space, and to be living a person life is
to be accorded a place in person-space, to live as and be treated as a unified locus
of the sorts of practical concerns and interactions that typify the life of those who
generate and maintain the social/cultural infrastructure within which these lives
take place. (119)
Furthermore, what is accepted as a person or human being is not a matter of belief or opinion.
Schechtman argues that to treat someone as a human being is to make him a focus of our practical
concern, as we are instinctively prone to form an attitude towards him. Reacting to others as if
they were human beings shows our commitment to ascribe to them “automatically … a place in
person-space,” this is, as long as they have a life of their own, since “a person is constituted by a
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person life” (188). Following Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations II, IV, § 22),
Schechtman suggests that the background of ‘assumptions’ composing the sociocultural
infrastructure we live in is not merely believed in (114). It is not as if we simply think that others
are persons because of the attributes they display and, under that assumption, we are willing to
interact with them expecting some given set of responses in return. Instead, the diverse ways we
instinctively react and respond to others signal a deep commitment to their humanity:
We do not, when we encounter animate things in daily life, make an assessment of
their attributes and capabilities before deciding whether they should be viewed and
treated as fellow persons. When we encounter other humans we automatically see
them as persons and interact with them as such. (113)
In other words, we do not get to choose who we will regard as a fellow human being: our
reactions give away the fact that we naturally see them as such. Thus, treating ‘others’ as
particular forms of human life involves having a basic attitude or orientation towards the
humanity in others. Such an attitude is not restricted to a rigid set of dispositions. Treating others
as members of the world of life roughly involves being disposed to see them as if they were part
of a larger community of persons than those included in a given sociocultural infrastructure (114).

Unity of Life and Personal Identity
From the perspective of the Person Life View, what makes up for a person’s identity depends on
how a person life is individuated, so that the persistence of a person is tantamount to the
continuation of a person life. Schechtman maintains that persons are individuated in terms of their
lives, i.e., their daily interactions and activities (139). This is possible given her conception of a
‘person life’ as a term connoting a cluster of psychological, biological, and social properties
which are holistically assigned to an ordinary person.
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Nevertheless, it is not as if any given (type of) property constitutes a necessary or
sufficient condition for a person to persist. As long as there is a person life to be continued, it will
be possible to say of a corresponding human being that it is the same person. Following Chiong
(141-85), Schechtman suggests that the persistence conditions of a person life are not bound by
the limits of the continuation of any given element in a person. Actually, no element is necessary
or sufficient for a person life to continue and, hence, for a person to be the same. Chiong
maintains that ‘being alive’ is a property that connotes “a cluster of characteristics—none of
which is in itself necessary and sufficient for an organism to be alive, but all of which contribute
to an organism’s being alive,” as the properties applicable to ordinary human beings tend to
support and constrain one another in paradigmatic instances (Schechtman 138). Thus, as all of the
different properties and functions that are ascribed holistically to a person contribute to the
persistence of his life, Schechtman claims that no element is indispensable for one to validly
speak of a person as persevering in existence (138).
We can give up on the project of defining the personal identity of an individual in terms of
the continuation of some set of properties as, for example, his biological traits, since “[l]ives are
… such complicated and multi-faceted things that providing a single list of necessary and
sufficient conditions for one to continue would be hopeless” (138). When speaking of the
continuation of a person life, Schechtman recommends that we look for the persistence of a
cluster of properties and functions without looking for any specific property or function to subsist
(145). Given a series of characteristics taken as paradigm cases of person lives, Schechtman
accounts for the continuation of a person life as the perpetuation of the support, constrain and
dependency of biological, psychological, and social capacities and functions on one another
(147). Such relations among properties integrate a particular human being into his own life form,
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resulting in a practical unity responsible for the continuation of the person. In effect, it is due to
the interaction of the different types of properties and functions that a life continues, and not
because of the specific persistence of any given property or function that the person remains the
same. The persistence conditions for an individual are thereby explained in terms of the
continuation of a whole entity regardless of whether any of his parts stay the same over time.
To illustrate this point, Schechtman employs Olson’s analogy between the life of a human
organism and the life of a storm. Under normal circumstances, we can decide
whether the storm that hit Cuba yesterday and the storm that brought floods to
Alabama today are the same storm or different ones; and our ability to know this
doesn’t involve any judgments about the persistence of material objects. We don’t
first need to find out whether the material object composed of all and only those
particles caught in the Cuban storm is the same as, or different from, the material
object composed of those particles caught in the Alabama storm. There may not
even by any such material objects. (139-40)
Schechtman contends that we can obviously identify a storm at different times without having any
independent way of verifying whether “all and only the matter that is caught up in it” has
remained (141). Similarly, in the case of person, “we are in principle able to identify and
reidentify salient loci of interaction by a string of events rather than through the reidentification of
material substance” (141.). The central point is that, when it comes to individualizing a person
life, our criteria is not merely grounded on bodily continuity. Instead, “[a]ll that is necessary”
when it comes to identifying and reidentifying human lives “is to be able to follow the series of
activities that makes up an event of the appropriate kind—a life or a storm” (141). It is then a
mistake to try and define personal identity solely as the continuation of a bodily substance, when,
after all, there is no such material organism existing independently of the structure of a person
life. As in the “case of the storm, in which there is no presumption that there is any independent
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object … identity conditions are clearly set by the activities” happening in the daily lives of the
person (141).
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III.

IN CONSTANT RETURN TO THE WORLD OF LIFE

The aim of this chapter is to propose and evaluate the viability of a ‘solution’ or ‘treatment’ for
the issue of personal identity. The intention is to further justify our practical approach to this
topic. Indeed, if personal identity were understood as a practical issue, it could actually be solved
in the context of daily activities and exchanges with others. A person would not be said then to
have by default an identity regardless of the concrete life he leads and the sociocultural
framework wherein such a life unfolds (Schechtman 113). Instead, a person would obtain for
practical purposes an identity as the result of gaining a considerable degree of unity or integrity
with his own life, so that his life would be ‘in agreement’ with the typical way human beings live
and interact with each other in society.
Now, if we view the issue of personal identity from a practical standpoint, it is clear that
the only persons requiring such a ‘remedy’ would be the ones who, having departed from
ordinary ways of living, have become distanced from their own lives. In a way, they no longer
form a “practical unity” (73) with these. Having become alienated or dissociated from regular
ways of relating to others, these individuals could value suggestions meant to help them in
readjusting to what a given community deems as a ‘standard’ form of person life. This
readjustment would involve the accommodation of a person life to a given sociocultural
infrastructure or ‘person-space’ (114). Then, as our lives acquire unity in function of how well we
assimilate to society, the “issue” with someone’s personal identity or lack thereof would consist
of the gradual deterioration of patterns of behavior that we conventionally associate with the ways
of life of ordinary human beings. It can be argued, thus, that this problem is treatable insofar as an
estranged person manages to recover and embody many of the patterns of behavior of full-blown,
typical individuals.
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The task here is to explain the details of how such a ‘readjustment’ is supposed to take
place and the way it is meant to serve those who are alienated from ordinary forms of living. In
this respect, it will be useful to examine some aspects of Wittgenstein’s early and later
philosophy, for he conceived of the transformation of one’s form of life as the ultimate objective
of his philosophy. Moreover, I suggest that this is precisely the type of change that dissociated
individuals should undergo in order to adjust to a ‘standard’ way of living. It will be necessary,
though, to consider why Wittgenstein thinks that this vital transformation is not possible if one’s
time is consumed with trying to go beyond meaningful speech so to articulate ‘the purpose’ of
life, say, with the intention of ultimately understanding why one might not be fulfilling it. This
further demands an explanation of the attitude that Wittgenstein suggests we adopt towards
ordinary uses of language, as his goal is to assist us in resisting the temptation to go past
meaningful uses of language to diagnose what is essentially ‘wrong’ with our life.
In the following section, I will propose a way of reading the Tractatus (1999) that will
eventually serve us in formulating an answer to the problem of alienation. As we first explain
Wittgenstein’s conception of language in the Tractatus, we will construe an interpretation of the
ethical resonance of this work that will shed light on ways of overcoming alienation. The
elements that will play a key role in this interpretation are Wittgenstein’s conception of the
‘willing subject’, the ‘proper attitude towards life’ that falls out from the relation of this subject
and the world, and his notion of the ineffable, this is, ‘what cannot be said’. Thus, the problem of
personal identity –which, from a practical standpoint, is understood as the issue of alienation–
will be initially tackled by explaining the connection between the ‘willing subject’, his attitude
towards life, and a type of change in his attitude that can serve him in overcoming alienation.
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Moreover, his early philosophy will be interpreted in accordance with his later philosophy
with some qualifications, particularly, with regard to the conception of ‘forms of life’ appearing
in the Investigations (§ 241). In the second and last section, the idea is to offer the basis for a
construal of Wittgenstein’s treatment of alienation that is compatible with Schechtman’s
conception of a ‘person life’ (110-119). It will be clear that the ‘therapies’ Wittgenstein offers in
order to surmount alienation go hand in hand with the framework of a person life provided by
Schechtman. Thereby, against the backdrop offered by her, the ordinary human being would find
a way of aligning his way of life with the forms of life of a community, such that his personal
identity would gain the class of ‘practical unity’ (75-78) required for having a full-fleshed
personal identity (141), this is, as opposed to the watered-down identity common in alienated
human forms of life.

III.1. Wittgenstein’s Early Transcendentalism: What Cannot Be Said
Wittgenstein’s main objective in the Tractatus is to demarcate meaningful speech. He wants to
“draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thought,” excluding
in turn meaningless expressions, such that “what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply
nonsense” (27). He believes that this limit cannot be drawn in thought, for otherwise, “in order to
draw a limit to thinking we would have to think both sides of this limit,” which is impossible —
that is, we would have to “be able to think what cannot be thought” (27). He wants indeed to set
this boundary from within language.
To accomplish this, he first distinguishes between two classes of propositions. On the one
side, there are empirical judgments, i.e., statements of fact, which are either true or false in virtue
of accurately or inaccurately representing states of affairs. On the other side, there are logical
truths and falsehoods that respectively amount to tautologous and self-contradictory statements. It
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is said that the truth-value of the second class of propositions can be ascertained regardless of
what is the case, whilst the truth-value of statements included in the first class can only be known
after considering what the facts are. Assuming, then, that meaningful language is exhausted in
these two classes of statements, any other type of proposition would have to be senseless.
Propositions that are meant to state something other than matters of fact or else show logical
connections between statements would lack meaning, because significant uses of language are
classified in this way.
This explains why Wittgenstein regards philosophical, ethical, aesthetic, and religious
statements as ‘nonsensical’. From this perspective, these propositions transgress the restrictions of
significant discourse. Basically, people who articulate them fail to understand the logic of
language, contravening restrictions presupposed in the very utterance of meaningful speech. As
these propositions do not entail either assertions of fact or logical truths or falsehoods, they
cannot express anything: our language is just not suited for expressing what lies beyond our
ordinary experience or specialized knowledge.
In the interest of contextualizing his early views, it is worth considering why Wittgenstein
distances himself from the way Ayer, Carnap, and other Logical Positivists interpret the status of
philosophical propositions. Even though Wittgenstein agrees with Carnap, for example, in
characterizing metaphysical propositions as “pseudo-statements” (Carnap 74), this expression
does not mean the same for Wittgenstein. Carnap thinks of metaphysics as the “expression of the
general attitude of a person towards life” (78). Metaphysical statements would thus relieve a
concrete urge: they arise from “the need to give expression to a man’s attitude in life,” an attitude
that would manifest itself “in everything a man does or says” (78) as it impresses “itself on his
facial features, perhaps even on the character of his gait” (79). Meanwhile, Wittgenstein believes
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that metaphysical statements cannot express anything, not even an attitude towards life. He rejects
Carnap’s emotivism as he goes on to make the stronger claim that philosophical propositions in
general, together with ethical and religious statements, are literally meaningless. Expressing an
‘attitude towards life’ would somehow involve appreciating life as a whole; still, no fact or sum of
facts can portray ‘life as a whole’, for this would require observing life from the outside, i.e., from
a perspective external to language. In the end, it so happens that there is nothing to have a general
attitude about in that regard. Metaphysical propositions rather intend to assert something about
what lies beyond our regular experience of facts, so they cannot be true or false about anything.
To see exactly why he thinks that these uses of language express nothing, it is necessary to
explain Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said but not shown as opposed to what
can be shown but not said.

The Sense of a Proposition: What Can Be Shown
Wittgenstein argues that the sense of a proposition is shown in the way that states of affairs are
represented or depicted in the context of a statement. For example, the fact that I am sitting down
at the moment is shown with the help of a description, such that, in virtue of the correlation
between elements in the description and objects in the fact, it can be said that the corresponding
description is true. Even so, this fact “can be described but not named” (Tractatus § 3.144). Since
the meaning of a proposition is precisely the description of an event, the state of affairs making up
the event can be described. We can thus show with the help of descriptions how the ‘world’ is,
which is defined as “the totality of facts, not of things” (§ 1.1). Still, we cannot say what the
world is. Making an analogy, Wittgenstein claims that “[n]ames resemble points; propositions
resemble arrows, they have sense” (§ 1.1). This means that an object can only be named if it
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constitutes the meaning of a sign, just like we can name a person by using a proper name. In that
way, the proposition in which the object is named refers to a fact containing the object in
question. Such a reference is possible as we combine names of objects in the framework provided
by elementary propositions (§ 2.01). Therefore, a description is meaningful insofar as it shows the
configuration of objects in a fact, although it cannot “name the fact” itself, as it were; it only
means to show how objects are related in a fact, given the reciprocal agreement of names with
objects. Therefore, Wittgenstein maintains that “[o]nly the proposition has sense; only in the
context of a proposition has a name meaning” (§ 3.3), which implies that the meaning of a
proposition can merely be shown and not said. Propositions, then, solely reveal the organization
of elements in facts, which is the way objects are organized in space and time.
The ‘fixed form’ of objects –which Wittgenstein regards as the fact that, for instance, a
proper name can stand in a proposition for a specific person– is shown in the correct use of a
name. But a proposition or representation cannot be placed outside its ‘form of representation’ –
which is what is common to the structure of empirical propositions and the structure of the facts–,
nor can it “represent its form of representation; it shows it forth” (§ 2.172). At most, logical truths
show this ‘form of representation’ in that they are true in every possible state of affairs (Kenny
Wittgenstein 51). Wittgenstein considers, though, logical truths as ‘pseudo-propositions’ because
they do not say anything about what is the case (Tractatus § 6.1.). In effect, the truth-value of an
empirical proposition can be verified by contrasting it with a certain fact it means to represent. A
tautologous statement, on the contrary, says nothing about the world, although it reveals the
structure of its symbols. For instance, in the case of the statement “It is raining, or it is not
raining,” we need not know what actually happens in the world in order to determine that it is
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true. Nevertheless, the truth-value is so determined because “It is raining” and “It is not raining”
oppose one another (Kenny Wittgenstein 51).
For their part, philosophical, ethical, and religious propositions neither describe events in
the actual world nor facts in any possible world. They do not even exhibit the type of connections
among propositions that logical truths reveal. The question, then, is what they are meant to do and
whether they accomplish it. Wittgenstein thinks that they intend to say what can only be shown.
They try to describe the ‘form of representation’ of language, but this cannot be said in language.
This form can rather be shown through the use of empirical statements. This is due to the fact
that, in order to say something meaningful about the ‘form of representation’ of language, we
would have to be able to ascribe meaning to our expressions by virtue of facts that have
themselves to be represented in our propositions. Then again, to be able to do this, our
propositions would have to share a common logical form with such facts, i.e., a structure capable
of corresponding with a fact. But how can these applications of language be placed outside this
‘form of representation’ and simultaneously be meaningful if any meaningful use of language
presupposes such a form? To successfully represent this form, one would have to articulate the
logic of language without employing this logic, which is absurd. It would be like representing by
its coordinates “a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the coordinates of a point
which does not exist” (Tractatus § 3.032). Wittgenstein claims, therefore, that how things are
expressed in language cannot be expressed through language, as genuinely significant
propositions –the ones that represent facts– only show the logical form of reality but this form
cannot be itself put into words (Kenny Wittgenstein 51).

61

Judgments of Absolute and Relative Value
By resorting to this ‘form of representation’ as a necessary condition for there to be meaningful
propositions, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can be said and what can be shown so as to
demarcate the limits of meaningful speech. In particular, he contends that ethical propositions
have nothing to make sense of. Indeed, ethics’ subject –which can be expressed differently by
saying “what really matters,” “the meaning of life,” or “what makes life worth living” (see
Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 34-35)– is something that “must lie outside the world”
together with “[t]he sense of the world” (Tractatus § 6.41). Since ethics is supposed to be about
what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ in itself, ethical statements would have to express an absolute value. But
again, “[i]n the world … there is no [such] value—and if there were, it would be of no value” (§
6.41). As everything in the world happens accidentally, this is, without being strictly necessitated,
what we consider ‘valuable’ would have to be contingent as well; however, this would not be
what we were looking for. By definition, an absolute value is supposed to be non-accidental.
Thereby, if ethical propositions intend to express what is higher, what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ with
logical necessity, there could be no ethical statements (§ 6.42). Meaningful speech cannot convey
what would in principle reside above and beyond what is the case, because genuine propositions
can only express factual matters. Since “facts are all as it were on a level,” what ethics tries to
express would be something standing “above the level of the facts,” even as it cannot be a fact
that something “stands out from the facts” (Diamond The Realistic Spirit 225).
It must be pointed out that, when Wittgenstein claims that “[a]ll propositions are of equal
value,” this is meant quite literally so that, by implication, no propositions are “in any absolute
sense … sublime, important, or trivial” (Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 37). Since no
fact stands out from the “dead level of all facts” (Diamond The Realistic Spirit 225), no empirical
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proposition can have a remarkable or insignificant status, nor can it express anything ‘sublime’.
Whatever it communicates can only be of relative value to us. In the end, what is of value in itself
must not be conditioned by the contingent nature of our experience, so it cannot be captured by
our statements. Consider, for example, the description of a homicide (Wittgenstein “A Conference
on Ethics” 37). It will be meaningful to the extent that it comprises details of the event in
question. But the reprehensive feature of the act of killing a human being could not be conveyed
through the description, for the latter can only communicate facts about the homicide (37). And,
in any case, if this feature were communicated, it would only be because it was formulated as yet
another fact (37). Ethical judgments would ultimately be meaningless because what they propose
involves running against the boundaries of language (43). Thus, since what ethical statements try
to express is something that cannot be articulated in language, we are better off without uttering
them.
Wittgenstein still grants that we can formulate relative judgments of value such as “This is
the correct road” in relation to a given goal, say, as we are trying to arrive to a given destination
in the least amount of time (34). Likewise, if someone was terrible at tennis, we could tell
whether he was playing badly but only in relation to the rules of tennis, the average performance
of players, etc. (34). Such a person would be relatively judged as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ at tennis in
function of his performance. Absolute ethical judgments, in contrast, are supposed to hold
regardless of what the details of the case are. It would be as if there was an “absolutely correct
road” to take in order to reach a given destination; namely, one we would feel logically compelled
to follow (35). But if we understand ethical judgments in an absolute sense, what are they
supposed to be correct or incorrect about? Since we have no independent criteria to determine
what counts as an absolutely correct route towards a given location or an absolute good
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performance in a game regardless of the parameters and objectives of the game in question, there
is nothing ethical statements can be correct about. This entails that there would be no matter of
fact we could appeal to in order to censure someone’s behavior (35). A judgment of absolute
value such as “You ought to want to behave better” applied to an outright liar (35), for instance,
would have to be meaningless as there is no fact or collection of parameters or rules in terms of
which it could corrected. In other words, there would be no “ethical facts” in contrast to which we
could evaluate such a judgment, for we can solely express relative claims of value.

Whistling What Cannot Be Said
In sum, the Tractatus does not propose or assume an ethical theory. Ironically, though, it has been
argued that what is left unsaid in it is taken to be precisely what bears the greatest importance to
Wittgenstein. In D. Z. Phillips’ view, it is as if Wittgenstein was reserving a ‘higher’ place for the
ethical, for he indirectly posited objective values that could not be touched by other propositions
(357). That is why many commentators usually think of the Tractatus as an ethical book.
According to these interpreters, this work points to something that cannot be said, which can be
conceived as the ‘right’ way of living (Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 35). In Phillips’
interpretation, even as Wittgenstein’s claim is that the topic of ethics lies outside the region of
what can be expressed, he still identifies an ‘external region’ residing outside our limited, human
comprehension. This is the region of “the mystical,” a place wherein objective values would have
to dwell if they were to count as such. Therefore, although this region cannot be described, its
existence would nonetheless be inferred. From one point of view, it seems that Wittgenstein said
what presumably could only be shown, particularly, when he claimed that “[t]here is indeed the
inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (Tractatus § 6.522). This assertion would
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involve Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said and what can be shown as two
mutually exclusive categories. What is ‘mystical’ or ‘transcendental’ would thereby not be
articulated in language or thought, since we could not view our world from the outside; however,
it would somehow exist beyond our world.
Accordingly, it has been pointed out that Wittgenstein’s claims in the Tractatus are
themselves neither empirical nor tautologous, which would seem to defeat its purpose. As
Ramsey noticed, Wittgenstein’s statement that there is the “inexpressible,” i.e., “the mystical” (§
6.522), is self-refuting: in the end, “[i]f you can’t say it, you can’t say it—and you can’t whistle it
either” (qtd. in Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein 111). Wittgenstein’s efforts to separate meaningful
language from nonsense had to be misguided, given that he transgressed the limits he had placed
on language (Wittgenstein Tractatus 27). In effect, the question is how can Wittgenstein “tell
what are the boundaries beyond which the human understanding may not venture, unless he
succeeds in passing them himself” (Ayer 34). Since the Tractatus contains philosophical
propositions about the structure of reality, language, and what ethics is supposed to be about (i.e.,
‘the mystical’), it presumably could not have achieved its objectives. In this vein, interpreters
such as Peter Hacker and David Pears along with Phillips have taken Wittgenstein to recognize “a
realm of ineffable fact-like quasi-truths, such as the fact-like quasi-truth that language and world
share a common logical form” (Kremer 61). These “quasi-truths” could not be articulated in
language, although they would be “shown” in its proper application (61). Consequently, even
though the statements made in the Tractatus would have to strictly speaking be nonsensical, they
would still “serve a useful purpose by directing our attention to the ineffable features of reality
and language that undergird all our meaningful discourse. In this way, they enable us to ‘see the
world rightly’” (61).
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Demonstrating What Cannot Be Said
Commentators such as Cora Diamond and Michael Kremer have rejected the previous line of
interpretation, for it is clear that Wittgenstein has to condemn such a way of speaking of an
‘external region’ of language as nonsensical. Indeed, he does say that the propositions of the
Tractatus are “senseless,” despite the fact that in another way they are “elucidatory” (Tractatus §
6.54). It would then be mistake to take at face value his talk about the ‘limits’ of language and the
world, together with his claims about the “mystical” and the “inexpressible.” Kremer agrees with
Diamond in that the act of distinguishing such a putative ‘external region’ of language inclosing
“quasi-truths” would be equivalent to “chickening out” (61). It would amount to “a refusal to take
seriously Wittgenstein’s claim that his propositions are nonsense” (61) for, in effect, “to take the
propositions of the Tractatus to gesture at ineffable quasi-facts underlying all factual language is
to continue to image necessity as a fact” (62). The problem with this image, Kremer says, is that it
would lead us “to the nonsense of formulating as propositions that which is said to be
inexpressible” (62). Deep down, Phillips and Hacker’s reading of the Tractatus is “incoherent”
given the “methodical purpose of the Tractatus,” which is “to bring us to see that philosophical
theorizing, conceived as offering us a source of grounding or justification for logic, language or
life, will, in the end, produce nothing but such nonsense” (62).
In order to avoid this incoherent reading of the Tractatus, Kremer suggests that this work
in its outlook is not so far from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy — with some qualifications.
According to him, the ‘senselessness’ Wittgenstein attributed to the propositions of the Tractatus
does not yet make them entirely irredeemable:
[t]here is a sense that can be given to some of these uses of ‘showing’ which does
not degenerate into the incoherence of envisaging in the form of a fact that which
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we declare not to be a fact. We should not read talk of ‘showing’, and correlatively
of ‘perceiving’, ‘seeing’ and ‘recognizing’ that which is shown on the model of a
relation between a subject and some ineffable fact-like entity (‘that p is shown to
S’, ‘S perceives that p’). This form of the idea of showing is exactly what the
Tractatus wants to teach us to abandon. Rather, we should read talk of ‘showing’,
and correlatively ‘seeing’, on the model of the demonstration of a technique and
the uptake required to understand the demonstration. (62)
In this way, Kremer finds a common ground between the notion of ‘showing’ as employed in the
Tractatus and the notion of ‘following a rule’ appearing in the Philosophical Investigations. In the
latter, Wittgenstein conceives of the notion of ‘following a rule’ as a “practice” (Philosophical
Investigations § 202) insofar as “[t]o follow a rule” is a custom (§ 199). Roughly, since using
language properly involves following rules, it follows that “[t]o understand a language means to
have mastered a technique” (§ 202). In this sense, Kremer interprets Wittgenstein’s use of
‘showing’ in the Tractatus along the lines of understanding or demonstrating a practice. For our
purposes, Kremer’s interpretation can serve us in avoiding the confusions that drove us into
thinking of the Tractatus as refuting itself:
In essence, my suggestion is that one who ‘sees’ that which is shown, is simply
one who ‘knows how to go on’. On this reading, phrases such as ‘the logical form
of the world’ have no independent meaning; it is only the larger contexts –
‘showing the logical form of the world’, ‘seeing the logical form of the world’ and
so on – which have a meaningful use. These phrases are like ‘dancing the waltz’,
which should be understood simply as ‘waltzing’ rather than as involving a
relation between a dancer and a particular ‘dance’ (the waltz). It is significant that
the introduction of the terminology of ‘showing’ at TLP 4.022 (‘A proposition
shows its sense’) is embedded in a discussion of understanding. To understand a
proposition is to ‘know what is the case, if it is true’ (TLP 4.024). However this
should not be seen as an instance of ‘knowledge-that’. To understand a proposition
p is not to know another proposition of the form ‘p is true if and only if q’. Clearly
knowing such a proposition presupposes understanding p and cannot explain it.
Rather, understanding is a form of ‘knowledge-how’. One understands a
proposition by knowing how to use it – when to assert it and when to deny it.
(Kremer 62)
The upshot of this interpretation about the context in which ‘showing’ appears in the Tractatus is
that such a notion has more than one use. Depending on the use that is attributed to it, a different
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reading of the Tractatus originates: “[o]n the one hand, talk of showing can tempt us into the
nonsensical illusion that we grasp a realm of super-facts beyond the reach of language … [while]
[o]n the other hand, talk of showing can …direct us to the practical abilities and masteries that are
part of our ongoing talking, thinking and living” (63). Assuming the latter use of ‘showing’, we
can thereby reinterpret Wittgenstein’s conception of the ‘ineffable’ in the redeeming fashion
proposed by Kremer. Particularly, it would involve a different understanding of the sort of
“ineffable truth” that the Tractatus is supposed to convey:
it is also possible to redeem talk in the Tractatus of the communication of a ‘truth’
which is other than propositional. But, again, we should not be drawn into the
nonsensical illusion of a realm of ineffable proposition-like ‘truths’ which we can
yet, mysteriously, grasp. There is another sense of ‘truth’ which we can appeal to
here … ‘Truth’ as something which one can do … is, rather, a way to be followed,
a ‘path’ for life. Insofar as the Tractatus communicates a ‘truth’ it is by
demonstrating to us, in practice, how to follow such a path. (63)
Kremer thus reads Wittgenstein as showing us something that is ‘inexpressible’ to the extent that
it “cannot be communicated through a set of principles, but must be demonstrated in practice”
(63). Assuming Kremer’s interpretation of the concept of ‘showing’ as involving the
demonstration of a practice, let us now explore how such a practice could be construed in
Wittgenstein’s terms according to a ‘proper attitude’ towards life. In the final section of this
chapter, such a ‘proper attitude’ will be shown to be consistent with a type of ‘conversion’ that
Wittgenstein recommends in his later philosophy so as to overcome alienation.
The Way of Life of the Happy
A way of explaining away the internal inconsistency attributed to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy
is thus to appreciate the resonance of his ethical stance according to its practical attributes and
benefits. This would require tracking the value of ethics in practice itself as something to be
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shown or demonstrated in how we live. Instead of providing an account of what an ‘ethical’ way
of living would be, the value of ethics would be noticeable in the form of our action.
Correspondently, Wittgenstein believes that while “ethics has nothing to do with punishment and
reward in the ordinary sense,” it is clear however that “there must be … some sort of ethical
reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself” (Tractatus § 6.422).
Wittgenstein focuses on the will as the subject matter of ethics, although it is not
something we can discuss (§ 6.43); still, it can be construed as something shown in our behavior
and action. He defines “[t]he will … [as] an attitude of the subject to the world” (Notebooks 87e).
In this sense, we can think of our acts as displaying either good or bad will, and of our will as
something we have some power over — even if we cannot control anything else. Because while it
is clear that we cannot change at will the world (i.e., what the facts are), we can nonetheless
change our will, and with this transformation we can bring a “change [to] the limits of the world”
(87e). Wittgenstein speaks of a change in our will by means of which we would enter in contact
with the world from a different place. Adopting good will would lead to a difference in our way
of living, so that “the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane
as a whole” (Tractatus § 6.423). We have some power over our own will because the facts are
independent of it (Notebooks 73e), of what we would want the world to look like, such that we are
left only with the possibility of changing our general disposition or attitude towards the facts.
Thereby, even though “I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will,” it is yet true that “I
can … make myself independent of the world” (73e) through a change of will. Indeed, we can
transform our will, despite the fact that this would be the only thing we can do: “[i]f good or evil
willing affects the world it can only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts” (Tractatus §
6.43). Eventually, with a change of will we can enter the world, so to speak, seeing life from a
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different angle (i.e., from ‘the inside’). It can thus be argued that Wittgenstein recommends a
change of will in order to perceive life differently.
Going back to Kremer’s reading of the Tractatus, he claims in this respect that “the will
can affect the limits of the world because the willing subject simply is that limit” (73). In effect, if
the subject constitutes the limits of the world, the world can only change to the extent that the
subject’s will has influenced these limits, even though his will could not affect what occurs within
them. Therefore, insofar as the will of the subject constitutes an “attitude towards the world”
(Wittgenstein Notebooks 87e), Kremer claims that happiness resides in our readiness to not will
that such-and-such be the case: “[m]y unhappiness stems from a lack of co-ordination between
my antecedent wants and the contingent facts which I find in the world; I can then make myself
happy by renouncing all such wants, counting them as nothing, and adopting an attitude of
acceptance towards whatever happens” (73.).
We can now follow Kremer and avoid the problematic discussion about the ‘limits’ of
language and the world by renouncing the talk about such limits altogether, throwing away the
ladder so as to see the world aright (Tractatus § 6.54). Here is, then, a way in which we can look
at the Tractatus for our philosophical purposes. We can interpret Wittgenstein as saying that we
should take the world as it is without trying to influence it whatsoever. That is, we should just
take the world and not the limits of the world, since by adopting a good will we are already
affecting these ‘limits’ without explicitly trying to change them. From this perspective, we can
accommodate the ethical resonance of the Tractatus that Kremer regards as its “quasi-mystical”
afterthought in terms of accepting an everyday proper attitude towards life. A noteworthy result
from this reading of Wittgenstein is that we lose the problematic frames through which we see
life, as we no longer aspire to distinguish ‘the limits’ of the world. And, without this aspiration,
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the recalcitrant problem of the ‘meaning’ or ‘purpose’ of life would no longer trouble us. This is
why for Wittgenstein such a change of will “must make the world a wholly different one” (§
6.43), as the ‘boundaries’ of the world would disappear “[a]s if by accession … of meaning”
(Notebooks 73e) in our lives. The idea is to not presuppose ‘limits’ to meaningful language and
the world, given that this way we would not feel the need to account for “the meaning” of life.
Since we would not look anymore for these boundaries, there would be nothing about which we
would want to express such “meaning.”
Moreover, in his Notebooks Wittgenstein thinks of the problematic conception that
someone might have of his purpose in life as an issue that can be remedied by undergoing a
change of will. For we cannot search for ‘the meaning’ of our life in the world, as this, being an
absolute value, cannot “lie in it but outside it” (73e). However, to the degree that our will is
somehow “connected to the meaning of the world,” by adopting good will we can alter how we
see and lead our life (73e). Conversely, having ill will would affect negatively our life, in that we
would not be able to show what is meaningful about life in our actions. From this perspective,
Wittgenstein can be read as suggesting that the sense or purpose of life is found in living in good
faith, as this way we would be (capable of being) happy, which in the end constitutes the purpose
of life: “the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence” (73e). The ‘solution’ or
‘remedy’ to the problem of not finding meaning in our life is to lead the type of unworried life
involved in having an overall good disposition: “[i]n order to live happily I must be in agreement
with the world. And that is what “being happy” means” (75e). In effect, it is not a wild idea that
when we live in good faith we are disposed to living happily so that, by living happily, we live in
accordance with the world (75e). And when we live this way, the question about the purpose of
our life does not surface, or at least it does not affect us as it would, that is, had we lived with bad
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will. Hence, not being in agreement with the world would entail that one is living an unhappy life,
as the grounds for our ‘happiness’ would reside in the absence of the type of existential perplexity
that is common in persons who cannot move beyond a problematic conception of life. The
remedy, once again, is to have good will, for he who lives with such a disposition does not see
any longer life as an issue: “we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who
no longer needs to have any purpose except to live. That is to say, who is content” (73e). Thus,
what we consider as a ‘problem’ in our general perception of life is something that can vanish by
living happily. Ultimately, as “[t]he solution of the problem of life is seen in the disappearance of
this problem” (74e), a change in our attitude can help relieve us from this existential doubt.
Subsequently, after we experience a transformation in our basic disposition towards life,
the resistance we oppose to it begins to lose its hold. It may be that those who practice a
benevolent way of living find the ethical reward considered by Wittgenstein, perhaps as it entails
attaining a class of peace of mind with which one lives in the present, in the day-to-day, not
bothered anymore by questions about the meaning or sense of life (74e). Our sense of purpose is
then no longer something to worry about, as we stop indulging in our desire to raise existential
questions about the meaning of life.

III. 2. Wittgenstein’s Later Transcendentalism
In the remaining sections, I will propose an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein that can help
us to think about the question of persons’ lives in a way that responds to the problem of
alienation, which would constitute a practical account of the issue of personal identity. Now,
having seen how Wittgenstein’ early philosophy distinguishes what can be said from what can be
shown, it is worth explaining in this section his late views on transcendentalism.
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Remember that Wittgenstein came in the Tractatus to the conclusion that there could be no
philosophical propositions because they intend to trespass the boundaries of meaningful speech.
As we saw, according to one line of interpretation he sought to overcome these limits, not just by
enunciating philosophical propositions, but, what is more, by referring to an ineffable,
metaphysical realm whose logical structure would be revealed through correct uses of language.
Although we have distanced ourselves from this interpretation, it can still be said that the
propositions expressing his putative metaphysics could not themselves be genuine statements,
since they are not either empirical or logical truths. This was acknowledged by him in the
Tractatus, when he claimed that the propositions appearing in this book would only be helpful as
long as we recognize them as “senseless,” having “climbed out through them, on them, over
them” (Philosophical Investigations § 6.54). This means, though, that from this perspective the
Tractatus failed to an extent, namely, in its effort to distinguish meaningful uses of language from
senseless speech, since it assumed that language had a rigid or ‘fixid form’ which senseless
speech would attempt to vulnerate. Thus, it can at least be said that the criteria used there for
drawing such a distinction relied on a stringent and incomplete view of how language works in
everyday life, which gave rise to a determined picture of the ‘structure’ of reality.
Giving up on his old conception of the logic or ‘nature’ of language, the ‘general form’ of
any proposition, and the ‘structure’ of reality, Wittgenstein no longer thinks in the Investigations
that there is anything that cannot be said, for, in truth, there is nothing past the limits of meaning
other than nonsense (Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 111). As in the Tractatus, he now aspires to
solve philosophical problems completely. However, he thinks that everything that can be said
could be expressed clearly, such that there is no need to say or even imply the existence of
something that could not be expressed: “the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity.
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But this simply means that philosophical problems should completely disappear” (Philosophical
Investigations § 133). He does not believe that general norms about the limits of meaning should
be established if the propositions prescribing those norms attempt to overcome themselves the
margins of meaningful language. Therefore, as far as his new philosophical method is concerned,
it cannot consist of a system of statements offering criteria for deciding in the abstract which
propositions are meaningful. For the most part, this system would not be useful for diagnosing the
source of philosophical error. For the later Wittgenstein, philosophical problems do not have a
single origin. By appealing to the use that is actually given to words in the context of ‘language
games’, he holds that philosophical puzzlement arises when words are deprived from their
common, ordinary employments. The perplexity we tend to associate with matters that transcend
our ordinary concerns and interests depends on concrete misunderstandings about how words
operate in regular contexts of utterance.

What Can be Said
It appears that, after having substituted his old philosophy of language with a pragmatic
conception of meaning, Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘what can be said’ changed significantly.
Religious and ethical propositions, for example, are no longer thought of as meaningless.
Wittgenstein thinks that words like ‘God’ and ‘good’ have legitimate uses in ordinary games of
language, but that, even so, they cannot properly become the object of philosophical scrutiny.
Philosophy cannot prove the existence of God, because, in this case, a proof is not part of any
linguistic game in which this word is usually employed. For him, the attempt to provide this type
of evidence is absurd as it entails a deep “misunderstanding” of the role that religious beliefs and
other classes of statements “about God, the soul and eternal life” have in the forms of life of those
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who use them (see Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 302). In effect, in ordinary language ‘God’ does
not automatically presuppose philosophical doctrines in the asbsence of which its use would not
make sense. It can rather be argued that when this word is abstracted from the role it plays in
concrete linguistic practices where it has a legitimate use and then subjected to philosophical
reflections, its content can perplex us.
On the other hand, the subject matter of ethics’ is expressible. Ethical claims are value
judgments that prescribe rules of conduct. They provide rules for the use of ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’,
and the like, in the set of linguistic games. These words can serve further purposes, this is, insofar
as they constitute “moves” in language games, becoming thus significant in virtue of having
functions in the speakers’ forms of life. Thereby, although ethical propositions are not factual, this
does not imply that they are meant to express something “higher.” On the contrary, ethical
statements express grammatical rules that norm the uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’, e.g., in particular
games and prescribe ways of conduct in corresponding circumstances.

What Should Not be Said
For their part, philosophical statements are not mere “pseudo-propositions” as it was alleged in
the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, many of these statements that had been considered as
nonsense are rather similar in kind to ‘grammatical propositions’, because they serve as
guidelines for the use of their constituent words. To explain this, Wittgenstein distinguishes
between empirical and grammatical statements (Philosophical Investigations § 102). The first are
statements whose truth-value is ‘contingent’ on some given matter of fact. For instance, “It is
raining,” “It is October,” and “Water quenches fire” are examples of empirical propositions.
Meanwhile, the second class includes sentences like “Everything that goes up goes down,”
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“Sometimes you lose and sometimes you win,” and “Every bar has a length” (§ 102). Unlike
empirical statements, grammatical propositions show how to use their component words; in our
examples, they prescribe the use of ‘up’, ‘length’, and so forth. One of the main obstacles that can
obscure the way a grammatical proposition works is that it is impossible to imagine the opposite
of what they assert (§ 251), and also, the assumption that, because it cannot be thought of any
other way, such proposition must express a ‘necessary truth’. It happens that, because
grammatical statements involve rules for the use of words, what is thought of as contrary to them
is inconceivable. But this is due to the fact that the negation of a grammatical proposition is not a
false grammatical proposition but rather nonsense (Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 115). In contrast,
the negation of a true empirical statement is always a false factual proposition, which is
something imaginable. Wittgenstein thus compares philosophical statements to grammatical
propositions, seeing them largely as prescriptions for modes of speech. They regulate the
employment of expressions, even though they have the disorienting appearance of factual
statements. He suggests that one of the main sources of confusion in philosophy is that we think
that philosophical propositions should say something about the facts, but, in reality, they do not.
Furthermore, he thinks of meaningful speech as occurring in the context of customs and
institutions of human forms of life. Using language in meaningful ways involves following rules;
this is, engaging in practices requiring the surroundings provided by the customs and habits of a
community. Language is supposed to be a way of living, and the common rules we follow when
employing language are supposed to help us understand each other. But the notions proposed by
philosophical propositions are not in agreement with our ways of life. To be sure, these concepts
take something from our ordinary uses of words but ultimately deviate from them, rejecting
something of them. Philosophical statements significantly contravene how language is regularly
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used, even though their departure from ordinary discourse is not always obvious — after all, their
constituent expressions retain their usual meaning to some degree. Even as philosophers do not
seem to be aware of how their formulations are recommending a change in our notation, they still
distort the way we normally speak. What is problematic about philosophical statements, then, is
that they do not show us how words are used in any game in which there are already known rules,
but instead are themselves norms for the use of expressions.

Reconsidering the Character of Philosophical Problems
Yet again, for the later Wittgenstein philosophical statements can be interpreted as the expression
of genuine issues. They are engrained worries we want to give expression to as we reflect on
different linguistic structures. The analogy between these structures bewilders the intellect in a
way that it leads it to aporia: “[t]he problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of
language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; they are as deeply rooted in us
as the forms of our language, and their significance is as great as the importance of language”
(Philosophical Investigations § 111). Our urge to deviate from regular uses of language, to go
beyond the limits of meaningful speech, is a testament to a human tendency that defines us (Cf.
“A Conference on Ethics” 43), for we have an irresistible, at times compulsory, desire to
somehow escape our ordinary ways of speaking and living.
Philosophical problems, thereby, cannot be solved by using language improperly, which is
to say, without attending to how their constituent expresions are usualy employed in our linguistic
games. They can only be overcome by employing language in conformity with the forms of life of
a community. Then, according to Wittgenstein, the way to address philosophical problems is, on
the one side, to say what can be said so that nonsense is consequently excluded. An appeal to
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grammar can indeed help the philosopher remember how the expressions with which he
articulates his problems are ordinarily used (see McGinn 14-19). On the other side, philosophy
proceeds by deconstructing philosophical problems, making the emptiness of their constituent
statements evident. It is thus that philosophical problems end up being rejected as ill-founded. In
general, he tries to dissuade us from engaging in philosophical discourse, as he shows time and
again why we are misled in different opportunities into assuming that philosophical problems
have a “profound” character (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations § 111).
Lastly, let us examine the type of change in our form of life that Wittgenstein recommends
in his later philosophy to overcome alienation by appeal to the notion of a ‘person life’ provided
by Schechtman.

III. 3. What Can Be Shown: Adopting a Proper Attitude Towards Life
We can think of the relationship between a person life and what is taken as a ‘standard’ person
life (Schechtman 113-115) in terms of the relationship between a microclimate and a climate,
correspondingly. Even though the temperature in our residence might be different from the one
outside, at the same time it is conditioned and influenced by it. Similarly, even as we ‘construct’
in a sense our own life depending on the choices we make, our daily activities and exchanges with
others are determined by the ‘person-space’ (115) we occupy in life, which is a place in a
sociocultural infrastructure (114). Therefore, it is in the context provided by a ‘person-space’ that
someone’s life can acquire a distinguishable human shape, although this does not mean that his
life is necessarily determined by what society dictates. In any event, it can be argued that when
his life is adequately situated in a ‘person-space’, this results in a “practical unity” (75-77).
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Meanwhile, a person is alienated when his life fails to adjust to or agree with some human
“form of life” (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations § 241), which, in Schechtman’s terms,
would amount to some or another ‘paradigmatic’ form of person life (2014 111-115). When we
are alienated, it is as if our life unfolded within our own “microclimate,” seemingly living in
isolation from the conditions and circumstances of the world; as if we lived in a microclimate that
could have any given temperature we desired regardless of the circumstances of the outside
world. But inasmuch as any microclimate largely depends on the temperature of the outside
world, by the same token, each person’s life is largely impacted by what society conceives as
“standard” ways of human life. The point is that our life cannot acquire the type of ‘practical
unity’ Schechtman considers if we live secluded from the currency of daily affairs. For we do not
get to decide, regardless of what are the ‘paradigmatic’ forms of human life, what type of life we
are living any more than we can alter the climate by changing the temperature of our domicile. In
the long run, it is in terms of society’s standards, customs, and habits that the identity of our lives
is fixed (147). Since having a person life that resembles what is considered as a ‘typical’ human
life is necessary for obtaining a personal identity, our identity becomes blurred insofar as we
depart from basic, ordinary forms of living. Indeed, this is a sign that we are failing to adjust to
the world.
In general, our lives do not unfold as isolated phenomena; we are social individuals, living
in agreement with some life form. It is not as if each human being inhabited a miniscule region of
space, that is, a microclimate that each helped create, such that our lives did not impact one
another. Quite the contrary, our lives affect and interfere with each other in several ways: they are
organized around each other at the outset. Precisely because our life is already in constant contact
with the lives of other human beings, it is in the course of our daily activities and exchanges that
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it develops. The point is that we cannot evaluate human lives in isolation from the sociocultural
infrastructure in which they are already situated. With this infrastructure serving as the
background, we normally assess how well someone’s life has been, and this evaluation provides
the materials needed for specifying who he is. Thus, several factors contribute to our personal
identity so that, in order to provide a complete account of who we are, we need to assume a
holistic approach that includes our entire life. In this regard, Schechtman’s model of a person life
is useful for our purposes, when she argues that “being a person … involves conceiving of our
lives in this holistic way, experiencing them as ongoing wholes” (100). For her, the practical unity
of our life requires understanding it “not just in terms of relations between individual moments,
but also in terms of the overall structure in which those moments play a role” (103). In effect,
when we assess someone’s life, we judge it “as a whole” (107) for it is the “person as a whole
[that] can be an appropriate target” of our judgments (108). Furthermore, this holistic picture of a
person life would only make sense when appreciated in contrast to the habits and customs giving
rise to the sociocultural infrastructure in which a determined person’s life develops.
Assuming this holistic approach to a person life, we can interpret Wittgenstein as
suggesting that, in order to overcome alienation, we should live by playing the language games of
some given forms of life, acting in agreement with them by playing diverse functions in the vast
network of interpersonal relationships that structure what are taken as ‘standard’ ways of life.
Specifically, he speaks of a class of ‘conversion’ through which general disaffection towards the
ordinary could recede as a person is able to reorient his life towards the tracks of a ‘typical’ way
of existing. It is by fulfilling our social roles and ordinary tasks in a committed fashion that we
can see ourselves returning to the world of life. That is, by familiarizing ourselves with how life is
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‘normally’ supposed to proceed, we can assimilate our alienated ways of behaving to ordinary
forms so that the problematic appearance of our life vanishes. According to Wittgenstein,
[t]he solution to the problems you see in your life is to live in a way that what is
problematic disappears.
Saying that life is problematic means that your life does not adjust to the form of
life. In consequence, you must change your life and, if it adapts to the form, what
is problematic disappears. (Aforismos § 149)
As we place ourselves in a ‘person-space’ (Schechtman 2014 115), we play an active role in the
world of life such that we situate ourselves in linguistic games where we can adapt to the forms of
life of a community. We thus start to live again in direct contact with some typical way of being
human, for we conceive of ourselves in terms of those around us, playing different roles through
which we associate with other human beings. While thus interacting with them, our life enacts
many of the habits and customs that give shape to the community wherein we reside. The
‘conversion’ Wittgenstein speaks of can be seen as a ‘window’ into a world that we already
inhabit but have somehow lost touch with.
Through this conversion, Wittgenstein shows a way of providing one’s life with a
‘standard’ framework or structure. To see what such a ‘standard’ trajectory would actually look
like, let us recall how Schechtman speaks of a ‘typical’ person life:
[i]t is a structural whole that has, by its very nature, attributes that apply to
it as a whole which do not necessarily apply to each individual portion. We
can thus say that the mature person is the same person as the infant or (in
unlucky cases) dementia patient because there is a single life course that
starts (roughly) with infancy, develops into maturity, and devolves
(possibly) into dementia. The person is defined by the unfolding of the
pattern in which these stages all play their part. (108)
In spite of this, an alienated person could problematize such a ‘typical’ development, perceiving
the very fact that ordinary persons go through (most of) these different transitions as an issue.
Evidently, it is not the case that he would not experience many of these changes by resisting or
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problematizing them. The point, though, is that by adopting an ‘improper attitude’ towards these
natural transitions, he is not able to see his own life in a way that he can identify with it, thereby
becoming alienated. Since he perceives life in general in this way, he ends up dissociating himself
from his own life and its ordinariness to the degree that, even as he suffers these changes while
going through the different stages of a typical life, he does not necessarily perceive himself as the
one undergoing them. It is as if it was someone else suffering such alterations, or as if, despite the
passage of time, he still remained deep down ‘the same’ through all of the mutations of an
ordinary person contingently associated to him. A gap between ‘himself’ and ‘his person’ would
then appear to open, which he must in turn bridge to surpass alienation.
Therefore, by not having a proper attitude in front of these changes he would grow
dissatisfied with the reality of his life, expanding more and more the gulf he has created between
what he sees as ‘himself’ and his ordinary life. Perhaps, as he cannot successfully define ‘himself’
in terms of any one phase of his life, he fails to associate himself with the entire, ongoing life of
the ordinary person he is and with all of the roles he plays in it. In consequence, the problem he
has with his life can be seen as a practical issue he has with his identity, for as he cannot see
himself as an everyday person existing in a given stage of life, he assumes the wrong attitude
towards his life.
But the identity of a person is not defined solely based on any one phase or aspect of his
life (Cf. II.3) anymore than it can be characterized by selecting any given role a person plays in
ordinary life (e.g., being a father, son, husband, citizen, etc.). From Schechtman’s holistic
interpretation of a person life, “in constructing an account of personal identity” we do not “start
with person-parts that must somehow be brought together into a single entity” (100). Instead,
when we assess our own identity we address our entire ongoing life and not the various parts
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separately, which “exist in the form they do only as abstractions from the whole, and so the whole
is, in an important sense, prior to the parts” (100). Accordingly, as “the attributes of the whole …
do not apply to each of its individual parts” (107), it makes no sense to try and decide who we
‘really’ are by attending to any single phase of our life, since we cannot isolate this way who we
‘truly’ are at our core. Alternatively, it can be said that we are not defined as any specific social
role we play in ordinary life but, as George Mead puts it, as a ‘constellation of roles’ (see 1972
145-157). Thereby, by adopting a holistic stance on persons’ lives, we can avoid selecting any
particular role we have in ordinary life so to define our personal identity. The reason is that, when
we try to understand who we are, our perspective has to include a much broader range of factors,
as we need to capture the form of our entire ongoing life.
Then again, assuming such an expanded perspective on our ordinary life in order to
determine who we are is not going to help us overcome alienation if we fail to change the attitude
we have towards such a life. It is further required the adoption of a (more) gracious attitude
towards our life and its changes, so that we are be able to see ourselves as forming a ‘unity’ with
it. We can then identify ourselves with the constant flux that is our person life, accepting it for
what it is, and so give up on the urge to escape such a vision of who we already are and have been
so far. We would perceive the form of our life as a coherent, integral structure comparable in
many ways to some ‘typical’ or ‘standard’ form of life, despite the many times we failed to
clearly see this. After abandoning a way of perceiving human life in general that is inherently
problematic –and, particularly, an ‘essentialist’ perspective on personal identity–, alienated
human beings can encounter a path back to life in common. As they move away from what might
be seen as a ‘peculiar’ form of acting and interacting with others, they can accomplish the
conversion Wittgenstein speaks of, bending to how life in common is perceived.
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The Bare Minimum for Conversion
But how does such a “life in common” usually occur? That is, to which ‘common life’ are we
supposed to adjust to overcome alienation? One might question the way ‘ordinary life’ is assumed
to occur, thereby becoming skeptical as to whether an alienated person should adapt to ‘common
ways of acting and interacting with others’ if ultimately it is not clear what would ‘life in
common’ amount to. However, we need not settle here which is the type of life we need to
convert to in order to surpass alienation, since the treatment of the problem of personal identity
we are offering is not that ambitious. Even if we can question whether this or that form of life
counts as a “common” or “standard” one, we are instead merely alluding to a bare minimum of
ordinariness of human life that a person should be able to be in agreement with to avoid or
surmount the fundamental class of alienation we have been considering. This requisite is a
threshold human life forms must meet upon which they can begin to unfold in rough agreement
with one another. Therefore, regardless of whether we are justified in criticizing the way “normal”
people live, and even if this criticism is part of our ordinary life, I take Wittgenstein to be
speaking of a more basic class of conversion that is necessary to acquire a distinct form of human
life. The objective is to surmount a fundamental type of dissatisfaction with one’s life regardless
of the details of how life in common ‘usually’ occurs. Then, although the question of exactly
which life ‘in common’ we are speaking of would still pertinent to our understanding of human
life in general, we need not address it in order to appreciate the value of the class of conversion
Wittgenstein considered. After all, the latter has to do only with overcoming a potential
preliminary alienation from our own ordinary life in the absence of which we would not have a
clear-cut personal identity expressed in a life form we would want to associate ourselves with.
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Quieting Down the Problematic Undertone of Our Life
From our construal of Wittgenstein’s treatment of alienation follows a certain kind of quietism
that the alienated individual can adopt so as to not look at his person life in a way that leads him
to philosophical perplexity. As the ordinary perspective he takes on his life helps him surpass its
‘problematic’ appearance, the philosophical problems that might otherwise come up are
sidestepped since a large part of their incentive is silenced before they can disseminate. As a
person overcomes alienation by adjusting his life to some ‘paradigmatic’ form of person life, he
has the grounds for ignoring the origin of the appeal of an atypical way of seeing and leading life.
What initially motivated a person to live as an ‘outlier’ fades away given that, from the
perspective afforded within the context of an integral or unitary life, it makes no sense to lead an
atypical, alienated life.
In this sense, by living in agreement with the life of an ordinary person within the
background of a sociocultural infrastructure, the problems that led him to live an estranged life no
longer affect him, at least not to the same degree. Against the backdrop offered by Schechtman,
the ordinary human being would find a way of aligning his own life with the forms of life of a
community, so that his person life would gain the class of practical ‘unity’ or ‘integrity’ needed
for having a full-fleshed personal identity, as opposed to the watered-down identity found in
alienated human lives. An indistinct, fragmented or dissociated way of life would thereby
encounter the means to solidify his life, becoming part of the forms of life of a community. He
could see himself represented in these forms of life, so that there would be no longer a gap
between his life and such forms of life.
We can read Wittgenstein as proposing a quietist, therapeutic conception of philosophy
with the intention of treating this class of alienation. The desired result of his ‘treatments’ or
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‘therapies’ (Philosophical Investigations §133d) is to calm down the progression of our
philosophical thought whenever we want to by rejecting, for instance, the tendency to
problematize life as a whole, as if life was in itself ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Wittgenstein’s ‘treatments’
(§133d) could help us dissuade ourselves from persisting in erratic trains of thought. The general
aim is to quiet down our thought when it digresses into speculations about the meaning of life, our
purpose in the world, and so forth. The concerns we would subsequently be left with would be
ordinary in character, as we abandon the strangeness in our lives produced by the puzzlement of
questions about the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’ of our lives. By giving up on the habits that support such
a neurotic attitude, we could forget to an extent about the troubles that were obscuring our
understanding of the place we already have in life. Thus, we can live in an uncomplicated way as
we persist in this state of mind.
There is a sort of resignation involved in resisting such an estranged form of life, as we
decide not to address anymore the question of whether life has a purpose. Nevertheless,
Wittgenstein wants to pull us away from the notion that there is anything to grieve about. This
‘grief’ would have no place in the linguistic games in which we would operate; there would be no
context for it to emerge while living in agreement with the forms of life of a community. As a
consequence, Wittgenstein does not recommed making a substantial sacrifice, because we do not
refrain from saying anything that could have meaning. This sacrifice is not intellectual, but one of
will or feeling (see Kenny The Wittgenstein Reader 263.). It is about renouncing, among other
things, to the feeling that there is something transcendental that can be said, precisely because in
abandoning this feeling lies the exit we are looking for to overcome our philosophical problems.
Particularly, this conversion represents an antidote to the urge to problematize life. Our purpose
could thus be described as silencing our philosophical thought (or at least its expression), since
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we rather understand philosophy as a disease. Again, Wittgenstein talks about a transformation in
our lives that would change our way of seeing and using language, such that we could stop
philosophizing whenever we want to (Philosophical Investigations §133). Our ‘life’ would not
become an enigma, for this word would only be used significantly in diverse ordinary language
games where it is not generally problematized. Accordingly, it is in our linguistic practices that
this transformation must begin, as we go about quieting down or attuning our strange behavior
and roughly adopt instead the habits and customs of those around us.

Wonder for the Mundane
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that, to avoid alienation, a human being would have to adapt
constantly to some paradigmatic form of person life, as he could not assume perpetually a
‘proper’ attitude towards life as a whole. In other words, there is no privileged stage of complete
unity in life where he could render the possibility of returning to an alienated way of life obsolete.
The individual that has acquired a level of practical unity in his life needs to persist in his
engagement with others, familiarizing himself with the customs and habits of the forms of life of
a community until these become his own. Mostly, he needs to practice the activities that such
forms of life would organize as elements in the trajectory of a ‘typical’ person life.
Having said that, are such practices and activities already settled? And even if we can
identify such practices and activities, how do we know to which community they pertain? It can
be thus objected that it is not settled what the community’s practices involve, such that the
alienated human being would have no guidelines to follow in returning to the world of life.
Moreover, even if these practices exist, perhaps they do not exist uniformly, i.e., in the way he
would require if he were to have a sense of what he needs to do in order to adapt to the form of
life of a community. Maybe he is just different from the community in which he resides so that, if
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there is no such fixed set of habits and customs, we could not ask him to adjust to them. From
another perspective, perhaps he does not see the community he lives in as his own; he would not
think that the community represents him. Thereby, even if he can recognize what the overall
activities practiced by the members of this community are, this would not mean that the rules
prescribing the activities of those individuals apply to him.
We can tackle these criticisms by pointing out once more that our treatment of the
problem of personal identity is meant to apply exclusively to a vital class of alienation, where a
bare minimum of normalcy in life is taken as the target. This entails that a person overcomes
alienation by continuously adapting to ordinary behaviors shared by the vast majority of human
beings. The ‘standard’ person life is to this extent flexible enough so as to capture habits and
customs of forms of human life in general. A person prevails over alienation by associating with
others in regular, instinctive ways that do not involve prior elucidation as to whether the activities
he practices reflect who he really is. In the end, the dissociated individual abandons a peculiar
way of life by integrating into any ‘standard’ form of person life. In this way, he commits himself
to being a part of such forms of life only if it is a commitment to who he would naturally be had
he not become alienated to begin with. It follows that merely becoming a member of a community
would not suffice to overcome alienation — after all, there is a trivial sense in which he already is
a member. The point is rather that surmounting alienation involves adopting a form of life that
comes naturally to him regardless of the community in which he might actually be situated.
In any event, our urge to surpass meaningful language in order to grasp ‘the sense’ of our
concrete life could be discouraged by remembering that we have abandoned an alienated form of
life so as to constantly adjust to a ‘paradigmatic’ structure of a person life. In this sense, the
problem of personal identity ceases to constitute an issue to us. The ‘sense’ or ‘purpose’ that
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one’s life could acquire would only amount to significant uses of language and modes of
engagement with others, where our verbal behavior fits a role required by a language game
presently played. Therefore, what is “problematic” about of our life –i.e., that which disturbs us
and for which we say that there is no solution– is not the consequence of the discovery of an
enigma for which we have to find an answer. Rather, that which can certainly amaze us becomes
a ‘problem’ when we lose the focus of what is important; namely, our wonder for everyday life,
which is something that at some point marveled us and that can surprise us again. But the lack of
wonder leads to a false class of amazement, that of the ‘philosophical problem’, which instead of
showing us what we have in plain sight –the everyday world with its complexities and
ambiguities–, it offers us instead a ‘shadow’ of what we should be looking for. This is a
simplification of our conceptual relations that can mislead us into producing conceptual
entanglements making ‘the problem’ increasingly insoluble. Still, this is not irremediable, for if
we can genuinely become amazed of ordinary life, the ‘problematic’ aspect of life should fade
away although our restlessness might linger on.
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Part Two
Self-Conception

90

IV.

THE USE OF A NOTION OF ONESELF:

A Static Approach to the Puzzle of Self-Conception
We have set up in Chapter I ordinary human beings at the center of our discussion, after which we
discerned in Chapter II criteria usually employed to speak of the personal identity of these
individuals from a practical stance. We can now turn to the problem of the status of the notion of
‘self’ or, better still, to an analysis of the ways of life in which this concept is supposed to play a
key role.
The issue to be addressed in this chapter and the next one can be phrased as follows: what
is the use of a notion of oneself? Indeed, as we go about under the impression that each of us is an
ordinary human being, what good is that impression for? It can be initially said that, under normal
circumstances, we characterize the type of individual we are by considering our psychological and
physical properties (see I.2), and, moreover, by assessing the kind of life we live (see II.3). We
appear to have not just an instinctive, pre-theoretical understanding of the class of creatures we
are, but also seem to possess a natural grasp of the identity of our own person. Roughly, then, this
grasp would amount to a ‘self-conception’ arising from the handle we have on our own particular
life. This handle would be prima facie indispensable from a practical perspective: without a selfconception, we would hardly comprehend our place in society and the range of opportunities
available to us, which in turn could significantly complicate our existence.
Yet, this approach can be problematized by noticing how many are compelled to
introspecting or looking inwardly to account for the uniqueness or singularity of the person they
are. It is as if our ordinary lives unfolded in function of the persistence of who we truly are ‘on the
inside’. We are prone to look beyond the concrete human being experienced in everyday life so as
to isolate the source of our individuality. But why cannot we satisfy ourselves with the notion that
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we ultimately amount to nothing more than mundane beings among corporeal objects in nature?
In other words, why do we look for some property that would in principle separate us at our core
not just from other species but, fundamentally, from all other persons? This tendency to search for
a property that could explain our special place in the universe has been further institutionalized in
the idea that, strictly speaking, we are ‘selves’ and not merely human beings. As a matter of fact,
the belief that deep down we are ‘selves’ is shown in the attitudes we assume in our daily
activities and interchanges with others, for we carry ourselves in ways that exhibit a special
importance we give to ourselves. There are several ways in which this conviction is shown in the
behavior of a person: “[o]ne could know he remains so convinced by listening to him talk about
himself, his personal problems … or by observing him act in everyday life as if he believed he
had a self that he valued and insisted other people value” (Canfield 1990 129). It thus seems as if
we could infer from people’s unreflective acts and utterances not just how they usually interact
with others but, more importantly, how they see themselves (131).
Now, we have established that there is no single property that makes us essentially the
concrete persons we are (Cf. II. 3). It is at least not clear why we need to appeal to ‘selves’ in
order to explain the singularity of our person. A putative account of ‘the self’ would end up
depending on the enumeration of attributes of a person associated to it — namely, of a person said
to have a ‘self’. However, in this way our explanation would not be informative. A similar
problem surfaces in the explanation of the uniqueness of persons in terms of ‘souls’ (Cf. Martin
and Barresi 2006) since, by the same token, that account would not get us any further. Why then
insist that I, an ordinary person, endure as the same individual throughout my life in virtue of the
continuity of a ‘self’ associated to me? Despite the obvious fact that any person’s physical and
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mental attributes and functions inevitably change and deteriorate in time, why should we identify
ourselves with anything other than the ordinary person we know ourselves to be?
For the sake of clarity, we must differentiate at this stage between two general types of
problems regarding the status of ‘selves’. Following Canfield, we shall separate the
phenomenological from the ontological formulation of the problem, thus recognizing two levels
of issues surrounding the topic of the self. On the one side,“[t]here is a merely theoretical belief in
or denial of self,” which gives rise to the ontological problem of the status of the self, while “on
the other hand there is gut-level or existential, belief or denial” of self, which calls for a
phenomenological approach to the subject (1990 4). A consequence of drawing this distinction is
that, for instance, a person who has theoretically discarded the existence of ‘selves’ may still be
convinced of their existence, which is shown in the ways he interacts with others. “This person,”
Canfield suggests, “retains what I am calling a gut-level belief in the self. It might be named an
existential form of belief … to signify that the belief manifests itself in a person’s life and actions
in a strong, pervasive way, as merely theoretical beliefs do not” (130). The opposite case would
be that of the Buddhist, who is not merely denying on theoretical grounds the reality of ‘selves’
(130). He further aspires to do away with the image he has of himself, since it involves the
elementary, existential belief that he is a ‘self’.
The issue to be examined here has primarily to do with our self-conception. We can center
our attention on the status of existential beliefs about ourselves while disregarding the
metaphysical issue, as these are separate problems. In effect, we can either believe or not believe
that we are selves regardless of whether we have theoretically retained or eliminated these entities
from the universe of speech. Thus, I will focus on the phenomenological problem, specifically, as
it regards to the utility of self-conception. My approach in the second part of this project is
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phenomenological insofar as it is limited to how we conceive of personhood and how this
conception is formed from first-personal experience. For its part, the problem of the ontological
status of ‘selves’ will not be addressed here; we need not ponder how idle the distinction between
selves and human beings might be. We will restrict our inquiry henceforth to how ordinary
persons appear to others and to themselves (3), as our problem involves questions about the
individual conception persons have of themselves, how they have acquired them, and the role that
these (might) play in their lives.
In order to tackle our main question about the use of a notion of oneself, it will be helpful
to first address the problem of how did we ever acquire such a notion. This problem is expressed
in the puzzle of self-conception, which is articulated by George Mead. Thus, after formulating
this puzzle and specifying ways of responding to it, we would have laid the groundwork we
require to assess the issue of the use of self-conception. There are two chief ways of addressing
this puzzle. Firstly, there are static approaches, which I will present and evaluate in this chapter.
Secondly, there are dynamic approaches; these will be examined in the next chapter together with
a dynamic approach I will then propose. As an upshot, we will come up with two general classes
of approximations to the same problem, such that there will be different ways of considering the
phenomenological problem of the use of self-conception.

IV. 1. Seeking Oneself: A Static Formulation of the Puzzle of Self-Conception
At first glance, it seems that we need not know whether the first-personal pronoun actually refers
to anything in order to establish the origin and utility of our self-conception. We can start by
focusing on the notion we already have of ourselves and then ask whether it is formed from a
potential impression of ourselves, given that such a focus does not necessarily presuppose
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understanding how ‘I’ works. Then again, how could we ever directly perceive the person we are
so as to attain an impression of ourselves? If I can only immediately perceive parts of my body,
how can these fragmentary impressions be put together to form my own self-conception? Since
the development of my self-conception in this way would follow parameters set by my prior sense
of who I am, these parameters would not be useful — they would have to be as arbitrary as the
conception I end up making of myself, which would beg the question of how could such an
arbitrary and therefore inaccurate image of myself be of any service to me.
In Mind, Self, and Society, Mead formulates this puzzle in the following terms: “[h]ow can
an individual get outside himself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to
himself?” (1972 139) He thinks of this as “the essential psychological problem of selfhood or of
self-consciousness” (139). This is a fundamental problem with our capacity to ever form a selfconception, which leads to the question of how did we ever become self-conscious. Based on the
assumption that “[w]e can distinguish very definitely between the self and the body” (136), the
issue is how could we come up with a notion of ourselves, not of our bodies, since these are not
equivalent. That they do not amount the same thing is clear from the fact that “[t]he body can be
there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being” a notion of oneself
“involved in the experience” of our own body (136). Mead explains this as follows:
[i]t is perfectly true that the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a
whole. We cannot see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are
agile, but we cannot get an experience of our whole body. There are, of course,
experiences which are somewhat vague and difficult of location, but the bodily
experiences are for us organized about a self. The foot and hand belong to the self.
We can see our feet, especially if we look at them from the wrong end of an opera
glass, as strange things which we have difficulty in recognizing as our own. The
parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the
body without any serious invasion of the self. The mere ability to experience
different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table. The table
presents a different feel from what the hand does when one hand feels another, but
it is an experience of something with which we come definitely into contact. The
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body does not experience itself as a whole, in the sense in which the self in some
way enters into the experience of the self. (136)
Notice that he formulates this puzzle from a ‘static’ perspective by pointing out how person
seeking to contemplate directly his whole body would fail in achieving an awareness of ‘himself’.
Mead particularly emphasizes one side of this paradox, namely, the case of a person failing to
become an immediate ‘object’ of his own awareness. The difficulty consists in the fact that a
human being cannot completely and immediately perceive himself, or else enter in contact with
himself, so as to acquire an image of who he is. Therefore, how can we have an operative
conception of ourselves if we do not have enough resources for coming up with this notion, given
that we cannot become objects of our own awareness? Assuming that a person becomes selfaware by perceiving parts of his body would beg the question, as he would apparently have no
basis for inferring that these are parts of himself (136). It follows that “the self as an object does
not enter [experience]” (137).
From another perspective, while a person is trying to directly and entirely perceive
himself, he might infer that he exists from the fact that there must be someone doing the
perceiving. But on what basis could he infer this? While a person perceives, he should not be able
to perceive himself, such that there would be nothing in his own awareness from which he could
suppose that there must be a corresponding perceiver. Indeed, there is no perceiving subject to be
perceived; he cannot, so to speak, step back and see himself as a subject. Subsequently, the self as
a subject cannot enter experience, either. The assumption that we can infer from our present
experience that there must be an experiencing subject implies what Canfield refers to as the ‘dual
aspect’ to consciousness: “there is the item we are aware of and, at the same time, an awareness of
being aware” (1990 29). He claims that this dual aspect leads to an infinite regress, since there
would have to be an infinite amount of perceivers in order to ground the awareness of the original
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person attempting to perceive himself: “if there is self-awareness, then the self must be a part of
consciousness, and that … seems unacceptable,” because it “gives rise to an infinite chain of
awareness of x, awareness of awareness of x, awareness of awareness of awareness of x, and so
on” (31). Thus, since from this point of view a person would have to become self-aware by virtue
of becoming a part of his own consciousness, self-awareness seems impossible.
As a result, since no one would ever be justified in taking himself either as an object or
subject of his own awareness, it looks like we cannot explain our self-consciousness, let alone the
properties of our self-conception. Still, we claim to know who we are and suppose to know how
others see us. From what we have said, though, it rather appears that we do not know who we are,
and that our self-conception does not fit us. All in all, if we have a notion of ourselves, it could
hardly be an accurate one. Even if we have a self-conception to entertain, its utility could not be
estimated because we have no independent grounds on which to determine its role.
One reason why this paradox arises is that, as a rule, any perception requires some type of
mediation to occur. Some sense or another must be used for some experience to be obtained, so
that through it we become aware of such-and-such. It is thus that, by default, immediately
perceiving oneself would have to be excluded from the act of perceiving itself, just as our eye’s
blind spot must be overlooked in order for us to observe an object. However, if the use of a notion
of oneself is supposed to be explained in terms of a direct acquaintance with or immediate
experience of the person one is at some point, it seems that we cannot ever come up with such a
notion. Then, there would not be any self-conception to be explained, but this is absurd. Actually,
we possess a self-conception insofar as we know ourselves to be this or that way, believe that we
have such-and-such physical traits, personality, and so on. It can be further argued with Canfield
that this conception plays a determinant role in how our lives unfold, as it largely impacts our
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behavior and how we act and interact with others, insofar as the attitudes we assume show the
deep conviction that we are not just human beings but, more importantly, ‘selves’. This is shown
in the special importance we put on ourselves and demand from others (130).
As will be seen, Mead tackles the puzzle of self-conception by adopting a dynamic stance
(see 1972 138). I will present his approach in the next chapter with the intention of grounding my
own dynamic account of the purpose of self-conception. For now, the idea is to advance specific
attempts to address this puzzle from a static perspective.

IV. 2. Traditional Static Approaches to the Puzzle of Self-Conception
Purism is a tradition that has paved the way for static approaches to the notion of ‘I’. This
doctrine consists of “an appealing conception of I as purified of the demanding features and
requirements which make other terms so complicated. A ‘simple rule’ gives its meaning. No
identification is necessary in central cases. Each use is logically secured against failure” (de
Gaynesford 2006 28). A classic exponent of this tradition is Descartes, for whom ‘I’ is a term
whose referent is guaranteed against failure provided a simple rule for its use. It is thus that there
cannot be a doubt without a doubter, a thought without a thinker (1997 36), from which one could
infer one’s own existence (36). Accordingly, we could interpret his proof of the existence of the
self (36) as implying that it would be practically impossible to conceive of a perception without a
perceiver.
However, as we begin to look for what ‘I’ denotes, we stumble right away with the issue
of whether this term refers at all, let alone to a person or a sub-personal entity. Lichtenberg claims
that this term does not refer, arguing in turn that ‘the self’ must be a grammatical illusion arising
from the assumption that ‘I’ has a substantive use (1971 412). We assume, in effect, a correlative
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reference for ‘I’ in the world as we utter it in diverse contexts, and we call this reference ‘myself’
or ‘the self’. Lichtenberg suggests, though, that the first person term does not refer at all because
it works basically like ‘it’ as used in “It rains,” which is a device of language not meant to denote
in those cases an object (412). Yet, even if we do not postulate the existence of an object denoted
with ‘it’ in order to make sense of that statement, we tend to think that ‘I’ has a referent in the
world. To avoid misunderstandings, he recommends reformulating Descartes’ proof of the
existence of the self as follows: “[w]e should say, ‘It thinks,’ just as we say, ‘It thunders.’ Even to
say cogito is too much if we translate it with ‘I think.’ To assume the ‘I,’ to postulate it, is a
practical need” (412). Lichtenburg’s suggestion is thus to interpret the necessity attributed to
Descartes’s proof of the self as practical, since we have to assume out of necessity a placeholder
for ‘I’ given the way our language functions.
Then again, since we have limited the scope of our inquiry to a phenomenological
approach to self-conception, we need not address the concern of whether the first person term
actually points to an object in the universe in order to account for the utility of our selfconception. So far, we have achieved a preliminary basis for questioning the idea that ‘I’ always
refers, which will later on serve us in loosening the grip that static approaches to the puzzle of
self-conception tend to have in us. Keeping in mind this consideration, let us turn to an
examination of particular attempts that have been offered to address this puzzle and show exactly
why they have failed.
Hume’s Quest for the Self as an Object
Hume famously introspected in order to find a potential impression in his experience that could
explain how he got his idea of ‘I’. His intent was indeed to track down the origin of his idea of
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himself. He can be seen attempting to perceive himself as an object by assuming a contemplative
approach, as he inspects the current perceptions in his stream of consciousness without finding
anything that he could properly call ‘myself’:
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can
observe any thing but the perception. (2005 165)
That his attempt was futile is not really surprising; after all, it is a given that there is no actual
object we could adequately name “myself” which enters our immediate awareness in its entirety.
There was no such impression in his experience or else a principle of association of ideas he could
identify with himself — nor could there ever be one, for what would such an impression or
principle have to look like if we are to properly call it ‘myself’? For the sake of argument, let us
assume that ‘the self’ is something that could in principle be perceived –i.e., something that could
impress our understanding one way or another–, whether it manifests itself as an impression or as
a cluster of impressions. Still, what Hume showed is that we are only presently aware of a flux of
impressions or perceptions of our own state of mind, and never experience ourselves as complete
objects of our own awareness. We are only conscious of concomitant fragments or episodes that
he calls ‘impressions’, but never experience these fragments together as a complete object we
could think of as ‘the self’.
Furthermore, there is nothing we can directly perceive which is worth calling ‘the self’.
Canfield explains that Hume’s endeavor “was to gain experiential awareness of his self. Only if
he could have such a direct, immediate awareness would there be a source in experience for the
idea of the self” (1990 32). But, since there is no such source, he had to conclude that there is no
I. The point is that Hume could never have achieved his aim. The reason why this is not possible
has to do with how we normally come into contact with objects in nature, which excludes the
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possibility of encountering ourselves. It is part of how we normally experience objects or enter in
contact with them in the world that we cannot experience ourselves the same way or else be
ourselves objects to contact. By definition, our immediate experience cannot admit any object to
be directly aware of in its entirety that we could properly conceive of as ‘ourselves’.

The Subject as a Condition for the Unity of Experience
Meanwhile, there have been accounts meant to explain how we can conceive of ourselves as
subjects of our own experience. For instance, Kant speaks of the ‘transcendental subject of
experience’ as a condition implied in the acquisition of organized, coherent experience. Still,
unlike Descartes, he does not assert the self’s existence in a substantive way, since he just infers
its formal existence. For Kant, we have to assume the existence of a transcendental reference for
‘I’ even if this entity is never experienced, as it constitutes a condition for the possibility of
experience (1984 163). The reference of ‘I’ –this is, the noumenal self– is ‘transcendental’ insofar
as it has no referent in time and space, but it is conceived as a requirement for intelligible
experience insofar as the idea of a ‘self’ must accompany all of our perceptions for these to be
obtained (166-167). As a consequence, even if he regards in the end ‘the self’ as a transcendental
illusion, the notion of ‘I’ still has a use to the extent that it accounts for how our experience is
attained in a unified way.
However, Kant does not explain the way in which this notion of a transcendental subject
helps synchronize the data we retrieve from our senses. And without having a function in
organizing our experience, it looks like we have no reason to hold on to it. In this way, Canfield
claims that “[t]he transcendental I is a trick” (1992 43). He argues that if this entity does not lie in
space and time, it is not clear how the existence of this subject in a “transcendental” sphere, being
“forever devoid of contact with things in real space,” can do any “explanatory work in how things
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are organized” in space and time (43). In effect, after close examination it is not clear that this
concept of ‘I’ does the work that Kant wants it to:
[t]he only thing it is called on explicitly to explain –the “unity of experience” – it
cannot. The explanation is supposed to look something like this: “That this sight
occurs simultaneously with this sound is explained by the fact that they are both
experienced by a something-I-know-not-what which is itself forever beyond
experience.” Such an explanation is only the appearance of one. (43)
Although we cannot find the thing itself in the world denoted with ‘I’, we still assume that we are
aware of a phenomenological ‘I’, if only implicitly, as the consequence of having intelligible
experience. Nevertheless, this supposition is unwarranted. Just as we cannot experience what is to
be strictly speaking called ‘I’ because it lies outside space and time, we have no evidence of the
workings of a phenomenological ‘I’, not even indirectly. It is true that we possess the idea of an
‘I’. But then, when we try to explain its origin, we arrive at a dead end: if the ‘I’ is supposed to
synthetize our intuitions into organized experience, then it must be part of our world (that is, it
must lie within space and time). Yet, if we cannot experiment it, it should not show up in any
way, not even implicitly as a condition for our experience. Thereby, if the reference to a subject
beyond our world cannot not explain what we think of as the unitary character of our experience,
where can our self-conception acquire its content, and what would be its purpose?
In any case, from Kant’s static perspective it is not obvious how the phenomenon of a
‘self’ could ever emerge (even tactilely) so as to become a content to be asserted in propositions
involving the use of ‘I’. The point is that, by restricting our approach to a contemplative
inspection of the matter, the phenomenological ‘self’ escapes us time and again.
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Wittgenstein’s Conception of the Metaphysical Subject
Wittgenstein’s claims in the Tractatus about the self can be interpreted from a Kantian point of
view, whereby in a way it makes sense to speak of the ‘I’ despite the fact that, whatever the use of
this notion might be, its referent must not lie in the world. But unlike Kant, he does not give the
concept of ‘I’ a role in synthetizing our experience: “[a]ll experience is world and does not need
the subject” (Notebooks 89e). Meanwhile, he denies the notion according to which “[t]he I is …
an object” (80e), this is, something we could confront (89e). The interesting issue for him is rather
why the ‘philosophical I’ or ‘self’ does not enter experience as a subject, although it is somehow
implied in it:
[t]he philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human
soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary
(not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is a
part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones, etc., etc. (82e)
But again, if the ‘philosophical I’ consists solely of the limits of the world, “[w]here in the world
is a metaphysical subject to be found?” (80e) This question is senseless insofar as the
metaphysical subject is not an entity to be encountered in the world. As a matter of fact, we
cannot get acquainted with ‘the self’ –or, according to our interpretation, with the phenomenon of
who we are – anymore than we can infer from observing something “in the visual field” that “it is
seen from an eye” (80e). He thus argues that the self as a metaphysical subject cannot enter
experience as an event, from which it follows that there is no phenomenon of a ‘self’ that can be
perceived: “it is true that I do not see the subject” (86e).
Having said that, the notion of ‘I’ still plays a key role for Wittgenstein, because “the
subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence” (79e). Thus, even though
“there is no knowing subject” (86e), in another sense there must be a metaphysical subject. In
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other words, the limits of the world can be shown in meaningful uses of language, despite the fact
that we cannot state what these limits are. At the same time, these boundaries do not make up for
a ‘thing’ we can rightly call ‘I’, since in the end it is reduced to an “extensionless point”
(Tractatus § 5.64). As the metaphysical subject is not in the world but constitutes a precondition
for its existence, it is seems both true that “in an important sense there is no subject” (§ 5.631)
while, in another sense, there has to be such a subject if the world is ever going to be experienced.
It can be argued that Wittgenstein adopts in the Tractatus a static approach to the issue of
the self, which is inherently problematic. The question is whether we can properly characterize
our notion of ‘I’ by appealing to a metaphysical subject, namely, something that is “not a part of
our world” (§ 5.641). Indeed, how could something that presumably does not exist in space and
time impact in any degree the way we see the world and how we conceive of ourselves (i.e., the
human being) to the extent that, without it, there would be no world for us to experience? If the
metaphysical subject amounts to the limits of the world but, still, we cannot say what such limits
consists of, this characterization of ‘the self’ would beg the question as to the origins of our selfconception. That is, how could our self-conception obtain any content from a subject that does not
exist in the realm of facts? At least in respect to the origins of our self-conception, it can be said
that Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘the self’ as a metaphysical subject comes down to an unnecessary
postulate, because it does not really explain how we have acquired the former — nor, to be sure, it
is meant to explain this. Thereby, such an appeal to the metaphysical subject could not contribute
to explaining the role of our self-conception. For even if we think of the I as the limits of our
world, it is not clear that that is actually how we conceive of ourselves.
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The Lasting Present
It is worth specifying why exactly our interpretation of Wittgenstein’s approach to the puzzle of
self-conception would be classified as ‘static’. This is shown in the line of reasoning that leads
him to adhere to ‘selfless realism’.
Wittgenstein thinks that, when carried out to its ultimate consequences, solipsism – the
idea that “only I am real, for others would consist merely in my awareness of them” (Canfield
1990 44)– collapses into selfless realism: “solipsism … coincides with pure realism. The I in
solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it”
(Tractatus § 5.64). His approach is static since he speaks of contemplating the world “as a limited
whole” (§ 6.45). Instead of trying to see the world as a whole from the outside (something he
claims we cannot do), he finds in the complete absorption in the present a way of contemplating
‘the self’, meaning, the limits of the world. He imagines an individual living perpetually
immersed in the present in a way that he would not perceive the passage of time. Under those
conditions, such a person could be said to live “eternally,” that is, “[i]f by eternity is understood
not endless temporal duration but timelessness” (§ 6.4311). Wittgenstein characterizes this form
of selfless contemplation of the world as a limited whole as the “mystical feeling” (§ 6.45), which
is not something that can be said but only shown (§ 6.522). He illustrates this idea in his
Notebooks:
As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one is
equally significant.
If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but know all you know is
the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I
had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was
contemplating the stove it was my world, and everything colorless by contrast with
it .…
(Something good about the whole, but bad in details.)

105

For it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless
momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among
shadows (Notebooks 83e).
Whenever we contemplate an item like a stove, for example, we can become absorbed in the
moment in a way that we forget that the stove is being perceived by us, and that there is anything
other than the stove in the world. Our total experience can be then contained in the moment, as it
were, since we perceive the stove with enough attention that it becomes our entire world
(Canfield 1999 47). For we are so immersed in the present that in a sense there appears to be no
longer a perceiver. Thus, while that “timelessness” lasts, it is as if nothing existed outside ‘the
world’ composed by the stove and what nearly surrounds it.
Subsequently, through sustained contemplation there seems no longer to be a dichotomy
between the contemplative subject and the world. The previous example involves an image we
can witness “as a limited whole” only when there is no longer a separation between subject and
world. This explains why Wittgenstein ends up abandoning idealism, for he does not think that
men are unique individuals to be singled out as opposed to the world. He is thus left with a
selfless world:
This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as
unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the
rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side,
as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought
out. (Notebooks 85e)
This view can be problematized by considering what would happen if we could live completely
absorbed in the present. There would be a basic phenomenological difficulty in our experience of
the present, which is the only thing we could ever experience: “if consciousness is tied to the
momentary present, and we imagine time as being finely divided, then there never seems to be
enough time to be aware of anything changing” (Canfield 1990 30). From this perspective, all we
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could ever be aware of is the state of affairs presently experienced, so that we could not ever
experience the passage of time — there would be no ‘next’ moment, since conscious experience
would be altogether contained in the present. If so, our consciousness would be reduced to
consciousness of the present, namely, of this moment. Therefore, the problem would be that we
would have no basis for inferring from our present awareness the existence of either the self as an
object or a subject. For if the present moment is all we have, it looks like we cannot infer the
existence of ourselves, say, by tracking our own deeds over time, which seems highly
counterintuitive. This would further beg the question of how did we ever come up with a notion
of ourselves. We would be stuck again without an explanation of the origin and utility our selfconception.

IV. 3. The Basic Unviability of Static Approaches
We have seen ways of undermining static responses to the puzzle of self-conception. Whether it is
in respect to the ‘self’ considered as an object or a subject of experience, we cannot account for
the origin and use of self-conception by appealing to an immediate perception of ourselves. I
suggest that this puzzle is largely the product of how it was initially formulated. Specifically, I
have argued that the paradox arises because we are trying to subvert a basic condition that must
be satisfied for perception to ever occur: namely, it must be mediated. Perceiving the world
through some channel (i.e., through a given sense) constitutes a ‘natural barrier’, so to speak,
which is entailed in the very act of sensing. In effect, we must use some sense or another in order
to become aware of anything. However, in order to contemplate ourselves directly and entirely we
would have to exceed such a barrier, thus undermining the very possibility of experiencing
anything. As a consequence, the puzzle of self-conception could not be solved with the use of a
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static treatment anymore than we could, say, run over our own shadows. Becoming aware of
oneself either as an object or a subject would have to be excluded from the very act of perceiving,
given that this exclusion is precisely a necessary condition for the existence of any perception.
What is problematic about static approaches in general is that they address this puzzle
from a perspective that is largely distanced from and unaffected by the world. Ironically, instead
of finding in such ‘distance’ enough space to perceive ourselves either as objects or subjects, we
end up missing the trees and the forest altogether. While we try to immediately perceive ourselves
through a contemplative approach, we unwillingly insulate ourselves from the rest of world, from
the activities and interactions that are part of people’s ordinary lives, such that the origin of our
self-conception becomes a mystery.
Moreover, by isolating ourselves from the context in which we are already situated, we are
prone to think of consciousness as occurring in a private realm. We are lead to believe that our
awareness is a phenomenon that only we could ever witness, thus implying that selfconsciousness, too, is an essentially ‘private’ event. In this way, we make it impossible for us to
explain how did we ever become self-aware, as this would require of an infinite amount of
perceivers to explain our original awareness (Canfield 1990 29). We are then separating the
person from his activities and interactions with other members of the community, despite the fact
that, as will be argued in the next chapter, it is in terms of them that we come up with a selfconception. Of course, if we assume that we could only know who we are exclusively from what
we discern from the first person perspective, the origin of our self-conception will remain an
enigma. It seems that we need to change our general approach if the puzzle of self-conception is
to be properly treated.
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Changing the Approach to the Puzzle of Self-Conception
I argue that a satisfactory way to tackle this puzzle is to adopt a dynamic approach. From a static
point of view, the puzzle is intractable insofar as a contemplative human being has no way of
becoming an object of his own awareness or else a subject to be accurately described as “aware”
of himself. On the other hand, from a dynamic standpoint a person is already conceived as
situated in a given sociocultural context, engaging in ordinary activities and interacting with other
members of a community. In this sense, the individual is not insulated from his ordinary life: he is
not in a privileged, neutral position from where he can judge what occurs in the world with the
dispassionate attitude a contemplating human being. Adopting a dynamic stance would thus
involve rejecting the idea of a contemplative subject who has an absolutely freestanding
perspective. Rather, he always sees some aspect of the world and environment from a specific
angle; this is, with a set of interests and necessities in mind. This means that a person cannot just
passively contemplate the world from an unbiased viewpoint so as to pick out the source of his
self-conception by pointing to some potential cluster of impressions, ideas, or facts, or else fail in
this attempt. On the contrary, from a dynamic stance a person’s self-conception is not necessarily
understood as a cluster of visual images or impressions. Instead, it consists of diverse attitudes
and beliefs he has about himself. From this point of view, the individual is not separated from the
social interconnections that shape his ordinary life. He is seen as a constitutive part of the forms
of life around him and not just a passive bystander, which further entails that he cannot be the sole
author of the notion he has of himself. This notion is molded in function of how others see him
depending on the roles he plays in society.
Hence, by considering our self-conception as originating and being shaped in the context
of the cultural and social background in which we are already situated, we can avoid many

109

difficulties that are inherent to static approaches to the puzzle of self-conception. If we understand
it this way, the basis of our self-conception does not appear as perplexing because it arises in the
course of exchanges with other human beings from which it acquires its content. The viability of
this type of approach will be assessed in the next chapter.

110

V.

THE ROLE OF SELF-CONCEPTION:
A Dynamic Approach

This final chapter proposes a dynamic approach to the puzzle of self-conception, so that an
intractable problem from a static perspective may receive a satisfactory resolution. After studying
some relevant accounts of this class of approach, I will advance what I shall identify as the TwoMoment View to account for the use of self-conception. I will end by complementing this account
with Mead’s conception of the ‘self’, which in turn will help us tackle the puzzle of selfconception.

V.1. Action, Deliberation, and Self-Conception or the Lack Thereof
A way of replying to Hume’s static approach to the puzzle of self-conception consists of
affirming that we become directly aware of ourselves when we willfully engage in action. James
Cornman holds this view. He claims that “[w]hat Hume overlooked … is that self-awareness
comes primarily, if not exclusively, when I am active; it is not some object I find in introspection”
(1970 178). He proposes a dynamic account whereby “[s]omeone is aware of himself when he is
active, as in willing, just as surely as he is aware of any idea” (178). Though not exclusively, he
argues that we become objects of our own experience as long as we behave in function of ‘acts of
will’ (178). Then, the actions through which we become self-aware are those in which our
intentions are consciously carried out, for it is thus that we become aware of ourselves as agents
of those actions. Canfield explains this idea by saying that “to be aware of myself, I must do
something; I will then be able to be aware of myself performing this or that act of will” (1990 33).
Therefore, when we undergo these ‘acts of will’ we become active individuals as our behavior
subsequently embodies our intentions.
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But consider this: while we (willfully) run to catch a bus that is about to leave us behind,
we seem not to be self-aware in the way Cornman suggests, or at least we do not possess a notion
of ourselves by means of which our action unfolds and that is at stake in this activity (Cf Sartre
2005 48-49). Perhaps deliberating or thinking too much about what is happening at that moment
could lead to hesitation, which can diminish our chances of getting on the bus. If we get
distracted, say, because we are worrying about missing the bus and the consequences originating
from this, we may slip and miss it nonetheless. In this case, it is not clear that we entertain or
presuppose a notion of ourselves or that such a notion, presumably involved in the mentioned
hypothesis, would be useful to our practical aim of catching the bus. Thus, if we suppose that a
person’s rushing to catch a bus is impacted by his act of will, the previous case would constitute a
counterexample to the emergence or usefulness of a notion of oneself in the context of action.
Besides, what is the ontological status of these ‘acts of will’? Indeed, “[w]here are the acts
of will or instances of “willing” Cornman alluded to?” (Canfield 1990 34) We are mainly looking
here for the relative contribution of these ‘acts of will’ to the task of securing a self-conception.
Yet, as Canfield argues, “[t]hey are invisible as the alleged self performing them; they, too, are
mythological” (34). It is not obvious that a notion of oneself comes up primarily while acting
consciously, since one has no corresponding experience of an ‘act of will’ as having any
connection to how one behaves. Many times, in fact, it is enough to react instinctively to a bus
leaving us behind to find ourselves already racing towards it, such that there is no conscious
decision upon which we would perform this act. More importantly, our self-conception would not
mediate the visual perception of the bus in motion and the act of running towards it, which
implies that, even if the act of chasing the bus is charged with intentionality, it is not the result of
a discrete ‘act of will’ connected to a notion of ourselves causing our behavior.
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Therefore, if we are going to assess whether a notion of ourselves emerges in the context
of action and whether there is any use to it, we will have to take a different route. For, as just
seen, it is not clear that a concept of ourselves emerges and that it is operating while we are
undoubtedly active, like when we are running to catch a bus. What is more, if there is a sense in
which a person’s self-conception plays a role in this context, it is not explained by appealing to a
person’s experience of himself as an agent, that is, if we only become agents when ‘acts of will’
are involved. It rather looks like we need not postulate a ‘self’ any more than we need to appeal to
‘acts of will’ to explain intentional action, since we can ordinarily and under regular
circumstances successfully interpret human action without having to appeal to either one.

Performing Without a Sense of Oneself
But then, if the way we see ourselves is not apparent while being active, to what extent can we
say that appealing to a ‘self’ helps to account for the actions we undertake? Hubert Dreyfus has
argued otherwise, claiming that many times the notion we have of ourselves does not play a role
when we are absorbed coping with world and environment. Following Sartre (Cf. 2005 48-49), he
suggests that when we are running to catch a bus, a deliberative subject is not present in our
awareness whatsoever. An underlying notion of a ‘self’ motivating our actions would indeed not
be found in this and many other instances, since it is precisely without such a notion that we excel
when performing multiple tasks.
He proposes this view by arguing that, when experts optimally cope by immediately
reacting to the incoming series of solicitations or, in other words, when they perform ‘in the
flow’, a “thinking subject” neither appears in their awareness nor does it prescribe their action
(Dreyfus 2007 358). He adduces the case of a pilot constantly guided by solicitations of the
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aircraft and instantly responding to them. In such a case, Dreyfus contends that a ‘thinking
subject’ is absent because the pilot is apparently not monitoring or reflecting on his behavior,
such that the lack of concomitant thought processes on his part means that he is coping properly
(358). It follows from this his idea that when acting in the flow one has no sense of oneself:
“[w]hen one is bodily absorbed responding to solicitations there is no thinking subject” (358). As
I interpret Dreyfus, the notion of a ‘thinking self’ that could otherwise interrupt our natural coping
with the world disappears with the type of detached premeditation that it entails. This does not
imply, though, that there is no longer an ordinary human being, for even if there is not an
operative concept of a ‘thinking subject’ in this type of cases, there is still evidently a human
being acting in the world of life. In Dreyfus’ view, it is rather the thinking subject that does not
appear over and above the person. Therefore, as an awareness of a ‘thinking self’ loses its grip
through the absorption of an ordinary person in his daily affairs (like when running to catch a bus)
or in cases where experts such as a pilot perform at their best, it can be said that many times
successful action does not demand a self-conception.
On the other hand, Dreyfus maintains that an awareness of this thinking or deliberative
subject could interfere with our performance, potentially working in its detriment. Supposedly,
what is not present in the consciousness of experts is a deliberating subject that could harm their
action, assuming that they excel at them when acting in the flow. Because to get in the flow it
would be necessary to lose a deliberative notion of ourselves when performing a given task, so
that our reactions are immediately elicited based on which are the solicitations and affordances
surfacing in each practice. In other words, we must abandon the perspective of an impartial
bystander on a game we are currently playing and become a part of it, immersing ourselves
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entirely in its unfolding without trying to analyze the quality of our performance in order to
improve it.
Dreyfus thus thinks that once we become competent in the diverse tasks we come across,
we have the freedom of choosing to immerge ourselves in them in a way that involves renouncing
to another human freedom, namely, the ability to occasionally step back and reflect on our
behavior to understand what is off about it and how we can enhance it. Importantly, he thinks that
what differentiates the expert from the merely competent or the beginner is that the former
voluntarily submerges in the current of responses and reactions to solicitations (355), even though
this entails giving up on reflection: “[f]ollowing Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I claim that the
freedom intermittently to step back and reflect presupposes a truly pervasive human freedom.
Unlike mere animals, we have a freedom not to exercise our freedom to step back but rather to let
ourselves be involved” (355). Experts constantly self-reflecting as they perform suggests that a
rather widespread ability of being voluntarily absorbed in a given task has been fractured to some
degree. Nevertheless, such a prevalent human freedom of being ‘voluntary immersed’ can be
reacquired when we abandon our distanced reflections and choose instead to immediately respond
to the solicitations of the world.

The Second Nature of Self-Awareness: Acting With a Sense of Oneself
An opposite position to Dreyfus’ can be maintained by arguing that a concept of oneself is always
involved in action, assuming that action is conceptually charged in its entirety. A prominent
exponent of this view is John McDowell, who, by inserting himself in the Aristotelian and
Kantian tradition, conceives of rationality and deliberation as the human freedom per excellence
and, thus, as its specific difference. In effect, he presupposes an Aristotelian notion of the human
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being as he conceives this individual as a rational and speaking animal (Mind and World 88-89).
Meanwhile, he adopts a Kantian approach insofar as he finds in the notion we have of ourselves a
precondition for deliberate action. This view follows from his idea that mindedness is pervasive in
the world in that it goes ‘all the way down’. Even in the context of constantly coping with the
world, he believes that there is always rationality involved since we must deliberate our way
about in the world. The pervasive nature of conceptuality in experience is thus shown in that “…
thinking does not stop short of facts. The world is embraceable in thought,” as the latter
“constitutes a background without which the special way in which experience takes hold of the
world would not be intelligible” (33). Therefore, he follows Kant in his maxim whereby
“[t]houghts without content are empty, [whereas] intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant qtd.
in McDowell Mind and World 87).
Additionally, rationality is always involved in action inasmuch as human nature “is largely
second nature” (87), given that “the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural” (88). Thereby,
he reinterprets Kant’s maxim from a dynamic stance applying it to action, as he goes on to say
that “intentions without overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere
happenings, not extensions of agency” (89). In order to convey this point, he introduces the notion
of education (Bildung) as actualizing “… potentialities we are born with” (88). He thus wants to
“accommodate” Kant’s maxim by further claiming that, insofar as “experiences are actualizations
of our sentient nature in which conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated,” then,
“intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our active nature in which conceptual capacities
are inextricably implicated” (90). This involves, though, distancing to an extent from Kant as he
rather sees in the Aristotelian definition of the human being as a rational animal a source of
reasonability:
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we can return to sanity if we recapture the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature
human being is a rational animal, with its rationality part of its animal, and so
natural, being, not a mysterious foothold in another [interior] realm. The way to do
that is to realize that our nature is largely second nature. (91)
The importance McDowell gives to the social aspect of rationality is seen in the way he
characterizes his naturalism by appeal to Wittgenstein (95), who thinks of “[g]iving orders, asking
questions, telling stories, having a chat … as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating,
drinking, playing” (Philosophical Investigations § 25). McDowell thus conceives of his view as
aligned with what Wittgenstein calls “our natural history,” namely, “the natural history of
creatures whose nature is largely second nature. Human life, our natural way of being, is already
shaped by meaning” (Mind and World 95).
With this set of assumptions as a backdrop, McDowell characterizes his notion of ‘self’ by
equipping Kant’s ‘Transcendental Subject’ with the concept of a second nature (99), thereby
redefining it in a way closer to Aristotle’s concept of the human being. Notice that he still holds
on to Kant’s claim that there would be no experience without a notion of oneself, although this
experience would now be contextualized in terms of a second nature. With Kant’s Transcendental
Subject in mind as “accompanying all my representations” (see Kant 1984 162), McDowell thinks
of ‘self-consciousness’ as something that “can hold together, in a single survey, states and
occurrences that are temporally separated; they are conceived as belonging to the career of a
continuant, a thinking thing” (Mind and World 100). Significantly, this is possible without
assuming that self-consciousness conforms to “a criterion of identity” (100), for the literal
persistence of a substance to be named with ‘I’ is not presupposed when employing this
expression: “[t]o put the point in Kant’s terms: in the “I think” that can “accompany all my
representations”, the reference of the “I” is understood as reaching into the past and the future”
without there having to be a “persistent referent for the “I” in the “I think”” (100). Therefore, for
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McDowell self-awareness does not imply a thorough account of personal identity because an
individual need not keep track of the literal persistence of a substance picked out with ‘I’ in order
to successfully conceive of the career of the human being he is: “[c]ontinuity of “consciousness”
involves no analogue to … keeping track of the persisting self that nevertheless seems to figure in
its content” (100).
Still, unlike Kant, he does not describe the notion of ‘self’ in a exclusively formal and
subjective way: “[w]e can say that the continuity of “consciousness” is intelligible only as a
subjective take on something that has more to it that “consciousness” itself contains: on the career
of an objective continuant, with which the subject of a continuous “consciousness” can identify
itself” (101). For McDowell the concept that an individual has of himself has also an objective
value capable of being appreciated from a third-person perspective, in the context of which the
path of a person becomes intelligible from his first-person point of view. Indeed,
[e]ven “from within”, the subjective take is understood as situated in a wider
context; so there can be more content to the idea of persistence it embodies. The
wider context makes it possible to understand that the first person, the continuing
referent of the “I” in the “I think” that can “accompany all my representations”, is
also a third person, something whose career is a substantial continuity in the
objective world: something such that other modes of continuing thought about it
would indeed require keeping track of it … I think something on the these lines is
the right frame for the Kantian thought that self-awareness and awareness of the
world are interdependent. (102)
It is thus that, whilst distancing himself from Kant’s formalistic conception, McDowell
nevertheless characterizes his notion of the ‘self’ as an essentially conscious/self-conscious
animal. The problem he sees with Kant’s Transcendental Subject is that an appeal to “subjective
continuity … as part of what it is for experience to bear on objective reality, cannot be equated
with the continuing life of a perceiving animal,” for it ends up shrinking the continuity of this life
to “a mere point of view: something that need not have anything to do with a body, so far as the
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claim of interdependence is concerned” (102). But then, as a consequence of reinterpreting Kant’s
notion, he understands this ‘self-conscious animal’ as the ordinary self:
[i]f Kant’s connection between self-awareness and awareness of the world is to
leave it open to us to regain the idea that the subjects of our experience are
ordinary selves, then the merely formal persistence of the I, in the “I think” that
can “accompany all my representations”, had better be only an abstraction from the
ordinary substantial persistence of the living subject of experience. It had better not
be something free-standing, which we might hope to build on in reconstructing the
persistence of the ordinary self. (103)
In this sense, we can take McDowell as contextualizing Kant’s notion of the ‘self’ in the ordinary
experience of living persons. This is clear from the fact that he understands the ‘self’ as taking
part in the world and not merely as an entity causing a body to act in diverse ways: “I think the
way certain bodily goings-on are our spontaneity in action, not just effects of it, is central to a
proper understanding of the self as a bodily presence in the world” (91 footnote).
Accordingly, the notion we have of ourselves cannot be a free-standing idea, as Kant
would have it. On the contrary, it is relative to a living human being that one’s self-conception
would be properly typified: “[t]he idea of a subjectively continuous series of “representations”
could [not] … stand alone, independent of the idea of a living thing in whose life these events
occur” (103). The issue, then, with Kant’s proposal is that it lacks of “a serious notion of second
nature,” in the absence of which it is impossible to integrate the subject with the concept of life
(104). In the end, he thinks that Kant gets to the “very brink of success” but fails because he does
not localize his concept of ‘self’ in everyday life, which would include an external perspective
from which it could also be pondered: “Kant’s insight would be able to take satisfactory shape
only if he could accommodate the fact that a thinking and intending subject is a living animal”
(104.).
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Let us now survey Dreyfus and McDowell’s disagreement about the role of selfconception in action so as to advance a response to the problem of the utility of self-conception.
This way, we will lay the groundwork for later on addressing the puzzle of self-conception from a
dynamic standpoint.

V.2. The Partial Use of Self-Conception in Action
It might seem clear that Dreyfus and McDowell think differently of the role of self-conception
and rationality in human life. However, the exact way in which their views are opposed on this
subject is not quite obvious.
As we have seen, according to Dreyfus our conceptual capacities are instruments that can
potentially interfere with our constant coping, which rather entails being absorbed in everyday life
so as to immediately respond to solicitations of the world and environment, given the available
affordances (2007 355). This explains Dreyfus’ hostility to McDowell’s all-embracing conception
of language and mindedness, as he further accuses him of being subject to the so-called “myth of
the pervasiveness of the mental” (355). Especially, he is not attracted to the Gadamerian
terminology used by McDowell to refer to rationality as a “free, distanced orientation” (354).
Dreyfus indicates that rationality thus viewed leads to poor engagement, as “we are no longer
able to act in the world” (354). Nonetheless, he concedes to McDowell that reflection in this
detached fashion is a sort of human freedom. But he does not see this as our most relevant
freedom since, although it is presumably found only amongst humans, he argues that reflection is
not traced among human experts when successfully performing tasks: “I agree with McDowell
that we have a freedom to step back and reflect that nonhuman animals lack, but I don’t think this
is our most pervasive and important kind of freedom” (354). According to him, when human
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experts perform in their prime they need not reflect on their actions as they take form, and
ultimately it is not through an appeal to such reflection that they account for the success of their
performances. Thus, since they do not step back and revise their own capacities while they act,
reflection becomes unrequired to proper functioning.
Even more, we noticed that Dreyfus claims not only that reflection understood as a
‘distanced orientation’ is unnecessary to action but also that it can work in its detriment due to the
fact that reflection can decrease the level of experts’ performances to mere competence: “when
we are absorbed in everyday skillful coping, we have the capacity to step back and reflect but …
we cannot exercise that capacity without disrupting our coping” (354). His negative evaluation of
reflection and deliberation comes from the idea that we are always coping with the world, or, in
Heidegger’s terminology, we are always beings-in-the-world (i.e., Dasein). This thought is
expressed differently by saying that we are ordinary human beings living in direct contact with
the world, such that we instantly react to it in a way that we need not step back and monitor on
our action to adequately respond to the world (355). Dreyfus’ problem with reflection is that it
can affect negatively the quality of our performance, assuming that in normal circumstances we
successfully cope without having to reflect on how this coping takes place.
But reflecting on one’s behavior while engaging in a given task is not always an activity
that lacks of any kind of benefit. Dreyfus acknowledges that, when learning a new skill,
monitoring the way the body is exercised is invaluable to the degree that it empowers apprentices
with the skills required to become competent. Yet, once expertise is secured, he argues that
monitoring one’s performance while engaging in a given activity can be harmful to it. Despite
this, even when disrupted by reflection, the ability to competently cope is still operating in the
backdrop (354). This explains how, for instance, a trained driver could reflect on his skills while
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driving a car without crashing it, for although thus monitoring his behavior involves risking to an
extent the quality of his performance, ultimately it does not compromise his aptitude.
On the other hand, McDowell targets the cases proposed by Dreyfus in which individuals
act ‘in the flow’ in order to say that even in those instances the individuals’ actions entail a notion
of themselves. He starts by saying that if experience in general is to obtain, our conceptual
capacities “must be operative in the experience itself” (“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 42).
This means that our conceptual capacities do not become operative “only when someone decides
what to think on the basis of experience, with experience conceived as something she enjoys
anyway, independently of any involvement of conceptual capacities” (42). Instead, he suggests in
a Kantian vein that experience does not exist independently of the subject’s articulation of it:
“That things are a certain way can be there for a subject to know, in her experience, whether or
not she has the resources for explicitly judging (or saying) that they are that way” (43). Indeed,
experience must be readily available for our conceptual capacities to embrace it such that, in the
end, whenever an individual makes the content of his experience “explicit – even if the subject
first has to acquire means to do that – [that] does not make the content newly conceptual in any
sense relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already” (43). There would not be successful
deployment of our abilities (even while acting in the flow) without these being conceptual — after
all, as human nature “is largely second nature” (Mind and World 87), these skills, being part of
our nature, must be shaped by reason (87). Thereby, “[i]f a rational subject does not have yet the
means to make explicit some way her experience … it is always possible for her to equip herself
with such means,” because there cannot be a subject of experience wondering how to cope with a
reality that is not conceptualized ((“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 43).

122

Next, in reference to the role of a ‘thinking subject’ involved in the deployment of these
conceptual capacities, McDowell objects to Dreyfus’ claim that he is subject to the Myth of the
Mind as Detached (44): “[n]ow Dreyfus thinks the very idea of conceptual capacities … brings
into my picture of experience a detached self, standing over against and contemplatively oriented
towards an independent reality. But this has no basis in the way the idea of conceptual practices
figures in my picture” (42). He rejects the notion that “we are always distanced from the world of
our experience,” further emphasizing that mindedness does not bring about the type of
detachedness of the ‘self’ from the world that Dreyfus alleges (45). It is of particular interest that
his picture of the pervasiveness of the mental accommodates Dreyfus’ notion of ‘acting in flow’,
since in his view the ‘self’ is not detached as a “rational agent” who “is always at least marginally
monitoring what she is doing, standing ready to intervene with full-blown monitoring if need be”
(45). For even as Dreyfus claims that his model leaves no room for experts to perform with “total
absorption,” McDowell still agrees that “[t]his supposed connection of rationality with
detachment is particularly damaging in the case of action” (45). His point is rather that such
detachment does not follow from his view precisely because a notion of oneself is already present
in the form of one’s actions:
[s]elf-awareness in action is practical, not theoretical. It is a matter of an “I do”
rather than “I think.” And the “I do” is not a representation added to
representations, as Kant’s “It think” is. Conceiving action in terms of the “I do” is
a way of registering the essentially first-person character of the realization of
practical rational capacities that acting is. The presence of “I do” … marks the
distinctive form of a kind of phenomenon, like the presence of the “I think,” as at
least able to accompany representations, in Kant’s account of empirical
consciousness. (“Response to Dreyfus” 367)
It is clear from this that ‘I’ is not a mere formal notion that McDowell takes to accompany all
“experience of acting,” for it rather accompanies “acting itself” (“The Myth of the Mind as
Detached” 45), which entails that there is no gap between the subject and the world. Indeed, “I
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do” does not supplement the representation of our action but rather characterizes its very form
(46).
For McDowell, then, “I do” describes the character of our action, whether we are
“reflectively engaged or not” (46). Specifically, while acting in the flow the subject’s
“absorption” does not prevent him from knowing “what he is doing in an instance of the selfknowledge that characterizes an agent,” even if such “self-knowledge goes unexpressed and even
if he does not explicitly think its content” (46). He admits, though, that if an individual were
acting in the flow, then by reflecting on what he is doing and verbalizing it he would interrupt this
flow. Nevertheless, after verbalizing what he is doing, the subject would still give “expression to
knowledge he already had when he was acting in flow” (46).

Two Types of Human Freedom
Let us formulate Dreyfus and McDowell’s disagreement from a general perspective with the
ulterior intention of pondering the role of self-conception in action.
As we have noticed, the philosophers diverge with regard to the type of freedom that is
essential to human beings. For Dreyfus, the primary human freedom consists in the ability to
voluntarily immerse ourselves in the tasks we perform in a way that there is no deliberative
subject guiding our action. Meanwhile, for McDowell the chief human freedom is the capacity to
deliberate or reason, such that a notion of ourselves is always entailed in our action as this
involves the actualization of our conceptual capacities. Now, McDowell could object to Dreyfus’
assessment of which is the fundamental human freedom by saying that this ‘voluntary immersion’
is not a mark that we could discern in experts when they perform in their prime. From the
behavioral signs they display, we have no criterion to account for how experts excel while
performing tasks without having an operative, deliberative notion of themselves. It seems that
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only through introspection they would be in the position to determine whether they are
performing voluntarily immersed or rather reflecting on their own conduct as they go along.
Indeed, if the way experts behave while acting in the flow is compatible with how they act when
engaging in deliberated performances, it is not clear to what extent even they can tell when they
are totally absorbed in their actions and when they are not. For if their behavior is one way or the
other in accordance with the rules of the task they engage in, such ‘voluntary immersion’ could
not ultimately be conceived as a complete departure from conceptuality.
In return, Dreyfus would respond by recounting how Chuck Knoblauch, a second baseman
for the New York Yankees, got ‘out of touch’ with his skills as soon as he over-intellectualized
the way he was playing (2007 354). Although his performance was still far better than that of a
competent player, after he tried to figure out the mechanics of throwing the ball, he could not
retrieve the high level of his past performances. It is as if Knoblauch could not immerse himself
again in the game. It follows from this example that, even though Dreyfus’ voluntary absorption
could not be positively taken as a trait of human experts, we can nevertheless tell indirectly,
through noticing the counterproductive consequences appearing in its absence, that it is a relevant
feature to human beings’ endeavors. Still, assuming that we are always coping with the world,
such ‘voluntary immersion’ would only be an asset for those who divert towards reflection and
thereby compromise their immediate reactions to the influx of solicitations of the world. In other
words, if complete absorption is the seen as the ability to avoid the temptation to step back and
overanalyze one’s current actions, then it would only count as an ability to exploit for those
whose performance has been harmed by the interference of excessive monitoring.
However, this implies that people normally do not require the capacity of immerging
voluntarily since they involuntarily return to their instinctive responses to the world after
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occasionally having monitored their own behavior, since they would not usually undergo the type
of disassociation that experts like Knoblauch went through. Knoblauch’s case would rather be a
rare example in which an individual could not return to plain action because he lost the ability to
naturally avoid monitoring his own behavior while performing. If this is correct, then the
‘freedom’ Dreyfus considers as fundamental has no pervasive, adaptive role in virtue of which we
could properly distinguish human beings from nonhuman animals. For even though in some
peculiar cases voluntary immersion can ‘free’ some individuals from their own thoughts and thus
increment the quality of their performance, such immersion would not be a feature that could pass
as the specific difference with respect to which we could properly separate humans from
nonhuman animals.
In any case, depending on what we consider to be our essential ‘freedom’, we would come
up with a different interpretation of the role of self-conception. If we suppose, following Dreyfus,
that what makes us human does not essentially depend on engaging in deliberative processes, then
we are not, at our core, ‘thinking subjects’. From McDowell’s perspective, though, there is always
going to be self-awareness and conceptuality involved in action, so that experts cannot merely do
without some degree of normativity ultimately guiding their behavior. They would not perform
better by not reasoning through their actions, although, admittedly, by so reflecting they would
not act ‘in the flow’. Then, for the sake of argument, we can assume that Dreyfus and
McDowell’s dispute is verbal to the extent that it leads to a false dichotomy: this is, either we
always presuppose an operative concept of ourselves while acting or else there are types of
intense absorption when there is no thinking subject deliberating and guiding our action. We can
think of their disagreement as not being substantive inasmuch as it arises from different
interpretations of the role of our conceptual capacities while performing a given task we are fully
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concentrated in, particularly, one in which we are not conscious of ourselves. Furthermore, if this
is assumed, we can think of their views as complementing one another, thus providing a fuller
picture of the matter that can be help us in explaining the utility of self-conception. This is the
strategy we will follow.
Before we do this, we are prepared to say that McDowell is right in respect to the fact that,
while acting ‘in the flow’, an expert still has a notion of himself –or, in McDowell’s terms, a
degree of self-awareness–, although this notion has been pushed to the background. For even if
this notion does not seem operative, it is nonetheless implied in the form of his action (“Response
to Dreyfus” 367). In effect, as he acts in the flow, he still knows himself as an agent, so we cannot
agree with Dreyfus that while acting in the flow there is no conceptuality whatsoever in an
experts’ performance.

The Two-Moment View
We can now respond to the issue of the utility of self-conception by noting that there are two
types of moments associated to the sorts of freedom referenced by Dreyfus and McDowell,
respectively, such that, depending on which moment an individual finds himself in, there would
be a use to his self-conception or there would not be. In general, sometimes there is a beneficial,
useful notion of oneself while sometimes there is not, given that it has been pushed to the
background as it can be detrimental to action. Yet, it has not absolutely disappeared.
Sometimes, like when we remember a series of events, engage in counterfactual thought
or are planning what to do in the future, a phenomenon or notion of oneself appears to
consciousness: we are the ones who felt such-and-such, did this and that, will be liable if we
commit such-and-such actions, and will be participating in such-and-such events. For example,
when thinking about the future a projected notion of ourselves displays anticipated characteristics
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that we attribute to our ‘future selves’, and based on this anticipation, we can determine what
would be the best course of action to take. We thus require a notion of ourselves to determine
what will be the best way of moving forward. Moreover, when we presently interact with other
persons, a notion of ourselves is implied in the form or character of our action, which embodies
our agency, as McDowell argues. In these moments, there is a deliberative notion of ourselves
which is indispensable in regulating our actions, as we are not only conscious of what we did,
would do or will do, but further become self-conscious while attending to how our lives unfold
from a present perspective — namely, as we reach into the past and the future (McDowell Mind
and World 100). In these instances, a notion of ourselves steps indeed to the foreground and
becomes useful in planning for what is to come, for learning from the past, or in order to attend to
the present and decide how to conduct ourselves.
On the other side, there are moments when our self-conception does not have a useful role
in our activities but, on the contrary, can prove harmful. For example, when the emergence of a
deliberative notion of ourselves can potentially disrupt the activity we are engaging in, it is best to
push it to the backdrop. In effect, if being absorbed in the current action would help a person
become sensitive to the solicitations of the world, whereas a deliberative self-conception could
hurt his interaction with the world, pushing his self-conception to the background would be best.
In this case, for the sake of performing properly a given task, it would make no sense to track the
consequences of the decisions reached in our actions by emphasizing a deliberative notion of our
person. Another case would be the one where our self-conception turns against us, producing a
high degree of anxiety in us, which ultimately does not let us see beyond how we see ourselves.
Canfield points out instances in which we are stuck with recurring self-centered thoughts (1990
223) that in the end are impractical, since they do not help us in directing our attention outwards,
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to the world of life, but rather bring us down. In these moments, it would be best to suspend these
self-involved chains of thought to whatever extent is possible (225), say, by concentrating in
practices that take our minds off of them.
It is worth remembering, still, that in the precedent cases a notion of ourselves still
accompanies our actions; it is just not part of our immediate awareness. As McDowell indicates,
while this notion does not emerge directly in our consciousness, we still know ourselves to be
agents coping with the world. Nonetheless, the point is just that our self-conception in these
instances has no practical benefit such that it should be pushed to the back of our minds in the
interest of responding faster to the solicitations of the activities we are engaged in, or else with the
purpose of decreasing the anxiety produced by self-centered thoughts. Either way, in these
moments over-reflecting on our actions by bringing our self-conception to the foreground can
become detrimental, so it is best to try and act without an explicit self-awareness.
It could still be objected on behalf of Dreyfus that the McDowellian type of “moment” in
our self-conception would appear to him just the point he thinks is overintellectualized. If we
always act with at least an implicit notion of ourselves, this notion can at some point interrupt the
course of our action, especially when we act in the flow. For if we are precisely letting the notion
we posses of ourselves go for the sake of improving our performance, what kind of control would
we have over it? It rather seems that we could not prevent our self-conception from emerging all
over again, so that it would consequently interrupt our action. Thereby, we can in this way
unwillingly end up functioning as the type of ‘thinking subject’ that Dreyfus speaks of: our
performance can become too mechanical, and, to that extent, we cannot enter ‘the flow’.
Moreover, when we project ourselves into the future, we can overintellectualize our action, say,
by thinking too much about what we have to do in order to achieve a given result. This way, we
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can become anxious given the large number of things we have to do: although we may encounter
several ways to achieve the desired result, the thought itself can overwhelm us and, in the midst of
feeling anxious, we can become paralyzed as we do not know which course of action to pursue.
Likewise, if we use too much time remembering what we have done to learn from our mistakes,
we can unintentionally reinforce a potentially noxious self-conception we already possess,
trapping us in the type of self-involved chains of thought Canfield refers to, so that anxiety would
again take over and work in detriment of our action.
However, it is clear that this is not that not what McDowell intends. He recognizes that if,
while performing in the flow, we monitor and reflect on our action to the point that we verbalize
what we are doing, this can in fact disrupt its ‘flow’ (“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 46).
Thus, he concedes that in times like this overintellectualizing our action can hinder it, particularly
when acting in the flow, which is a class of moment in which suspending a conscious awareness
of ourselves can be advantageous to our action. Thus, it would not be times like this which would
be included in the McDowellian “moment,” as he seems to make a different point: that even while
performing in the flow, we do not absolutely lose a sense of who we are, this is, that we still know
ourselves, even if only implicitly, to be acting as agents. He insists that the knowledge a person
acting in flow gains after verbalizing his own behavior is not new in any substantive way. It is not
as if the skills he was deploying were non-conceptual but then became conceptualized after he
reflected on his behavior. Quite contrary, as this individual makes the content of his experience
“explicit – even if the subject first has to acquire means to do that – [that] does not make the
content newly conceptual in any sense relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already” (46).
Therefore, the knowledge he attained by reflecting on how to act in the flow while thus acting
was all along there ready to be embraced by his conceptual capacities, which means that, after
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verbalizing what he was doing, the subject only gave “expression to knowledge he already had
when he was acting in flow” (46). And even if we are not acting in the flow, McDowell’s point is
not that we cannot overintellectualize our regular action in a way that is harmful to it. He just
points out that there is always an operative concept of ourselves working while we act, which is
as much a part of our nature, which is mostly second nature, as walking and drinking water. To
suggest then that by saying this he is overintellectualizing action is either to deny that our nature
is largely second nature or else miss his point. But as we are not ready to concede the former, it
follows that Dreyfus is misinterpreting McDowell’s picture of the pervasiveness of the mental, as
he takes McDowell’s concept of the self to be a formal, disengaged notion accompanying all
“experience of acting,” when it actually accompanies “acting itself” (45). Hence, there would not
be enough distance between the subject and his regular action for him to constantly
overintellectualize it.
Meanwhile, it is true that spending too much time planning what to do or remembering
what we have done can be overwhelming and potentially paralyze us. This is, however, not what
McDowell intends to do. We do not regularly and under normal circumstances overthink our
future plans, as we just picture what we have to do while admitting that we might not even get the
chance to do such-and-such, so that we put a stop to a rabbit hole that could lead us to anxiety as
soon as we realize that these are mere plans and several conditions must be in place for any of
these to be pursued. Similarly, even if we can spend a lot of time remembering what we have
done, there comes a point when we normally understand that there is no use to this and that we
have to move on from our self-involved thought. In these cases, we usually turn to the second
class of moment: we return to our current, practical affairs that require our attention not just
because we do not want to be trapped by noxious self-involved chains of thought. Instead, it is
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because these affairs in fact demand our full attention that we naturally center our awareness in
them, so that our self-awareness is in turn instinctively pushed to the back of our minds.
The particular disagreement in the Dreyfus-McDowell debate regarding the role of selfconception can thus be explained away by asserting that both are right depending on which type
of moment a person is presently in and what are his practical interests and needs. However, in
another sense both are wrong insofar as we cannot exclude once and for all either type of moment,
assuming then an inflexible attitude towards the role of self-conception, as if it involved an
absolute benefit or cost regardless of what are the interests and needs of a concrete human being
under specific circumstances. It follows that both types of moments constitute two modes of being
a person, none of which can be sacrificed at the expense of the other.
A way to further alleviate the tension between Dreyfus and McDowell in this aspect can
be brought about the following way. First, there is the concern of whether we can perform
successfully in a given activity without following or conforming to a rule — which is something
we cannot do for, presumably, we can subsume any action under some rule (see Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations § 201). Following Wittgenstein, Alva Noë stresses that our actions
always presuppose rules (i.e., a normative component), even in the case of experts excelling in
their performances, since “[w]hat mastery (or understanding) of rules enables is for one’s actions
to involve the rules without needing to think about them in any explicit, deliberative way” (2007
181). Secondly, assuming that conformity to rules is not the issue here, the question on behalf of
Dreyfus is whether overthinking (i.e., monitoring in excess) decreases the quality of experts’
actions. But then, the relevant problem for him could not be the presence of thought while acting
in the flow; because understanding what it is to excel in a given practice and doing so involves
some expectation on the part of the expert, that is, of what should be done, which entails a
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previous acquaintance with the rules of a concrete activity. Thereby, the issue is whether
overintellectualizing an action can disrupt it in any significant way. It is true that ‘overthinking’
understood as hesitation or doubt in the face of solicitations that demand instant, opportune
reactions can be disadvantageous. Yet, this does not imply that experts’ actions are not rulegoverned, although it constitutes a fair warning on their potential propensity to monitor in excess
their behavior while performing.
Thereby, while conceding to McDowell that at a proficient level experts always operate
with concepts –meaning, categories or rules with which they guide their actions (though not in a
stringent, determinate way)–, it could be said on the other hand that a weaker interpretation of the
implications of Dreyfus’ notion of ‘voluntary immersion’ can be taken as an asset for successful
performance. For if there is good reason to think that experts choose to be immersed in the class
of uninterrupted state of spontaneous reactions to solicitations so as to remain sensible to
unforeseen factors, avoiding reflection seems to be a useful guideline to expertise. Such
susceptibility to the context arguably requires that one should not think too much, that is, that one
should not reflect on one’s role and the expectations of such a role, etc. Once more, this does not
mean that experts in their prime do not follow rules at least unconsciously or implicitly (181).
Rules are internalized indeed through practice to avoid having to review them time and again,
especially while performing a task that requires an elevated degree of focus. Practice makes rules
eventually unspoken, and perhaps such silence is the type of indication of success Dreyfus alludes
to when speaking of experts, as in the case of professional pilots who can flight flawlessly but
cannot provide the rules that explain their success (Cf. 2007 358). Nevertheless, following the
weak interpretation of Dreyfus’ ‘voluntary immersion’, it can be argued that even if experts seem
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many times not to follow any rule or do not to recall any such rule to account for their success, it
is clear that they are still acting in accordance with rules that have already been internalized.

V. 3. The Self as a Social Construct: A Dynamic Response to the Puzzle of Self-Conception
Finally, in order to tackle the puzzle of self-conception, it will be helpful to draw from Mead’s
concept of the ‘self’. By employing this concept, the utility of self-conception will be further
accounted for.
According to Mead, the ‘self’ comes down to a process of social control regulated by
further social processes, so that a person acquires a notion of himself by internalizing social
practices (1972 158). One has a ‘self’ in accordance with the multiplicity of roles one plays in
society, such as being a father, a husband, a lawyer, etc. This way, he proposes a view of the self
that takes its resources from the outside, namely, relative to the roles undertaken by other
members of society: “[t]he individual has, as it were, gotten outside of his limited world by taking
the roles of others” (xxix). Insofar as one has several social roles, one obtains a ‘self’ by
coordinating these functions in consciousness, from which it can be said that ‘the self’ is formed
by a constellation of roles (xxix.). ‘The self’, then, is a mechanism of social control (158), given
that the roles people play are structured by the functions of other people in a community.
A person has a notion of himself in virtue of putting himself in the place of others,
namely, by interiorizing and appropriating himself with their behavior, referring their conduct to
his own person and life. Thereby, a notion of ourselves enters our experience to the extent that we
become objects to ourselves, which is not possible in an immediate manner:
[t]he individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from
the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or
from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he
belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or
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immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first
becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his
experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of
other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of
experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved. (138)
We obtain a self-conception by assuming the perspectives of others on us, that is to say, by
adopting the beliefs and attitudes that others have towards us, as we thereby become indirect
objects of our own experience. The notion or image we have of ourselves is derived from how
others see us, so that we only attain a grasp of who we are through interacting with other persons
in the multiple activities that make up for the customary or habitual manner in which people
conduct themselves, that is, according to the forms of life of a community. Consequently, we
would not acquire a self-conception through introspection –as Hume intended–, regardless of
which are the attitudes that those around us have towards us. Quite the opposite, we obtain it due
to our participation in the customs and habits of the forms of life of a community (see Consigni
2001 124). Indeed, we acquire knowledge of the particular human being we are only as we
participate in the ways of life of a community, living amongst other human beings. Therefore, to
the degree that we share the forms of lives of others we discover who we are, so that our selfconception would amount to a compound perspective on ourselves afforded by the standpoints
that those around us possess about us (Mead 1972 138). It follows that there can be no “privileged
standpoint” from which we may observe who we ‘truly are’, this is, independently of the forms of
life of a community in which we reside, since our self-conception is rather the product of our
engagement with others (see Consigni 2001 124).

The Sense in which the Self Is a Social Construct
It is worth observing that there is a use to our self-conception as we adopt the attitudes that others
have towards us, thereby becoming objects of our own awareness. Mead’s notion of the ‘self’ as a
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mechanism of social control illustrates a further use of self-conception, as it serves to organize in
our “field of direct experience” the roles we play in society (1972 158), regulating our action
based on social processes in which we participate. In these cases, a notion of ourselves emerges
and plays a crucial function given our present needs and interests, having thus a practical value as
it coordinates a person’s life relative to his being a member of a community. Hence, we can think
of our self-conception in terms of the practices in which it serves a purpose. It will be seen in the
last section of this chapter the way in which Mead’s concept of the ‘self’ as a mechanism of social
control constitutes a counterpart to McDowell’s considerations of self-conception.
Now, as each of us “has a persistent, gut-level belief in the reality of the self” (Canfield
1990 129), this conviction can be shown to play a role in the formation of the social beings we
are. Since we can deny the existence of the ‘self’ without thereby abandoning our existential
belief in it, the issue is whether the notion we form of ourselves exhibits any properties in
function of which we could explain why we treat ourselves the way we do. According to
Canfield, the practical impact of our self-conception is traced in our particular “manner of
walking, gesturing, style of dress, and so on” (218), which he regards as a sort of ‘accent’ or ‘fine
behavior’ that speaks to the specific life we lead, for it involves a series of attitudes we have
towards it. Then, given that from Mead’s perspective the phenomenon of the ‘self’ ultimately
amounts to a social construct, the question is whether the notion we possess of ourselves plays a
significant enough role to render it necessary in the organization of our interpersonal practices.
The usefulness of our self-conception can be specified if we qualify it as a ‘necessary
fiction’, as it is a social figment we require to properly navigate the world. Insofar as this notion is
needed to see ourselves the way others see us, its fictitious aspect roughly resides in that there is
no matter of fact about what should our idiosyncratic behavior comprising our particular gestures,
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ways of speaking and carrying ourselves actually be. Following Mead, Canfield characterizes the
‘self’ as a “figment of the social imagination” (129) as opposed to something ‘real’, i.e., a
substantive entity. He maintains that our self-conception reflects a ‘persona’, which is “the object
or target of acts of self-characterization” (143). A ‘persona’ would be the leading character in the
stories we narrate to ourselves about the lives we live –this is, our autobiographical narratives–,
which we have in part invented: “[i]n a natural, untutored way, we cast ourselves as central
figures in stories we supply characterization and narrative structure. We are the protagonists”
(134). In other words, the persona is the “believed-in self, the I a person holds so dear” (134).
The persona depicted by our self-conception reflects the self-conceptions of other
characters in our autobiographical narratives, which correspond to other persons in our lives:
“[o]ur sense of the other players also often involves some view we hold about ourselves. She as
unfair aggressor, for instance, mirrors me as a victim” (134). This shows how a person adopts a
self-conception by mirroring the way others see him, given the social roles he has in life, which
work around the roles that others have. Self- and other-characterization are then codependent as
they inform one another: “[o]ne’s (pretheoretical) self-beliefs, and those other-beliefs which
reflect oneself, make up a self-image” (134). However, one’s self-image is not equivalent to the
person one is, though it is directly related to it: “[t]he person is what the self-image images; the
self-image is like a picture, and the persona, what it portrays. In terms of belief, it is what selfbeliefs are about” (134).
Yet again, even though our self-conception is as real as the set of beliefs we have of the
person we are, what our self-conception pictures is fictional (134). Indeed, the person “has beliefs
about himself; but the object of the self-image, the persona, is not” real (134). Canfield claims
that the persona is at least party fictional or ‘quasi-real’ (134): “[t]o some significant degree the
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persona is freely created or … invented. Invention enters at two points. First, when the persona
is–if only implicitly–pictured as existing, and, second, during self-characterization, when its
properties are elaborated” (134). Therefore, after we assume our persona to exist, we further
chisel it by ascribing to the person we are a larger host of properties (135). But in what sense is
one’s persona fictional? Canfield argues that the boundary between what counts as ‘creating’
one’s persona and describing the person one is happens not to be sharply delimited. He claims
that a persona is like a character in a partly fictional historical novel (143). Thereby, the beliefs
we hold about our persona are governed both by fictional and empirical criteria:
I say these part-fictions partially model the persona in order to emphasize the two
different criteria governing self-ascriptions. One sort has to do with objective fact.
A person’s belief about where he is, how tall he is, whether he is married, what his
name in social life is, and countless similar sorts of beliefs are all governed by
criteria concerned with how things are … [but] there are also self-ascriptions
where the person is free to make up truths about himself … we are free to create
and maintain certain aspects of our personae, including some of our beliefs about
why we do things. (146)
The point of making this analogy is that, in this class of novel, historical truths about a person are
told although there is room for fiction to enter with respect to the thoughts of the person in
question, the content of the conversations he had, and the reasons for many of his actions (145).
However, the analogy breaks inasmuch as partly fictional historical novels will not be revised if
historical facts that came to light contradicted the events narrated in them, whereas our selfconception is indeed subject to modification if these facts were to surface.
Then again, we are interested in the utility of the self-image of a person and not so much
in the persona pictured by such an image. The persona, still, is pertinent to our inquiry inasmuch
as it is the target of the self-beliefs constituting the notion we have of ourselves. Consequently,
we need a clearer understanding of the role of one’s self-image relative to the persona depicted by
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it, for we intend to determine in this chapter what is exactly the purpose to our self-image or selfconception.
We can say now that, whilst deliberating with ourselves about which is the best course of
action to pursue in a given situation, the concept we have of ourselves plays a role as it helps us
determine whether such a course of action is viable given the way others see us and what they
find admissible. What we take ourselves to be appears to be relevant in this case even if our selfimage does not accurately portray the attributes and thoughts of the person we are, this is, as long
as others see us that way as well. In this class of moment, our self-conception has a practical
import insofar as it guides us in the course of figuring out what we can do and what should be
avoided. Additionally, our self-conception plays a role in the context of our autobiographical
narrative. As the persona it depicts constitutes the protagonist of this narrative (143), the diverse
roles performed by the persona in it depend on which traits our self-conception comprises.
Importantly, autobiographical narratives need not be linguistically articulated, but can count as
such as long as they amount to a tacit understanding of an unfolding, structural whole to be
identified with the life of the person we are (see Schechtman 2014 99-102). Nonetheless, for these
narratives to make sense or structure the course of our life, we must at least possess an implicit,
pre-theoretical sense of what we call ‘I’ or ‘me’ — namely, of our persona. Our self-conception
must therefore be useful because it entails an understanding of the trajectory of our life (100).
Furthermore, the image we have of ourselves plays a distinct role as it affects not only how we
perceive our life but also how we lead it: depending on how we conceive of it (i.e., how we
recount it to ourselves), we will correspondently act in the world of life. It follows that selfconception plays a complementary role in the way a person’s life unfolds to the extent that it
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impacts to a meaningful degree its constitution through the way the existence of this life is
understood by the person in question.

The Sense in which Our Self-Conception Is a Useful Fiction
We can now explain exactly in what way our self-conception is a useful fiction by drawing on
Canfield’s considerations of a ‘persona’ as the target of our self-conception and Schechtman’s
discussion of autobiographical narratives relative to the function these play in how a person
structures his life. We have accepted that anytime we act we operate with a given self-conception,
even if this is unspoken, not linguistically articulated, or shoved to the back of our minds in order
to act in the flow. Based on the implicit, holistic understanding of the life we are leading, we
decide what to do, what to avoid, when to do such-and-such so that our life can in the best
scenario unfold as we want it to. We are thus constantly conceiving of ourselves as agents in the
world, undertaking actions and then many times evaluating their implications, while we
instinctively react to how others treat us (Cf. I.1) based on what are the attitudes that others have
towards us.
Even so, we cannot literally, immediately, and entirely observe the person we are when
acting as agents. This is not, though, a deficiency that (strangely enough) we all share, as it would
otherwise seem from a static standpoint (Cf. IV). On the contrary, not being able to do this is,
among other things, what is implied in being a living person who engages with other persons in
the context afforded by a ‘person space’ or ‘sociocultural context’, as Schechtman would call it.
We will see in the final section of this chapter that our not being able to step outside of our
awareness and view ourselves as persons just as we can see others is a necessary condition for our
existence as individuals. All the same, we do have beliefs, attitudes, and opinions about the
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person we are, which constitute our self-conception. But we have seen that not all of these reflect
our actual attributes. As Canfield notes, there is enough space for us to make up many reasons for
our actions and the content of our thoughts. As we are aware of who we are, our self-conception
cannot then merely be limited to a list of the properties we could directly observe if we could step
outside of ourselves and see us as others do. Therefore, as we make explicit to others and
ourselves the content of our autobiographical narrative, we cannot refer to the person we are and
select properties of ourselves we consider pertinent to who we are without having to fill in some
gaps. Still, these ‘gaps’ are not the consequence of lacking the opportunity to literally observe
who we are, but rather filling them is characteristic of how our autobiographical narrative is
further elaborated in the course of our social interchanges. Many times, we must justify to others
why we did this instead of that, although we might not remember why we acted that way, we may
want to hide our real motives, or maybe we simply acted without a conscious reason guiding our
behavior.
Other times, people might want to know what we are thinking, perhaps not only to made
sense of our current behavior but to discern what are our patters of reasoning. We might then
want to say actually what we were thinking; however, if this might compromise us in our social
exchange, we may need to substitute what our response would be for a harmless one. Even more,
in some situations we might not actually be thinking anything relevant, but when asked to
contribute to a discussion by saying what are we thinking about a subject matter, we may
spontaneously have to come up with what might seem the current status of a train of thought. This
way, by fitting in with the image others have of us (of what ‘we’ would say about such a topic),
we may facilitate the continuation of a conversation that would otherwise be interrupted. It is thus
as if when we fill those blanks we convey to others a fuller image of who we are, which boils
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down to how we see ourselves, because normally we are not just interested in how other persons
literally look but want to know more about why they act as they do, what they tend to think in
given circumstances, and so forth. Our self-conception has in those instances a social role, for it
supplements a member of a social group and of a given community not only with an image of
how others see him, but, correspondently, it provides others with an image this member has of
himself, which facilitates their social interchanges. In this sense, our self-conception is useful as it
enables us to relate to one another by relying on how other see themselves and how we see
ourselves: we can coordinate our action and discourse around the image a person has of himself,
while others can regulate how they relate to us based on how we see ourselves, provided that they
have a grasp on what our auto-biographical narrative is and that we understand what are their
respective autobiographical stories. In consequence, self-conceptions would be useful as they help
us navigate a world of people circumnavigating us.
From what we have seen, the ‘image’ a person has of himself does not accurately reflect
the list of attributes of the person in question nor is it meant to. It also comprises beliefs and
attitudes that the individual has of himself and which are recounted in his autobiographical
narrative. Therefore, his self-conception is partly ‘fictitious’ to the degree that it is articulated in
an autobiographical narrative, which comprises aspects that are not subject to factual verification
such as the reasons for one’s actions and the content of one’s thoughts. The criteria governing
how these ‘aspects’ feature in our autobiographical story are similar to those governing the main
character of a partly fictional historical novel (Canfield 1990 143), so there is consistency to them
in these narratives just as there is consistency to our patters of thought about a given subject
matter. In these sense, our self-conception is a construct because it strings an autobiographical
narrative we build to understand our place in the world in a dynamic fashion, this is, relative to
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how others see us and what would they expect us to say or do if some conditions were met. This
does not mean, however, that these aspects comprised in our self-conception are actually false, for
this would entail that they could be ‘true’ by mischaracterizing actual traits of our person. As
Canfield explains, since the limit between what counts as ‘creating’ our persona and describing
our person are not severely delimited, there is space for us to invent parts of our narrative that
would help us integrate into the autobiographical narratives of those around us.
Hence, it is in this sense that the notion we use of ourselves goes beyond a construct from
socially available materials: as we have room to create aspects of who we are through the
elaboration of our autobiographical narrative, our self-conception is not reduced to a compilation
of the standpoints that the persons around us have on us. It further includes properties we ascribe
to ourselves –like beliefs about the content of our thought and the motives for our actions in
different opportunities– which do not depend on what others gather from inspecting who we are.

Steps for Addressing the Puzzle of Self-Conception
In order to address the puzzle of self-conception we must start by recognizing that, when we are
to conceive of ‘ourselves’, we are not looking for an image of a ‘self’ or a ‘human body’. It is
rather about conceiving an ordinary human being in the context of a concrete life. And, as we
stated in the previous chapter, it makes no sense to look for an immediate perception of ourselves
because any perception must be mediated to take place. Mead appreciates this when he says that
the individual does not enter his own experience “directly or immediately” (1962 138).
But an immediate, entire perception of a particular human being is not really required in
order to attain a self-conception, since we are not limiting the origin of our self-conception to a
visual impression or image. Indeed, following Mead we have redefined our standards of ‘self-
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conception’ in terms adopting the standpoints of other persons by assuming the beliefs and
attitudes that they have towards us. Moreover, as we have assumed a dynamic approach, we have
conceived of the human being as situated in a community, playing certain roles, engaging with
other individuals from which he has acquired the beliefs and attitudes that make up for his selfconception. Consequently, there is no fundamental mystery about the source of a person’s selfconception, since he is not isolated from his surroundings in a way that he could only obtain a
self-conception through a contemplative perspective, seeking thus an impossible visual
impression of himself.
Next, we can attend to the specific issue of whether the individual enters his own
experience as an object by appealing to Mead, as he believes that we become objects to ourselves
as soon as we adopt the beliefs and attitudes of others towards us, seeing ourselves as others do
and thus treating ourselves as an ‘other’. We end up having a notion of the person we are by
treating ourselves as objects of the attitudes that other human beings have towards us, taking their
standpoints on ourselves. It follows that the ordinary human being indirectly enters his own
experience as an object through the experience of others.
On the other hand, despite Mead’s position (138) we can argue that a notion of ourselves
as a subject enters our own experience although, again, indirectly. Even as we enter our own
experience as objects of indirect awareness by assuming the attitudes that others have towards us,
this does not exclude the possibility of simultaneously taking ourselves to be indirect subjects of
our awareness while engaging in action. A notion of ourselves also becomes part of our own
awareness to the extent that we take ourselves to be ‘agents’ from the first point of view. This is
explained in the fact that our self-conception is entailed in the form of our actions, such that we
have sense of who accompanies our actions as these occur (McDowell “Response to Dreyfus”
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367). We are then subjects of our actions, beliefs and attitudes as these have real implications in
the world. This way, it can be argued that the ordinary person we are becomes a part of our own
awareness as a ‘subject’ by appeal to McDowell’s concept of the ‘self’, which is not only implied
from the first-person point of view but rather can be appreciated from a third-person perspective
as an ordinary ‘self’ among persons. Then, from the first person perspective we can perceive the
consequences of our actions even though we are not directly aware of ourselves. To put this
differently: as we are the ones from which these actions emanate, we trace ourselves as their
cause in a core sense. Even if we do not perceive ourselves while perceiving the world, from a
dynamic perspective it can be said that we still assume that we are the ones acting, thus treating
ourselves as subjects and not merely as objects. Therefore, while the notion we possess of
ourselves plays the role of a mechanism of social control, it is nonetheless complemented by the
sense we have of ourselves as a subject of action, in the absence of which we would not be able to
attribute the actions we commit to the person we are from the first-person perspective. This
‘sense’ is in effect entailed in our action, as we can monitor our behavior from the first-person
perspective — although, again, this would not be all that we require for attaining an altogether
functional self-conception. We would still need to take ourselves as objects of our experience by
assuming the attitudes of others towards us, thus being able to coordinate our action in relation to
theirs by putting ourselves in their place.
The idea that we can indirectly become subjects of our experience would not give rise to
an infinite regress (see IV. 1) because, as we have established that the origin of our selfconception is social, this conception need not be based on an ulterior awareness. Instead, it only
needs to be grounded on our social practices, as it is articulated in terms of the roles a person
plays in his daily life and the attitudes others have towards him. Our self-conception is useful in
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showing us what our social roles are given the ways in which other social actors view us. Thus, a
notion of ourselves enters experience indirectly, this is, through the meditation of language and
behavior, because we adopt the beliefs and attitudes that others have towards us after the fact, this
is, once we have actually engaged with others in the context of the activities and customs that
constitute the forms of life of a community.
Finally, we cannot ‘step outside’ of ourselves and view ourselves ‘completely’ anymore
than we can view other people ‘completely’. For how is this supposed to be accomplished? We
can observe a person from several perspectives, but we cannot see him from all possible
perspectives at once, which is what would have to be done, in a rigorous sense, to see someone
‘completely. Then again, if we cannot see anyone (or anything) from all possible angles at the
same time, why would we need to see ourselves simultaneously from all possible points of view
to acquire a self-conception? As this exigency seems out of place, this cannot be what it is meant
when we say “completely,” so we could reinterpret this expression more charitably if we read it as
meaning ‘as a whole’. In this sense, it is a matter of fact that we can see a whole person standing
at a distance, and in virtue of that visual impression we can discern who he or she is, say, by
recognizing the shape of that person. We can thus identify someone we have already acquaintance
with. Yet, we cannot ever do the same in our own case. But why would we ever need to do this?
We need not identify ourselves, from the first-person perspective, by recognizing our silhouette as
we do need to in the case of others. Actually, from the first-person point of view, we need not
‘recognize’ who we are if this means obtaining a visual image of our whole person. Why then
assume that we must fulfill such a requisite to ever come up with a notion of ourselves, this is, if
we do not need to contemplate the person we are as a whole from the first-person perspective to
form such a notion? This seems to be a confusion produced by adopting a static standpoint, since,
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from a dynamic perspective, we are not looking for a direct visual image of our person as a whole
to explain the acquisition of our self-conception. To do this, we must only pay attention to how
we participate in the habitual activities and customs that give rise the forms of life of the
community in which we reside, as our self-conception is rather based on how others see us given
the ways we act and interact with them.
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CONCLUSIONS
We have assumed at the beginning of this proposal that self-conception does not imply personal
identity. This is due to the notion that you can have a sense of who you are, be aware of the career
of your life as you track yourself in the past and project yourself onto the future, without
presupposing the literal existence of a substantive ‘self’ which you pick out with the use of “I”
(McDowell Mind and World 100). On the other hand, we have stated that having a personal
identity –which, from our perspective, roughly means living in agreement with a typical way of
life– does not entail possessing a corresponding self-conception mirroring such a life. In the end,
that is part of what it means to be ‘alienated’ in the sense implied in Chapter III: even though you
lead a given person life, you do not see it as representing who you are. Maybe because you have a
problematic idea of life in general, you problematize your own life in a way that ultimately you
cannot identify with, hence becoming dissociated from it. And as you do not see your life the way
others might see and evaluate its structure, you further become alienated by entertaining a
different conception of who you are and what type of life you lead.
Still, even if having a determined self-conception does not necessarily entail the
possession of a firm grasp of personal identity, whereas having a personal identity does not
presuppose having a corresponding notion of the person one is and the life one has, the subjects of
personal identity and self-conception intersect at diverse points. We can thus synthesize our
practical and phenomenological approximations to the human being by fleshing out these points
of intersection.
First, in order to obtain the class of ‘practical unity’ discussed by Schechtman with the
intention of overcoming alienation, it is not sufficient to live in agreement with the forms of life
of a community. It is further necessary to change how we perceive our own life in a way that its
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problematic appearance can fade away to an extent. This would be possible if we could modify
the tone of our autobiographical narratives, recounting our lives in accordance with the alienated
life we have had, accepting it for what it was, to then embrace the vital changes we seek to
undergo in order to adapt to the forms of life of a community. The ordinariness we would bring
afloat would merge with our story without it seeming as an abrupt, artificial choice. The goal is to
rephrase our autobiographical narrative in a way that we are not too hard on ourselves, such that
we can encounter a tone, after going through the pertinent changes, with which to relate a story
that is in accordance with the larger structure of our life, understanding our past alienation as a
phase of it that does not significantly determine its overall path. If this is viable, the source of the
problematic appearance of our life ingrained in our self-conception can begin to lose its grip on
us, enabling us to see a life we can identity with, so we can see ourselves out of our dissociation.
The reason is that our self-conception would not be confined to picturing an alienated life, as it
would encapsulate a broader pathway in which such alienation is merely a period.
From this it is clear that the role that self-conception plays in autobiographical narratives
is key. If we do not pay attention to what notion we have of ourselves and modify it if necessary,
after we have gone through the mentioned vital changes it would be easier to revert to an
alienated form of life. This is a point in which our two general approaches to the human being
interconnect: in order to avoid alienation, a human being must change the way he sees himself to
a degree in which he can assess the different phases or stages of his life as parts of his identity,
and he must resist defining himself, accordingly, based on an alienated phase of it. Following
Schechtman, he would see these different phases as parts of an ongoing whole, which is his
person life (2014 108). Moreover, as he conceives of his life holistically, he would be able to
reorient his life towards a typical class of development by modifying the narrative that constitutes
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his understanding of himself. Since having a ‘self-conception’ would involve possessing some
kind of orientation towards what we are doing based on an understanding of who we are, by
remodeling how we conceive of ourselves in a more indulgent way we would be able to associate
with typical aspects of our life that are already present in it; although they have been dismissed as
irrelevant, actually through them we can reenter the world of life. The individual would then
adopt an unproblematic perspective on his life by changing how he values himself, which could
lead him to interact differently with others.
To put the point otherwise: after modifying the tone in which he recounts his
autobiographical narrative, he would not see the different social roles he plays in life as a burden,
as if there was a gap between himself and these roles such that his life could exist without them,
but rather as integral aspects of his identity (Mead 1972 xxix). This is possible by reconceiving
these roles holistically, seeing them as pieces which taken together give rise to who he is. By
understanding this, he could motivate himself to perform them in a committed way since he
would find precisely in that commitment a way of outlining who he is. Therefore, by graciously
relating his life he would come to terms with it, comprehending that after all it has been worth
living it. It would further help if the individual can tell himself a convincing autobiographical
narrative, specifically, one that can help him persuade himself about the value of ordinary
activities and interactions with others. It would also be of benefit if this story can dissuade him
from continuing down a path that is disconnected from everyday life. Ultimately, with an affable
self-conception it would be easier for him to assume the type of proper disposition that
Wittgenstein recommends to overcome alienation (see III. 3).
Another point of junction is, accordingly, that changing the way we see our lives (this is,
our self-conception) is not sufficient for surmounting alienation. It is also necessary to change the
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way we behave and engage with others by leading an ordinary life; we would then be able to
think of this life as our own, as something that represents who we are. Indeed, as someone
modifies how he interacts with others and the type of activities he engages in, he can properly
redescribe himself, thereby adopting a different self-conception than that of the alienated
individual he was. He would approach the world of life differently in order to assess his place in it
from another angle. By associating with others in a more ordinary fashion, he could reconceive
the roles he plays in life such that he would be able to commit himself to them in the way
previously specified. Therefore, as he is no longer dissociated from his social roles, he recognizes
himself as the person playing them and can therefore gain the class of ‘practical unity’ with his
life that Schechtman speaks of. Particularly, he would amend his self-conception by explicitly
adopting the attitudes that others have towards him insofar as he engages with them differently,
emphasizing his ordinary traits, such that there would be no longer an incompatibility between
how he sees himself and how others see him. In the absence of this incompatibility, he would be
able to exceed the fictitious boundaries he saw in his life, which apparently separated him from
the lives of others and confined him to live in an alienated way: as he no longer perceives a gulf
between his life and the lives of others, he can associate anew with the shared forms of life of a
community.
As a result, if we understand the class of alienation we discussed here as a class of ‘selfexile’, to overcome it it is both important to change to a degree the form of our lives and the way
we see life in general, so that we can modify in turn how we evaluate our own life. The idea is to
restore our everyday comportment and self-conception by adopting the structure of a unitary
individual’s life and a similar undertone of his autobiographical narrative, respectively. A
suggestion that can prove helpful to realize this is that, if we have departed from ‘ourselves’ at
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some point by abandoning the exercise of a typical life, we can overcome alienation by having
good will towards life in general and, importantly, by assuming a gracious attitude towards our
own life (Cf. III.1, III.3). We can thus find the means to reconstruct a life story in which we
actually find ourselves in as being involved with forms of life we belong to. It is not, though, as if
such graciousness and good will constitute an antidote by themselves to surmount alienation.
Nonetheless, it is a start for eventually attaining this, because without them we would not have the
necessary resources for living a happy life, as Wittgenstein would put it, in the lack of which we
could not live in agreement with the world. Therefore, having a good disposition towards our own
life and good will towards the life of others is part of what must be in place for acquiring a
discrete personal identity, as we thus can merge ourselves with our own life. It is further required,
again, a change in the way we lead our life, as we want to reach a bare minimum of ordinariness
that we have lost. Finally, a change in self-conception is needed, this is, a modification in how our
autobiographical narrative takes shape; for if it is told in a way that we can identify ourselves with
the main character it depicts, we can mitigate another source of alienation.
In respect specifically to the first part of this proposal, since the identity of a person
depends on his agreement with the forms of life of a community, it follows that an individual
avoids alienation by participating in the language games, customs and habitual ways of
interaction of these forms of life. We can thus restate the conclusion of Part One by saying that an
individual acquires a clearly defined personal identity through his engaging with typical ways of
human life, particularly by playing the language games of a community and not merely being a
spectator, which means that he must actually participate in their habitual activities. Further, this
point would intersect with the discussion in Part Two, and it can be rephrased in that a person
would do well in abandoning a static approach to his self-conception and adopt instead a dynamic
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standpoint on his interactions with others, because it is in these terms that his self-conception
would indeed acquire content. A person has to get involved with the members that share the forms
of life of his community to develop a self-conception that can in turn be compatible with his life.
Conversely, in the absence of this involvement he would not be able to properly assess his life in
a way that is useful to overcome alienation, because he would only count with a notion of himself
that is incompatible with his actual life, which cannot then be useful in redirecting him towards a
typical way of life. Therefore, he must partake in the habitual activities of the forms of life of a
community to develop a self-conception that is useful in regulating his interactions with others by
adopting their attitudes towards him (Mead 1972 138). Moreover, he needs a self-conception that
is in accordance with a life that is ordinary in character if he is going to value at a bare minimum
the act of planning his future and if he is going to remember his past as his own. All of this
involves, once more, adopting a holistic outlook on his life, so that he can understand its
unfolding as being that of a class of life he finds worth living.
Meanwhile, with particular regard to the issue of the use of self-conception, the main
conclusion of Part Two can be recapitulated by appeal to the Two-Moment View, which is a
dynamic account meant to address it. There is indeed a partial use to our self-conception
depending on the type of moment we find ourselves in. For example, as we adopt the beliefs and
attitudes that others have towards us, we presently become an object of our own awareness by
coordinating our action based on that of others (138). In addition, this notion has a use while
deliberating with ourselves about what is the best course of action to undertake in the future, as
we learn from past events by thinking of ourselves one way or the other in a given situation. Selfconception also has a purpose when employed in counterfactual thought, as we conceive of
ourselves based on how others would see us, given how we extend the beliefs and attitudes of
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others towards us in the actual world to possible worlds. In virtue of this extension, we fashion a
notion of ourselves and of what we would do if certain conditions were met. Other times,
however, our self-conception can be rather detrimental to action, as Dreyfus shows, specifically
when we overanalyze our performance in ways that can deteriorate its quality while acting (2007
354). Canfield notes as well that if we become self-absorbed in the concept we have of ourselves
to the extent that we cannot see past how we perceive our own life, this can produce a level of
anxiety (1990 223) that can hardly help us engage with the world. This way, we could become
paralyzed, thus not being able to participate in the world of life effectively, namely, in the way
required for overcoming the sort of alienation discussed in Chapter III. Still, we have observed
that even in these cases we cannot completely do away with the sense we have of ourselves, even
while performing a task ‘in the flow’. In such moments, at best we get to push our self-conception
to the back of our minds so that it does not interfere with our performance and engagement with
others. The point is to not monitor excessively our behavior whenever this can lead us to
dissociate ourselves from our action and interaction with other persons.
Generally speaking, another upshot worth stressing is that, inasmuch as an ordinary
human being gains both a personal identity and a self-conception by participating in the customs
and institutions of the forms of life of a community, he does not have an ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ that
predates his contingent sociocultural interaction with other human forms of life. This is, he has no
prior identity, or method of acquiring a self-conception, independently of what are his interactions
with others; say, an inherent psychological faculty (e.g., the capacity of reasoning) or a biological
property (such as being an animal) upon which he could determine what his personal identity or
self-conception consists of. Quite the contrary, whether seen in respect to his practical or
phenomenological dimension, a human being makes his personal identity and acquires a self-
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conception in relation to other persons by partaking in their customs and activities. It follows that
a human being has no essential, primitive trait upon which his identity is definable or his selfconception obtainable regardless of which is his concrete life, the roles he plays in it, and how
others view him.
This implies that having a personal identity would be a rather difficult, fragmentary
achievement to work out as it involves more than simply being a ‘human being’, whether we
understand by this a Homo sapiens, a rational animal, or a member of the moral community (Cf.
I.3). For we do not address the issue of personal identity by responding to the question “What am
I?” which can instead be properly answered by presenting a locus of quantity, this is, by pointing
to what we share and makes us alike: for example, our forms of life, which include our customs,
institutions, and habits; our biological properties and functions; our psychological attributes and
capacities such as the ability of reasoning; our moral dignity and worth, all of which could be
argued to constitute our specific difference. Meanwhile, by addressing the question “Who am I?”
we would tackle the problem of personal identity, as it asks for the singularity of our person, for
what makes us a unique individual as opposed to a member of a biological or moral community.
To satisfy this question, we would then have to offer a locus of quality in order to select what is
unique to a high degree in the human being we are. But still, this would not be something
essentially inner or intrinsic to our person such as an ‘inner self’ or ‘soul’. It would have to do
instead with how we qualify our particular form of life, singling out the aspects that give it
distinctiveness as a concrete value, as opposed to what is found in the ordinary lives of other
humans. For example, it would comprise a list of the social roles that we play in our lifetime, our
physical appearance, the demeanor and way of speaking that is peculiar to us, our general
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temperament and sense of humor, our life story, and other aspects that shape us into the unique
persons we are.
Hence, the question demanding the reference of ‘I’ is ambiguous, since from one point of
view it refers to a mundane human person with a concrete life, which is expressed by responding
to the question of who am I, whereas from another standpoint it refers to a member of the class
‘human being’, whether this is taken as a biological or moral category, and it would involve
responding to the question of what am I. Olson conveys this point nicely when he claims that the
problem of personal identity suffers from an equivocation in its formulation (1997 42). He
explains that if something individualizes any human being into a single thing capable of
persevering over a lifetime, it would in principle exclude the attributes that we all (or most of us)
share, given our common human nature. In effect, if something makes us the distinct people we
apparently are, a substance concept such as ‘human animal’ or ‘ordinary human being’ would not
be satisfactory. For if we are supposed to speak to the differences that give uniqueness or
singularity to the beings we are despite our obviously recognizable physical and psychological
disparities, then the aforementioned substance concepts would not exhaust aspects of our concrete
humanity in a way that can help us specify what our personal identity consists of. Having a
personal identity, as mentioned above, has instead to do with leading a particular person life in the
context of the forms of life afforded by a community (Schechtman 2014 139), so that selecting a
substance concept would not work.
To conclude, the importance of this proposal can be seen in how it is meant to ease the
potential anxiety caused by the notion that there is no fundamental, compulsory ‘track’, if you
will, to which our life must adjust in order to acquire ‘sense’ or ‘purpose’ or else be alienated in
an absolute way. The preoccupation we may have about how our life unfolds or what it would
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ultimately amount to could be attenuated in the realization that we have no ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ in
virtue of which our personal identity could otherwise be specified or based on which we would
acquire selfhood. Since the type of ‘correction’ of the way we live would not be based on an
“agreement … in opinions, but rather in form of life” (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations
§ 241), our existential problem about what grounds the judgments on how well we have lived
would dissipate as long as we live in accordance with the forms of life of a community. For there
are no grounds external to the agreement in our forms of life upon which these judgments are
founded. Indeed, there would be no ‘correct’ way of living independently of what our agreements
in life form entail, such that the necessity of our practices rests on nothing more than these.
This might still produce anxiety because we might not want that responsibility on us.
Many would prefer the burden being on an external source based upon which the sense or purpose
of human life would be a matter of fact. But why would the idea that the judgment on how our life
unfolds ultimately depends on the contingency of our natural history make us anxious? If, after
all, there can only be ‘human necessity’, so to speak, such that it could not be otherwise –which
means that there could not have been an external, necessary ‘track’ our lives would adjust to–,
why would this terrify us? For if there could not be transcendence grounding the sense or purpose
of human life, our agreements in form of life, the necessity of our practices, and so on, it seems
like we are merely longing for something that could not ever be. Our anxiety seems thus to be the
product of craving for something to justify our practices when in fact they do not require of any
such foundation.
From the phenomenological perspective, making an analogous point can help us
appreciate the value of our inquiry. Even if the conception we have of life’s structure in general
can worry us to the extent that we end up problematizing our own life, what terrifies us cannot be
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the fact that life occurs the way it does. Just because there is no foundational sense or purpose to
our life, this does not imply that our alienated life is ‘good’ as it stands. We are not more
‘authentic’ when we renounce to live a typical life because we have discovered that there is no
essentially ‘correct’ paradigmatic way of life. For if there could not be a compulsory foundation
external to our forms of life upon which our own life could be grounded, why would we think that
we can find genuine ‘sense’ through living an alienated life? By understanding the ‘purpose’ of
life in an alternative, distanced way, a person might dissociate himself from his ordinary life but
would still not find a self-conception to conciliate with, for he would not have acquired that way a
clear-cut personal identity to reflect in his self-conception. He would have thus watered down his
identity, and as this is precisely partly the source of his anxiety, he can begin to mitigate it by
living in agreement with an ordinary form of life. In consequence, as his self-conception would
present him in this agreement with life, it would be of actual use to him insofar as it would at least
not be any longer in conflict with how, roughly speaking, human life is normally conceived. This
way, even if there would always be opportunities for his self-conception and person life to
mismatch, he can encounter means to combat his anxiety by readapting to the forms of life of a
community. This is possible as he modifies how he perceives life in general, for this would enable
him to reconceive his own life in an unproblematic fashion.
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